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Abstract 
Privatization became a major component of economic policy around the world since 
the mid-1980s despite the conflicting theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
for this policy. The inconclusive evidence, apart from reflecting genuine differences 
among countries and industries under investigation, is also the result of 
methodological and empirical problems this literature is beset with. This provides the 
motivation for this research project which intends to contribute to the literature by 
addressing some of these problems and also by applying it to a particular set of 
countries, the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, that have been either not 
studied at all or not studied as a group despite the fact that they share the same history 
and the same economic, political and social background which are distinct from other 
transition economies. As with the established empirical literature in the field, the 
research focuses on the impact of privatization on the performance of firms in the 
broad context of the neoclassical theory and its extensions.  
The thesis aims at investigating the impact of privatization on companies’ 
performance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Slovenia, independent countries that emerged from the disintegration of 
the former Yugoslavia. In doing so, this thesis initially embarks on a critical review of 
theoretical and empirical literature, identifying their theoretical predictions and 
assessing their empirical validity, highlighting a variety of methodological problems 
from which the previous studies have suffered. The empirical investigation of this 
thesis uses Stochastic Frontier Analysis to estimate the efficiency of companies with 
different ownership structures. It also addressed the issue of missing data by 
employing a multiple imputation procedure. In addition, policy evaluation 
econometrics using matched difference-in-difference estimators is employed for 
estimating the causal relationship between ownership transformation and companies’ 
performance. Special attention is paid to addressing the issue of selection bias which 
is the main challenge in evaluating the effect of privatization. 
The empirical results suggest that privatization is associated with improvement in 
companies’ performance in terms of technical efficiency and sales levels, while it is 
associated with a significant drop in employment levels. Also, privatization is 
associated with improvement in performance over time. The results suggest that there 
is some heterogeneity across countries, industries and ownership types. In particular, 
they show that the average efficiency scores of companies in the successor states vary 
systematically across these countries with Slovenian companies being the most 
efficient, followed by those in Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia i.e., 
in some order of institutional and economic development in the region.
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Preface 
Privatization has been a major component of economic policy around the world 
during the last four decades. It was part of a reconsideration of the role of the state in 
the economy, both in developed and developing countries, which was settled in 
favour of the view that state involvement had been excessive, and that the private 
ownership would raise both allocative and technical efficiency (defined in the context 
of the neoclassical theory and the assumption of optimising firms), leading to greater 
economic well-being. While over half a century ago, there was general support for 
public ownership in a variety of the so-called ‘strategic’ industries, the following 
decades witnessed a shift towards the support for the return of these industries to 
private ownership. This was primarily encouraged by well-documented poor 
performance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as well as by the return to prominence 
of theoretical propositions that support private ownership over public ownership. The 
theoretical arguments, however, do not seem to have provided a definitive prediction 
on the relation between ownership and performance. A large body of empirical 
literature on the subject also failed to provide conclusive evidence on the relationship 
between the ownership form and performance of companies. 
In spite of inconclusive theoretical and empirical arguments, the privatization policy 
has been embraced by governments around the globe soon after Mrs Thatcher’s 
Conservative government embarked on its privatization programme in the UK.  The 
last major region to embrace the privatization policy was Central and Eastern Europe. 
Privatization in this region was part of the broader effort to transform the countries of 
the region from command to market economies. As the scope and size of the state 
sector in these economies was much wider and larger than in Western countries, the 
scale and scope of privatization in the former was much greater and more diverse than 
in the latter.  
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The impact of ownership transformation on companies’ performance has been the 
subject of extensive research. However the evidence is still somewhat mixed. While 
differences in results can reflect genuine heterogeneity among countries and 
industries under investigation, they may also be due to a variety of empirical 
problems that have been largely overlooked in the current literature. This provides 
the motivation for this research project which intends to contribute in filling a gap in 
the literature by remedying some of these problems. Also, this thesis covers a 
particular set of countries that have not been investigated jointly, and some of them 
not individually, despite the fact that they were part of the same country and under 
the same economic system for nearly half a century.  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the impact of privatization on companies’ 
performance in successor states of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia). This thesis addresses 
the following specific research questions: does ownership matter, in theory and 
practise; weather private companies perform better then SOEs; whether foreign 
companies display better performance compared to domestic de-novo private 
companies and SOEs; whether following privatization, firms improve their 
performance measured in terms of selected performance indicators; and whether there 
is any difference in performance of companies across the six countries under 
consideration?  
As this list indicates, the thesis is a purely microeconomic study within the framework 
of the neoclassical theory and its extensions and the assumption of optimising firms. 
As with the established empirical literature on privatisation (such as Megginson and 
Netter, 2001; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Estrin et al., 2009), it focuses on the impact 
of this policy the performance of the firm measured by productivity or efficiency as 
defined in the broad framework of neoclassical theory and its extensions. The thesis 
does not investigate the macroeconomic implications of the privatization policy such 
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as the potential increase in unemployment in the aftermath of large scale privatisation 
– issues which are beyond the scope of this study. 
The main motivation and the importance of this thesis is in its contribution to current 
literature on privatization, especially in the context of successor states of former 
Yugoslavia. The novelty of the research in this thesis is that it uses up-to-date 
econometric techniques that have not been previously applied in the context of the 
countries that are in the focus of this thesis. These approaches try to remedy some of 
the problems that are often overlooked in the current literature on the impact of 
privatization. Another novelty of this research is that it addresses the missing data 
problem, which again is largely overlooked in existing studies.  
The research questions are investigated by initially embarking on a critical review of 
theoretical and empirical literature. This is done in order to identify theoretical 
predictions and assess their empirical validity as well as guide our own empirical 
research in later Chapters. The empirical methodology relies on cross-sectional and 
panel data analyses employing Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) as well as policy 
evaluation econometric techniques combining matching methods with difference-in-
difference estimators. The empirical methodology takes into account the potential 
problems that have been largely ignored in the current literature. The data used for 
the empirical part include survey data from the World Bank and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) which cover six successor states of 
former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia); as 
well as survey data from the Riinvest Institute for Development Research, which 
covers Kosovo.  
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 covers two dimensions. First, it outlines 
the major theoretical framework behind the ownership debate. Here special attention 
is paid to theoretical foundations on which privatization rests, including key elements 
of property rights theory, public choice theory, and principal agent theory among 
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others. However, a theoretical case for state ownership is also presented. Secondly, it 
reviews privatization as a policy, with the focus in the context of Transition Economies 
(TEs). The privatization process in this region was part of a broader effort to transform 
the countries of the region from command to market economies. Therefore it 
highlights an important point: the empirical analysis must distinguish the effects of 
privatization from that of other reforms carried out around the same time. This 
Chapter maintains the idea that theoretical predictions are not self-
evident propositions and that one has to necessarily turn to empirical evidence for 
more conclusive understanding.  
Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the empirical literature on the impact of 
privatization on companies’ performance particularly in the context of TEs. The 
empirical literature on this topic is vast and the number of relevant studies in TEs’ 
contexts is far beyond a hundred. Thus, this chapter was selective rather than 
exhaustive, focusing on the studies that were published after the year 2000. Special 
attention was paid to the performance measures used; the methodological issues and 
strategies; and the sample coverage of individual studies. This Chapter complements 
the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 in establishing the analytical framework for the 
impact of ownership on companies’ performance in Chapters 4 and 6.  
Chapter 3 discusses the nature of social ownership in former Yugoslavia as a form of 
ownership distinct from other TEs. It also summarises the ownership transformation 
before and after the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation by reviewing common and 
distinctive features of privatization methods employed in the successor states. This 
Chapter also reviews the limited empirical evidence on the impact of privatization on 
the performance of emerging private companies in these countries, pointing out their 
shortcomings. The Chapter examines the main aspects of ownership and performance 
in this specific context and, as such, informs the investigation that is undertaken in 
Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 embarks on an empirical investigation of the efficiency of companies in the 
successor states of the former Yugoslavia, focusing on the effect of ownership. From 
policy perspective, the measurement of efficiency and the analysis of the gap between 
efficient and inefficient companies is of particular importance. This Chapter starts by 
discussing the concept of efficiency, in particular Technical Efficiency, which is the 
measure of interest in this Chapter. After an extensive and detailed discussion of 
alternative methods of estimation of efficiency, the Chapter explains the choice of SFA 
as the preferred method of estimation. Issues such as functional form of the 
production function and distributional assumptions about the efficiency term and the 
error term are subject to an exhaustive discussion. This Chapter also employs a 
simulation based extension of the Heckman selection model for nonlinear models (as 
proposed by Greene, 2006) in order to control for selection bias problem, which is 
largely ignored in the literature. The missing data problem, which is another endemic 
problem in studies using survey data, is often overlooked in the literature. Ignoring 
the missing data might introduce bias of unknown size and direction in the estimation 
process. It also involves implicitly making a more restrictive assumption that data is 
the missing ‘completely at random’. This Chapter deals with this problem by using 
the ‘Multiple Imputation’ procedure after a careful consideration of different 
approaches. A step-by-step presentation of this process in presented along with 
detailed discussion of each step. This process has increased the sample size by around 
44 percent.  
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the privatization process in Kosovo. Privatization 
in Kosovo was distinct from other successor states of former Yugoslavia as well as 
from other TEs due to its political and economic specificities. Here, these specificities 
are discussed in details, including a background of Kosovo’s economy within former 
Yugoslavia till now. Chapter 5 presents the relevant background information on the 
privatization process in Kosovo and provides the context of empirical investigation 
which is conducted in the following Chapter. 
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Chapter 6 provides an empirical analysis of privatization induced performance 
improvements in Kosovo companies. A novelty of this chapter is the use of policy 
evaluation econometrics in assessing the impact of privatization on companies’ 
performance. Methods like Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) are discussed in details. Here a combination of the matching 
estimators with difference-in-difference is employed, which is expected to deal with 
various methodological problems and improve the precision of estimates 
significantly. The choice of the method is preceded by careful consideration of its 
relative merits compared to other estimation strategies. This methodology is 
especially capable in addressing the selection bias problem which is endemic in the 
existing literature. Using matched difference in difference estimators, in a balanced 
panel dataset, changes in two performance measures, sales (measured by real sales) 
and the number of employees, are estimated. By using a control group of companies 
that were subject to similar business environment, and benefiting from longitudinal 
data, the effect of aggregate shocks are stripped off from the effects of ownership 
transformation. This allowed us to isolate the impact of privatization on companies’ 
performance. This is particularly important in the context of the massive systemic 
change in Kosovo where privatization, as argued, was part of larger reforms which 
can confound the estimates if not accounted for.  
Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of the thesis as well as its contributions to 
the current literature. This Chapter also points out the limitations of this research and 
suggestions on the avenues along which this research can be further extended. Finally, 
some policy implications are also presented.  
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Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks to outline the main conceptual 
framework and theoretical foundations underpinning the ownership debate.1 
Secondly, it reviews privatization as a policy; especially in the context of 
Transition Economies (TEs).2 The debate about the size and scope of the 
government in the economy has been a part of the economics discipline since 
its inception and it is still on-going. The answers given to the fundamental 
questions arising from this debate, and the underlying reasons for these 
answers, have been constantly changing. While in the period after WWII, there 
was a large tendency to support government ownership, the following decades 
witnessed the rise of strands of literature that made a case against the state 
ownership.3 The latter were primarily fuelled by dissatisfaction with the actual 
performance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as well as by the return to 
prominence of theoretical prepositions supporting private ownership.4  
There are several distinct conceptual frameworks which underpin the 
privatization debate. They range from those that fall in the area of economics 
to those that contemplate the privatization process as a political mechanism 
which allows the government to advance noneconomic goals (Hodge, 2000). 
Both will be given sufficient attention in this Chapter.   
                                                        
1 It is largely accepted that the term privatization was coined by Drucker (1969). See for 
instance: Hodge (2000, p. 13), Savas (2000, p. 15), Johnson and Walzer (2000, p. 3), Greene (2002, 
p. 27), Megginson and Netter (2003, p. 31), and Megginson (2005, p. 15). Bel (2006) suggests that 
the term privatization has appeared much earlier in literature; citing the 1961 Webster 
Dictionary of English language as the first source.  
2 Privatization is spelled with “z” or “s”. While British spelling is used throughout this thesis, 
still privatization is spelled with “z” in line with dominant use in current literature. Megginson 
and Netter (2001) find that the vast majority of papers they surveyed use “z” spelling. 
3 A concise survey of this debate is provided by Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Shleifer (1998). 
4 In Yugoslavia and its successor states, the concept of State Owned Enterprise was replaced by 
Socially Owned Enterprise (the abbreviation remaining the same, SOE). The differences will be 
discussed in greater details in Chapter 3.  
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Governments embarking on the privatization process have articulated, both 
explicitly and implicitly, different objectives for the reform. Most of the cited 
reasons underline that SOEs are inherently less efficient. This premise seems 
less ambiguous in cases where companies operate in competitive markets, 
which are largely immune from substantial market failures and there is no goal 
ambiguity. However, as soon as any market imperfections are present, or even 
suspected, the theory becomes less conclusive. It becomes especially 
controversial when companies are thought to pursue some social objectives as 
opposed to simply maximize profits.  
Despite the inconclusiveness of the ownership debate, privatization of SOEs 
became a major economic policy of many countries during the last several 
decades leading to thousands of state owned firms becoming private during 
this period. Soon after Mrs Thatcher’s Conservative government came to power 
in the UK, the privatization agenda started to evolve globally and this period 
is considered by many as the beginning of the dominance of modern 
privatization paradigm (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Shortly after the UK, 
privatization programmes spread rapidly among both developed and 
developing countries around the world. The last major region to embark on 
privatization was Central and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the socialist system. The privatization process in this region was 
part of broader effort to transform themselves from command to market 
economies (Estrin, 1994; Estrin et al., 2009). As the scope of the state sector in 
former socialist countries was more wide spread and different in nature than 
in Western countries, the scope of privatization was much greater and more 
diverse.  
This chapter intends to set the scene for the theoretical and empirical findings 
presented in the latter part of this thesis. Given the large range of discussions 
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on privatization, this chapter had to be selective rather than exhaustive, 
focusing on the main strands of literature on the ownership debate and 
privatization.5 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 
presents the main strands of the ownership debate. It starts from the 
neoclassical point of view which largely overlooks the importance of 
ownership and rather focuses on the importance of market structures in 
generating efficient outcomes. It then relaxes some of the assumptions to 
emphasize the importance of ownership. Here, the theoretical case for state 
ownership as well as the theoretical case for private ownership are presented. 
At this point, particular attention is paid to theories supporting privatization 
(such as property rights theory, public choice theory and principal agent 
theory) while also highlighting their shortcomings. Section 1.2 presents 
privatization as a policy. Here the emphasis is on TEs given that the focus of 
this thesis is on that context. Several elements required some explanation when 
analysing the privatization process in TEs. This section therefore analyses 
elements related to: sequencing of privatization; privatization vs. de novo 
private sector development and the importance of competition; restructuring 
and privatization; methods of privatization used in TEs as well as the size of 
privatization proceeds in TEs relative to their GDP. Section 1.3 concludes.  
1.1 The ownership debate 
 
The ownership debate has been part of the economic discourse for a long time; 
however, it peaked in the 1980s and 1990s as the privatization reforms spread out 
in both developing and developed countries. This debate has shifted from one 
largely favouring government ownership over half a century ago, to one largely 
supporting private ownership in subsequent decades (Shleifer, 1998). From the 
                                                        
5 A more extensive survey of this literature is provided Megginson and Netter (2001) and 
Megginson (2005).  
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neoclassical point of view, a perfectly competitive market, free of externalities with 
perfect information flow can lead to a Pareto optimal equilibrium solution (no 
redistribution of goods or productive resources can improve the position of one 
individual without making at least one other individual worse off). In these 
instances, the ownership per se is rendered unimportant. This neutrality outcome 
serves as a suitable benchmark which is valid only under very restrictive 
assumptions. However, when these assumptions do not hold or are relaxed, then 
ownership is expected to matter.  This section reviews the ownership debate by 
comparatively analysing the theoretical case for state ownership and private 
ownership. Here, a summary of main results in the economic theory of 
privatization is provided which are needed to guide the review of the empirical 
evidence in Chapter 2 and to channel our own empirical research in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 6.  
 
1.1.1 Theoretical case for state ownership  
State ownership enjoyed popularity for decades, especially during the post–
Second World War period (Shirley and Walsh, 2001). The fundamental reasons 
for state ownership broadly fall under two categories. First, state ownership is 
justified by the shortcomings of the market outcomes and is hence viewed as a 
remedy for many market failures. Secondly, state ownership has been regarded 
as an instrument for the attainment of non-economic goals (Grout and Stevens, 
2003). Both of these reasons need further attention.  
The theoretical case for public ownership, according to neo-classical economic 
theory, rests on the perceived solution to market failures. This case has tended 
to focus mainly on market failures associated with, among others, public goods 
and imperfect competition. Neoclassical economics was used to support the 
idea that public goods should be produced by companies owned by the 
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government. These goods have the following distinguishing features. First, 
there is a non-excludability from consuming the good (i.e. it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to exclude those who do not want to pay for the goods from 
consuming them). Second, the collective consumption feature which states that 
additional consumers of the goods do not deplete the quantity of the goods. 
The problems with provision of these goods are both from demand and supply 
sides. On the demand side, markets fail to produce sufficient level of public 
goods because consumers tend to free ride on others; hence no consumer is 
willing to pay for the full cost of the public good. On the supply side, companies 
are reluctant to produce a good for which they cannot recoup the marginal 
value of their investment. Therefore, public ownership is viewed as a solution 
to this market failure situation.  
Market failures due to imperfect competition, which appear mainly in the 
presence of natural monopolies, enjoying large economies of scale, are another 
example providing some justification for public ownership.6 Proponents of 
public ownership argue that private ownership of natural monopolies will lead 
to output levels below the optimum level and prices above the marginal cost 
(Megginson, 2005). Given that government is not constrained to profit-
maximising objective, publicly-owned natural monopoly can increase output 
to optimal level and reduce prices to the marginal cost level (though at such 
levels they may suffer losses) (Shleifer, 1998).  
The opponents argue that pubic ownership is not the only solution to natural 
monopolies and that regulation of these monopolies can be considered as an 
alternative.7 In this type of market failure, the focus of the literature turns 
                                                        
6 Similar argument is used also for other monopoly distortions, where the price/marginal cost 
equality is disturbed, leading to allocative inefficiency. 
7 An excellent summary of the regulatory literature is provided by Laffont and Tirole (1993) 
and Laffont (1994).   
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towards whether state ownership or regulation of private monopoly yields 
more optimal results. According to Laffont and Tirole (1993), this largely 
depends on the ability to design complete contracts. If contracts are complete, 
the result would be the same between regulation of private monopoly and 
public ownership. In case when contracts are incomplete, the results will be 
different. Similarly, Adam, Cavendish and Mistry (1992) suggest that the 
results would depend on regulatory capacities. Regulation of private natural 
monopolies as a second-best alternative is viewed as ineffective and inefficient 
by supporters of public ownership. This is due to several reasons, including 
information asymmetries which put private owners in a better bargaining 
position over regulators; the complexity of regulating multiproduct companies; 
the risk of regulatory capture and overcapitalisation (the so-called Averch -
Johnson effect’) (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989).8,9 Also, Sappington and Stiglitz 
(1987) make a case for public ownership in the view that this lowers 
transactions costs faced by the government when attempting to intervene in 
economic affairs.  
Methods to address regulatory failure are also part of this discussion. Demsetz 
(1968), Kay and Thompson (1986) and Bishop and Kay (1989) suggest that 
competition at entry level could mimic competitive behaviour in non-
competitive markets. Similarly, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) propose a system 
which would allow regulators to reward companies’ efforts to enhance 
efficiency. However, it is suggested that in reality these solutions are hardly 
                                                        
8 The Averch–Johnson effect is the tendency of regulated companies to engage in excessive 
amounts of capital accumulation in order to expand the volume of their profits. If companies' 
profits to capital ratio is regulated at a certain percentage then there is a strong incentive for 
companies to over-invest in order to increase profits overall. This investment goes beyond any 
optimal efficiency point for capital that the company may have calculated as higher profit is 
almost always desired over and above efficiency. For details, see (Averch and Johnson, 1962).  
9 It is important to point out that these four problems could also be faced by managers of SOEs 
(Shirley and Walsh, 2001).  
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attainable (Shirley and Walsh, 2001).10 Moreover, the success of such methods 
largely depends on the institutional environment (Shapiro and Willing, 1990; 
Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Shirley, Kikeri and Nellis, 1992). Despite potential 
problems, countries with more developed regulatory infrastructure are 
expected to be more capable of privatizing and regulating firms operating in 
non-competitive markets. The regulation is expected to be even more 
problematic in less-developed countries (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988). So state 
ownership is cited as a potential remedy for this type of market failure, 
primarily in the absence of strong regulators (Shirley and Walsh, 2001).  
Another reason for public ownership relates to the ability of government to 
pursue non-economic objectives seeking to maximise social welfare, even at a 
tolerable loss of economic efficiency (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989; Yarrow, 1986; 
Willner, 1996). This assumes that government has the appropriate social 
welfare function as an objective. Such function may include policies that 
facilitate regional development, reduce inequality, paying above-equilibrium 
wages and increasing employment, among others (Choksi, 1979; Megginson, 
2005).  In other words, policies that otherwise would not necessarily be pursued 
by the private sector. This framework assumes that political markets (the 
competition between politicians) are efficient. In case that political markets 
work efficiently, public ownership – in theory – has the right potential to 
maximise social welfare, i.e. the sum of producer and consumer surplus. 
However, in case of failures in political markets, the appropriateness of the set 
social objective cannot be tested nor challenged. Shirley and Walsh (2001) 
suggest that studies advocating a social welfare maximising paradigm fail to 
provide any evidence that social benefits can offset efficiency loss. As such, 
                                                        
10 As far as competition at entry level is concerned, Williamson (1976) and Goldberg (1976) 
suggest that this condition is improbable due to incumbent advantages, information 
asymmetries or collusion.  
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according to these author, the comparisons are arbitrary. Moreover, other ways 
of attaining social objectives are not discussed. Also, the theoretical case for 
public ownership rests on the assumption that the behaviour of the 
government is benevolent. This assumption has been challenged by opponents 
of public ownership to which we turn in the next section.  
 
1.1.2 Theoretical case for privatization 
As argued in the previous section, the case for state ownership, as far as efficiency 
is concerned, rests on the argument that, in cases of market failure, public 
ownership can serve as a remedy. It also assumes that governments act 
benevolently. In contrast, privatization rests on perception that state ownership 
has failed (i.e., there is ‘government failure’) either due to vaguely defined 
property rights or due to the behaviour of the government and its agents. There 
are several theoretical foundations on which privatization is based, including key 
elements of property rights theory, public choice theory, and principal agent 
theory among others. Each of these concepts support the view that privatization 
improves efficiency through better incentives, organizational performance and 
control. These theories basically argue that SOEs’ relative inefficiency is primarily 
a function of ownership, and also a function of the behaviour of government and 
its agents. However, there is another strand of literature that argues that 
competition is more important than merely ownership. This line of thought 
maintains that SOEs largely operate in non-competitive environment (primarily 
because of restrictions on competition imposed by governments) and that the 
relative inefficiency of SOEs is also a function of lack of competition. This section 
will initially discusses theories that support private ownership, including property 
rights theory; public choice theory and principal agent theory. The last part of this 
section will briefly discuss the effects of competition.  
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Property rights theory 
The issue of property rights was largely overlooked in economics until the late 
1960s; the use and allocation of property rights were generally taken as given. 
The subsequent years saw the rise to prominence of the idea that property 
rights are important and that their arrangement cannot be taken for granted. 
Property rights theory argues that the discrepancy in performance between 
state- and private- owned firms is a function of their ownership arrangement 
(Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Furubotn and Pejovich 1972; De Alessi, 1987). 
According to the property rights school, private ownership is believed to 
improve corporate performance through incentives, with the market system as 
disciplinary mechanisms for allocating resources efficiently. Also, it is argued 
that property rights provide an incentive to pursue long-term rather than short 
term economic goals (Soto, 1996). In cases when the property rights are not 
defined clearly and when the decision makers do not bear the cost nor enjoy 
the benefits of their decisions, they put the assets to inefficient use (Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). Similar outcomes are expected even in cases when 
property rights exist, but are loosely or poorly defined. The important 
implication of well-defined property rights is that it generates strong incentives 
for economic agents which in turn lead to better performance.  
Property rights, in a narrow sense, cover the control rights over assets and 
rights over cash flows generated by putting the assets to use. In case of an SOE, 
property rights are divided among various actors, including managers and 
politicians (who collectively split control rights) as well as the state treasury 
(who controls cash flow rights). According to property rights theory, 
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privatization should serve as a mean of unifying property rights in the hands 
of a single owner.11 
According to property rights theory, there are two important factors that lead 
to better performance of private companies compared to their public 
counterparts: first is the transferability of ownership; and the second, there is a 
risk-bearing associated with decision-making process under private ownership 
(Alchian, 1977). These factors are expected to have a significant impact on the 
monitoring system within the firms and incentives leading to greater efficiency 
and productivity in private companies. As far as the transferability of 
ownership is concerned, there is an important distinction between private and 
public ownership. While in former, the owner has the right to transfer property 
rights, in the latter, the owner (public at large) cannot transfer these rights. In 
the words of Alchian (1977, p. 139):  
“Public ownership must be borne by all members of the public, and no member 
can divest himself of that ownership. Ownership of public property is not voluntary; it 
is compulsory as long as one is a member of the public.”  
This implies that owners of public property cannot transfer property rights 
even if they are not satisfied with the performance of an SOE. The proportion 
of ownership that each member of the public holds is negligible, therefore they 
have insufficient incentives to monitor the performance of an SOE and its 
managers.12 Consequently, managers of SOEs have greater opportunity for 
shirking than their counterparts in private sector (Zeckhauser and Horn, 1989). 
                                                        
11 Property rights in private ownership setup are not necessarily concentrated on a single 
owner. They may be shared among more individual owners but they are clearly defined. In 
spite of this, concentration of property rights in smaller number of owners permits easier 
response to any agency problem (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). 
12 Davis (1971) argues that even in cases when ownership is equally dispersed in a private 
company, the monitoring is more efficient than in a case of an SOE. This is primarily because 
public at large essentially does not think of itself as being effective owners of SOEs.  
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Also, it is very costly for an individual owner to detect poor performance of the 
company. Even if poor performance is detected, the benefit from engagement 
in improvement of the performance is divided among all members of the 
public, lowering the incentives for monitoring and exercising ownership rights 
in the first place. In turn, the inability of owners to react is internalised by 
managers of SOEs who consequently are not compelled to improve 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Another reason for weak incentives 
is that SOEs are generally not subject to a bankruptcy constraint.  
Conversely, in a private company, the ownership rights are transferable. Under 
private ownership, poor performance is detected easier and owners can react 
by either selling their shares or engaging in better monitoring – or by 
dismissing the managers (the so-called ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ mechanisms). This 
puts pressure on managers who subsequently improve the performance of the 
company. As a result of transferability, it is expected that detection and 
disciplining of poor management is less costly. Also, the ability to transfer 
property rights allows owners to acquire shares of companies that are 
compatible with their skills based on comparative advantage principle. The 
resulting specialisation of ownership is expected to have efficiency-enhancing 
consequences by improving monitoring and decision-making process (Davis, 
1971).  
Another important factor discussed by the property rights theory is risk-
bearing. Given that property rights, in the case of public ownership, are divided 
among various parties, the risks and/or rewards are not borne by the decision 
makers. Lack of risk-bearing creates disincentives for SOE managers to seek the 
best use for assets. On the other hand, in the case of private ownership, the risk 
is borne by individual owners as property rights are concentrated and because 
they participate in the decision-making process by choice. Liability towards 
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risk increases the incentives of individual owners to actively participate in 
decision-making process and in monitoring.  This also encourages managers to 
improve performance.  
Property rights arrangements in private companies provide strong incentives 
for managers to pursue policies and decisions that maximise companies’ value 
(Pejovich, 1990).  In De Alessi’s words (1980, p. 27-28): 
"The crucial difference between private and publicly owned firms is that 
ownership in the latter effectively is non-transferable. Since this rules out specialization 
in their ownership, it inhibits the capitalization of future consequences into current 
transfer prices and reduces owners' incentives to monitor managerial behaviour."  
To summarise broadly, the property rights theory argues that ownership 
structure has a significant impact on companies’ productive efficiency and that 
ownership effects dominate other sources of performance variation between an 
SOE and a private company. However, according to Starr (1989), property 
rights theory fails to recognise other sources of discrepancy in performance 
which can be related to other factors (including, among others, size of the 
company, information asymmetry, ambiguity of goals or other incentives that 
are not related to property rights, such as contract incentives). Despite its 
shortcomings, property rights theory has served as the main theoretical 
rationale for privatization. This theory views privatization as a suitable 
reassignment of property rights.  
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Public choice theory 
The public choice theory has also been very influential in providing a 
supporting framework to justify privatization as a political reform.13 It focuses 
on the comparative efficiency of private and public sector (Parker, 1998). The 
public choice theory postulates that public sector is comparatively less efficient 
because of the idea that government agents maximise their own utility function 
rather than pursuing public goals, or the interest of the company (Buchanan, 
1972; Tullock, 1976; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). Thus, the role of the 
public sector, the argument goes, should be limited.  In fact, the advocates of 
the public choice theory counsel the reliance on private ownership which they 
expect to increase competition and improve efficiency. Downs (1967, p. 257) 
argues that: 
 "We can intuitively postulate that the total amount of waste and inefficiency 
in society is likely to rise as bureaucracy becomes more prominent. This seems probable 
because true waste is so much harder to define and detect in bureaus than in private 
firms. Also, there are no automatic mechanisms for limiting it in the former as in the 
latter. This admittedly untestable conclusion implies that society should arrange to 
have services produced by market-oriented firms rather than bureaus, when possible, 
other things being equal." 
The public choice theory rests on two basic arguments: (i) that individual 
preferences cannot be aggregated into coherent social ordering and (ii) that 
individuals are rational own utility-maximisers. Both of these arguments 
deserve some explanation. The first problem that this theory addresses is the 
difficulty of coordinating multiple actors and aggregating preferences in 
collective decision-making. As every agent pursues own utility maximisation, 
                                                        
13 Linowes (1990) suggests that teachings of the public choice theory were the main arguments 
that motivated contemporary privatisation movement in the United States. 
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hardly any integrated goal can be designed. One way to surpass this problem 
is to use unanimity as a decision-making rule in setting an optimal collective 
choice. However, even if only one individual is worse off from the collective 
choice, the decision will not be made. Therefore the unanimity hardly seems 
practical. Instead, a majority voting rule can be considered as an alternative 
decision-making rule. Even though the latter avoids problems arising from 
unanimity, still it cannot provide a definite and stable choice. Instead, the result 
will be ‘cycling’ since each choice produces different majority with no non-
arbitrary stopping point.14 Multiple and frequently changing objectives of these 
enterprises arising from government’s attempts to accommodate diverse 
interest groups also exacerbates agency problems since outcomes of managerial 
decisions become more difficult to measure and monitor (Estrin and Perotin, 
1991). 
The second argument focuses on the behaviour of economic agents which is 
considered to be rational utility-maximising. In the words of one of the leading 
authors of the public choice theory, Buchanan (1978, pp. 17): ‘People should be 
treated as rational utility maximisers in all their behavioural capacity’. Centred on 
the rational choice model, the public choice theory does not justify the reliance 
on public ownership as a solution to market failures and increasing economic 
efficiency. The public choice theory holds that self-maximizing behaviour in a 
private market setting leads to benevolent outcome while in public decision 
making process the effects are detrimental (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; 
Niskanen, 1971; Borcherding, 1977).  
The public choice theory maintains that government agents are inclined to 
pursue their own interests, or that of interest groups, rather than the interests 
                                                        
14 This is known as Kenneth Arrow’s ‘impossibility theorem’ which shows that, if certain 
conditions hold, no decision-making rule can translate the individual preferences into a well-
behaved social utility function.  
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of the public at large (Buchanan, 1978; Mueller, 1984; Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1996). Moreover, the gain that may be achieved by utility maximising 
agents is positively correlated with the size of an SOE under their supervision 
(Niskanen, 1971; Buchanan, 1977; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). In turn, 
this prompts government agents to seek to increase the size of an SOE rather 
than focusing on improving its performance.15 This is primarily present in cases 
of ambiguity of goals and policies that government agents pursue (Niskanen, 
1971). Moreover, given that SOE managers are subject to soft budget constraints 
and have access to finance at discounted interest rates, they are encouraged to 
use more capital (Niskanen, 1968; De Alessi, 1969). In turn, this leads to another 
major distortion as government agents – who are in office for a limited period 
– will concentrate on short-term rather than long-terms plans concerning the 
SOE.   
SOEs are viewed by many as a way for government to advance social goals at 
a tolerable expense in terms of economic efficiency (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989; 
Willner, 1996). Along those lines, Okun (1975) argues that governments use 
SOEs to pursue equality in income distribution. However, the transferring 
mechanism by which this (re)distribution is conducted can lead to waste of 
public resources and inefficiency in resource allocation. Also, following the 
rational choice assumption, the major beneficiaries will be the government 
agents in charge of the process, i.e. the benefits are concentrated with SOEs’ 
managers and politicians while costs are dispersed among the public at large. 
Other interest groups, such as unions, can also benefit by using their bargaining 
power through rent-seeking. In this context, according to Sunstein (1990, p. 70), 
rent-seeking is defined as a waste of wealth through (re)distribution efforts by 
politicians rather than production of wealth through markets. In cases when 
                                                        
15 Buchanan (1977) points out that this explains the spreading out of public sector and excess 
labour in SOEs.    
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managers of SOEs and politicians try to maximize their own benefits or 
electoral interests, the outcome is expected to be inconsistent with efficiency. 
The company managers under public ownership are not exposed to 
disciplining effect of the market; they expect to be bailed out when in trouble 
with the excuse of serving public or social goals. The public choice theory also 
puts emphasis on competition against ownership. This feature of public choice 
theory distinguishes it from property rights theory which suggests that it is 
ownership per se that affects performance and efficiency (Vining and 
Boardman, 1992; Miranda, 1994).  
The public choice theory has faced important criticisms related to its 
underlying assumptions. Firstly, it is argued the assumption that agents are 
self-interested utility maximisers is a simplistic assumption. While it is agreed 
that self-interest is an important element of agents’ behaviour, it is not the only 
motivation (Boston, 1991; Self, 1993). Similarly, in cases when political markets 
work efficiently, self-interest is slightly mitigated. Secondly, the public choice 
theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions lack empirical 
validation.16 Despite its shortcomings, public choice theory has provided a 
crucial supporting framework for privatization.   
 
Principal-agent theory 
The principal-agent theory relies on the assumption that control and ownership 
in a company (be that public or private) are separated. Therefore, the principal 
and the agent enter into a contracting arrangement. Given that these parties 
may not share the same set of interests (i.e. they have diverging interests), the 
agency problem arises. The agency problem also arises due to the inability of 
the principle to monitor and control the agent due to asymmetry of information 
                                                        
16 This issues is further elaborated in Chapter 2.  
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Walker and 
Vasconcellos, 1997). The principal-agent theory has attracted significant 
interest in the privatization literature as it can explain differences in the agency 
problem in public and private sector.  
According to Vickers and Yarrow (1989), the principal-agent relation in private 
companies is different from that in SOEs. In the case of private companies, the 
manager (the agent) is responsible to the owners (the principals) while in case 
of an SOE, the manager (the agent) is responsible to the government (the 
principle) who is not the ultimate owner (that being the ‘public’ or the ‘society’). 
Moreover, in case of an SOE, there is another principal-agent relation between 
the government (as an agent) and the general public (as a principal). This dual 
principal-agent relationship is expected to aggravate the agency problem. The 
managers of SOEs will seek to advance their own interests while also satisfying 
the objectives of the government through attainment of often political and 
social objectives. Reconciling these multiple diverging objectives is expected to 
increase costs and negatively impacting efficiency. Conversely, in the case of 
private companies, where the objective is clearer, the management will have to 
satisfy only the goals set by the owner(s) (Magginson and Netter, 2003).    
If a private company performs poorly, it is easier for the principle to observe 
the performance and efficiency of the agents. The principle of a private 
company can take measures to force the agent to improve performance or can 
decide to sell off her shares in the company. This in turn, triggers the threat of 
bankruptcy and takeover which can induce more efforts from the agent in the 
first place (Singh, 1971). These disciplining effects are absent in case of an SOE 
as there is no easy (costless) way to determine bad performance; no easy way 
to push agents to improve efficiency; and ultimately there is no credible threat 
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of bankruptcy and takeover.17 Therefore, the principal-agent theory suggests 
that SOEs will not be compelled to strive efficiency (Yarrow, 1986).  
The principal-agent theory suggests that privatization can lead to more efficient 
outcome as it breaks the dual principal-agent relationship inherent in SOEs. 
Also, through privatization, ambiguous and conflicting objectives set for SOEs, 
which are an important source of the pronounced agency problem under public 
ownership, can be eliminated.18  
 
The Effects of Competition 
Apart from offering superior incentives for improved monitoring and 
efficiency, private ownership also encourages competition. Conversely, state 
ownership promotes a non-competitive environment and this may be one of 
the sources of its relative inefficiency (Smith and Trebilcock, 2001). 
Theoretically, a competitive market setting allows free entry of new firms to the 
market leading to optimal levels of output and marginal cost pricing. 
Competition therefore increases production efficiency as it creates the right 
incentives for businesses to do so.  
On the other hand, non-competitive environments, which are more 
pronounced in under extensive state ownership, lead to welfare losses by 
restricting output and charging prices higher than marginal cost. In the absence 
                                                        
17 This is also augmented by arguments made by public choice theory which assumes that 
governments do not strive for maximum efficiency because of other, mainly electoral, 
motivations.  
18 Private companies also suffer from this problem but the ability to monitor the actions of the 
agent is easier and there are simpler ways to devise appropriate incentive schemes in absence 
of ambiguous objectives. Still, individual small shareholders in private companies face similar 
problems to monitor managers and exercise property rights as the individual shareholders in 
case of an SOE. The only difference remains the transferability of property rights which was 
discussed earlier in this sections.   
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of competitive pressure, SOEs are not incentivised to strive for higher 
efficiency. This is more noticeable in the case of natural monopolies where state 
ownership can be viewed as a remedy in the absence of a proper regulatory 
framework as discussed in Section 1.1.1. In industries where government 
ownership is large, generally competition is discouraged or reduced (Shirley, 
1994). Of course, in TEs, the scope of state ownership is not limited to natural 
monopolies. Indeed, during the early phases of transition, these countries were 
dominated by state ownership in all economic sectors.  To sum up, the 
transformation of ownership from the state to the private sector is expected to 
promote the development of a competitive environment as it will diminish the 
role of the state in the economy. This in turn would lead to improved 
performance and higher efficiency.  
 
1.2 Privatization as a policy framework 
Over the last three decades, both developed and developing countries have 
embarked on ambitious privatization programmes. The privatization process 
was part of a reconsideration of the role of the state in the economy, which was 
largely resolved in favour of the perception that state involvement had been 
excessive and that the private ownership would raise enterprise efficiency.19 
This was also encouraged by the development of economic theories that 
supported private over state ownership. Soon after Mrs Thatcher’s 
conservative government came into power, the privatization agenda started to 
evolve. The privatization process in the UK had an influence on economic 
                                                        
19 This was an important change in course by most countries which until then had employed 
extensive state ownership in a wide range of sectors in the economy. Until the late 1970s, state 
ownership had been embraced for various reasons, but primarily because it was perceived as 
necessary to promote growth (by controlling the so-called ‘commanding heights’ of the 
economy) and respond to market failures and shocks. Some of these reasons were also 
ideologically motivated. 
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policy throughout the world and this period is associated by many as the 
beginning of the general acceptance of privatization as an effective policy by 
economists and policy makers around the world (Bishop and Kay, 1989; 
Megginson and Netter, 2001).20 
Privatization served as a mean to expanding state revenues by either 
generating revenues via asset sales or by reducing the cost of subsidies to 
inefficient SOEs (Lopez de-Silanes, 1997). It was also viewed as a way to limit 
the state intervention in the economy while also promoting wider share 
ownership.21 However, the most important reason for divesting state owned 
companies was the well documented poor performance of SOEs. Privatization 
in turn was seen as a key element in improving economic efficiency of those 
firms (Frydman, et.al. 1999). Given that the focus of this thesis is on TEs, the 
following section discusses the privatization process in that context.   
 
1.2.1 Privatization in Transition Economies 
Following the developed and developing countries, the Central and Eastern 
Europe was the last major region to embrace privatization wholeheartedly. The 
extent of privatization that has taken place in TEs is unprecedented (Nellis, 
2001) and was part of a broader effort to transform these countries from 
command to market economies (Estrin, 1994). As such SOEs’ privatization in 
TEs cannot be seen in isolation as a simple transfer of ownership. The scope for 
                                                        
20 Privatization initiatives can be traced even earlier, such as the privatization programmes in 
West Germany in 1960s for instance (Esser, 1998). Also, other countries have divested state 
owned companies from time to time prior to 1980s. However, these initiatives did not feature 
as core component of public policies in these countries.  
21 Broadening share ownership was also viewed through political lenses, primarily because it 
was viewed as a way to increase the support for privatization and other market-oriented 
reforms and also for making it hard for succeeding governments to reverse the already 
undertaken reforms (Megginson, 2005).  
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privatization in TEs was much greater and more diverse in nature than in 
Western countries as the scope of the state sector in the former was more 
widespread. According to Estrin (1994), at the beginning of transition, the state 
sector was producing the bulk of national output in all TEs. Such a huge scale 
of privatization would be a daunting task even for mature market economies 
with sound institutions and legal infrastructure. In TEs, however, neither 
academics nor policy makers were certain how to design and implement 
privatization schemes on such a massive scale (Jelic, Briston and Aussenegg, 
2003).   
Unlike developed countries, where the debate was focused on the objectives of 
privatization, the debate in TEs centred around alternative methods of 
privatization rather than the privatization itself as the ‘reasons for privatization 
were clear; a political symbol of reform and addressing inefficiencies of the 
state sector’ (Estrin, 1994 p.20). The announcement of privatization 
programmes was a clear political statement to express governments’ intentions 
to creating a well-functioning market economy. Moreover, international 
financial institutions backed by Western governments insisted on including 
privatization in the transformation package as a condition for financial and 
technical support (Batt, 1994 p.89).22  
The necessity to embark on privatization in TEs was largely influenced by well 
documented inefficiencies of SOEs and the evidence was by far stronger than 
in Western economies (Estrin, 1994; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). 
Privatization was also viewed as a way of limiting state involvement in 
economic affairs as well as a means to balance the books. Having operated in 
                                                        
22 A policy package approved by the international financial institutions to support developing 
countries in crisis, commonly referred to as The Washington Consensus, included privatization 
as one of the three main policies for transition economies (alongside liberalisation and 
stabilisation) (Irdam, Scheiring and King, 2016).  
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centrally planned economies, state firms were too large, vertically integrated, 
producing poor quality goods (Blanchard, 1997). They produced goods to serve 
their internal markets and to trade within the socialist trading block without 
being subject to international competition (Ellman, 1989). A large public sector 
was often used by the government to achieve non-commercial objectives, such 
as employment, or other protectionist policies. Generally, the public sector 
lacked monitoring and incentives, and managers did not perform as effectively 
as in the private sector (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). Another reason for 
weak incentives is that SOEs were not subject to a bankruptcy constraint or 
take-over threats which would discipline inefficient managers. They rather 
expected to get ‘soft budgets’ from the state and be bailed out when in trouble 
(Kornai, 1980). There were several elements that require attention when 
analysing the privatization process in TEs. This includes elements related to: 
sequencing of privatization reforms, privatization vs. de novo private sector 
and the importance of competition, restructuring and privatization, and the 
method of privatization. The rest of this section briefly discusses these points 
in the given order.   
The privatization process was one of the most important aspects of the 
transition to a market economy, yet none of TEs could privatize all of its SOEs 
at once. This raises the issue of the sequencing the privatization process and 
whether governments privatize strategically (Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 2001). 
Several authors such as Husain and Sahay (1992), Glaeser and Scheinkman 
(1996), Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2001) have investigated this issue closely and 
modelled the question of sequencing the divestment of SOEs. They generally 
argue that the sequence of SOEs’ sale was determined by the governments 
rather than being a random selection. They further argue that the sequencing 
and staging of sales was developed based on governments’ conflicting 
objectives which might have been to maximize Pareto efficiency, maximize 
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public support and goodwill, minimizing political cost, maximizing economic 
efficiency through informational gains of privatization, and maximizing 
privatization revenues (Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 2001 p. 34). In addition to its 
theoretical importance, this issue also has important implications for empirical 
studies that evaluate the impact of privatization on companies’ performance. 
The selection bias in privatization, despite being largely ignored in empirical 
work, has been considered by a few studies to which we will return in Chapter 
2.  
Another important issue is whether there is a trade-off between privatization 
and the development of the de novo private sector, or these are complementary. 
The complementarities between the privatized and de novo private sector can 
be argued for in terms of the competitive environment that the latter generates 
and the competitive pressure it puts on the privatized firms (Havrylyshyn and 
McGettigan, 1999). Privatization also is also intertwined with restructuring 
which leads to the freeing of assets locked in SOEs with positive effects on the 
private sector. In practice, most countries have concluded that the existing state 
sector cannot be left to survive or ‘wither away’ on its own; hence have 
embarked on some form of privatization (Hare, 1994 p.31). Privatization in this 
context was viewed as an opportunity to increase competition. Moreover, it 
was coupled with facilitating the entry conditions for de novo private 
companies. Along these lines, equally important is the question of whether 
there is any effective alternative policy to privatization. In the case of TEs, 
privatization was not the only component of microeconomic adjustment or the 
transformation programme (Estrin, 1994). There is a strand of literature which 
argues that competition and deregulation are more important for improving 
performance of firms than privatization alone (Yarrow, 1986; Kay and 
Thompson, 1986; Bishop and Kay, 1989; Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Pinto, Belka 
and Krajewski, 1993; Nickell, 1996; Allen and Gale, 1999; Angelucci et al., 2002; 
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Zhang, Fitzpatrick and Parker, 2002). Studies examining both competition and 
privatization found that the latter had higher impact on company performance 
than competition alone. Similarly, the imposition of hard budget constrains 
was considered by many TEs as a way of improving company performance. 
Nonetheless, Frydman et al. (1999) suggest that the financial discipline is not 
sufficient to improve corporate performance i.e. there are clear limits to what 
the imposition of hard budget constrains can accomplish if not coupled with 
ownership transformation. According to Nellis (1994) and Shirley and Walsh 
(2001), improvement in companies’ performance is attained only when the full 
package of reform, including the ultimate threat of privatization, is employed.  
An important decision that governments have to make is whether SOEs should 
be restructured before the sale or the restructuring should be left to the private 
owner afterwards. Comprehensive restructuring before divestiture aims at 
attracting effective owners, but this is usually done at the expense of 
privatization speed (EBRD, 1994). Restructuring SOEs may involve financial 
restructuring or operational restructuring where the former is considered less 
difficult (Megginson, 2005). In centrally planned economies the majority of 
enterprises, including banks, were owned by the state, therefore writing off 
enterprise and inter-enterprise debt i.e. financial restructuring, represents a 
simple accounting exercise (EBRD, 1994). In turn, operational restructuring 
which would involve reorganization of production processes, splitting up 
SOEs, selling off or closing down non-core activities, and compulsory 
redundancies is much more difficult (Carlin and Mayer, 1992). In the early 
stages of transition, the World Bank advised that governments should 
restructure SOEs comprehensively before divestiture (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989). 
Later on the same World Bank experts (Shirley, Kikeri and Nellis, 1992 p.60) 
suggested that small and medium-sized SOEs “should be sold ‘as is’ at the best 
price possible, as quickly as possible.” This was backed by the fact that most 
Chapter 1 - Theory of privatization: does ownership matter? 
32 
 
SOEs were not very profitable, were overstaffed and employed obsolete 
equipment; some even incurring significant loses (Perroti, 1994 p. 55). The state 
would be under great political pressure to subsidise such companies while on 
the other hand runs the risk of fiscal collapse. Therefore a more rapid 
privatization process would lead to macroeconomic stabilisation and greater 
confidence in the reform itself. Moreover, the predominant Western 
recommendation was to consider privatization while focusing firstly on 
macroeconomic stabilisation (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995). This is in line 
with the neoclassical view of transition which pays attention to market 
liberalization before addressing property rights issues. Yet, the Austrian School 
considers that macroeconomic stabilization can be achieved only under a 
private property rights order (Calcagno, Hefner and Dan, 2006 p.42).  
Restructuring before divestiture was used in some of TEs like Hungary, 
Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Rumania (EBRD, 1994) and for some of the larger 
companies.  Some countries, like East Germany, managed successfully to 
restructure some companies before privatization, however this road was 
unattainable for other TEs. It is widely agreed in the literature that 
restructuring would be virtually impossible in the absence of privatization in 
TEs. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that restructuring before 
privatization does not pay off (see for example Lopez de-Silanes, 1997; Chong 
and Lopez de-Silanes, 2002; Chong and Galdo, 2002). Generally, these authors 
suggest that the government should not intervene to restructure SOEs prior to 
divestiture. Instead, government should focus on creating social safety net for 
redundant workers rather than invest in these SOEs. Delays in privatization 
will only decrease the confidence in the reform itself and give more space to 
the parties that oppose privatization, including SOEs’ managers for whom 
privatization acted as a direct threat to their privileged position (Blanchard, 
1997). 
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The question regarding the different methods of privatization employed in TEs 
has attracted widespread discussion in economic literature (Schüsselbauer, 
1999). Since state property was created in different ways, there was no best 
single way of privatizing them. This is especially true in the context of TEs 
where countries had different levels of institutional and economic 
development. TEs have employed different techniques and combination of 
them to privatize their SOEs which in turn resulted in different ownership 
structures and overall efficiency gains (Havrylyshyn and McGettigan, 1999). As 
Earl and Estrin (1997) have suggested, the share ownership structure and the 
pattern of dominant ownership in different countries vary significantly 
according to the method of privatization used.  
As discussed earlier the main focus of the debate in TEs was on the method of 
privatization unlike in western countries. The problem of ‘method’ arises 
primarily due to the absence of a capital market, where company valuation is 
a difficult task and information provided by companies is unreliable (Estrin, 
1994; Brada, 1996). There was a huge mismatch between the domestic supply 
of savings and potential market value of firms to be privatized (Estrin, 1994). 
Also, in the early phases of transition, these countries were not an attractive 
destination for foreign investors. Moreover, due to the widespread asset 
stripping, governments had to act promptly (Canning and Hare, 1994). 
Consequently, a majority of these countries launched some form of “mass 
privatization” or ”voucher privatization”, distributing shares of a large number 
of companies for free or at low nominal prices (Megginson, 2005). There were 
of course other methods that TEs used for divestment of SOEs too (see Table 1 
for details on different methods of privatization used in TEs),23 but mass 
                                                        
23 For instance, selected number of TEs used privatization through restitution. This method 
featured in all those countries where the government embarked seriously on privatization, as 
it demonstrates the commitment of the new political system to righting the wrongs of the past 
(Batt, 1994). This divestment method was appropriate only when dealing with privatization of 
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privatization was the "primary" method of privatization in 10 TEs, and a 
secondary method in another 9 TEs (EBRD, 2004). According Boycko, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994) and Nellis (2001) many TEs had no real alternative to the 
mass privatization method. Mass privatization is understood as offering the 
free or very highly subsidized transfer of a large proportion of state assets to 
the whole population. It was assumed that give-away schemes met both 
efficiency and distribution goals as a “second-best solution’ (Schüsselbauer, 
1999 p.67). Other benefits of mass privatisation were that it partially overcame 
the constraint of an underdeveloped capital market, it enjoyed public support 
as it eliminated the concern of the public that privatization is benefited only a 
small number of individuals. Mass privatization led to diffused ownership 
which raised the concern that the new owners will not be effective owners as 
they would lack the knowledge and the incentive to undertake deep 
restructuring (EBRD, 1997). However the resulting ownership structures 
proved to be only transitional as, in most countries, a gradual concentration of 
ownership emerged through the process of ‘secondary privatization’ (Grosfeld 
and Hashi, 2001).24 
  
                                                        
easily identifiable property that have been expropriated during the past government by 
returning to the original owner or their inheritors. This method of privatization was not 
dominant given that the property that was subject to restitution was limited. 
24 This issue was more difficult in cases when managers and employees were effective owners 
and where restructuring involved large redundancies. However, Blanchard (1997) argues that 
even in such cases, and when insiders cannot restructure the company themselves, they are still 
incentivised to sell their shares to outsiders as they are aware that status quo will only reduce 
the value of the company in the future. 
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Table 1.1. Privatization methods in TEs 
Country  Primary method Secondary method 
Albania  MEBO vouchers 
Armenia  
direct sales (since 1999) 
vouchers (pre 1999) 
MEBO 
Azerbaijan cash auctions vouchers 
Belarus  MEBO vouchers 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
vouchers direct sales 
Bulgaria direct sales vouchers 
Croatia  MEBO vouchers 
Czech Republic  vouchers direct sales 
Estonia direct sales vouchers 
Macedonia  MEBO direct sales 
Georgia vouchers direct sales 
Hungary  direct sales MEBO 
Kazakhstan  direct sales vouchers 
Kyrgyzstan vouchers MEBO 
Latvia  direct sales vouchers 
Lithuania vouchers direct sales 
Moldova vouchers direct sales 
Poland  direct sales MEBO 
Romania MEBO direct sales 
Russia  vouchers direct sales 
Serbia and Montenegro 
auctions (Serbia)  
vouchers (Montenegro) 
direct sales 
Slovak Republic  direct sales vouchers 
Slovenia  MEBO vouchers 
Tajikistan direct sales MEBO 
Turkmenistan MEBO direct sales 
Ukraine vouchers MEBO 
Uzbekistan  MEBO direct sales 
Source: Transition Report (EBRD, 2004) 
 
Other forms of privatization included Management and Employee Buyout 
(MEBO) which was primary method in 8 transition countries. This was also a 
way for governments to avoid clashes with the entrenched managers and 
employees who were strong opponents of the reforms. Direct sale of companies 
to the public was another method of privatisation though only 7 out of 27 TEs 
used this method as their primary method of divesting SOEs and these were 
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among the most successful TEs (Estrin, 2007).While the economic arguments 
for privatizing state assets through direct sale are convincing, it faced practical 
difficulties given the short domestic supply of savings as discussed earlier. 
Privatisation has progressed differently in different countries depending on the 
speed of the implementation of the policy, the strength of supporting 
institutions and other factors. Privatisation revenue as share of GDP is a good 
indication of what different countries have achieved (Table 1.2).   
 
Table 1.2. Privatization revenues as share of GDP in TEs (%)                                       2  
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Albania 11.4 11.5 11.7 13.1 13.6 16.0 na* 
Armenia 10.2 na na na na na na 
Azerbaijan 3.0 3.2 na na na na na 
Belarus 3.0 3.1 2.9 5.5 6.3 na na 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.6 na na na na na na 
Bulgaria 18.0 21.2 22.5 23.5 24.3 24.3 na 
Croatia 14.6 14.7 15.7 16.7 17.0 17.4 na 
Estonia 7.2 na na na na na na 
Macedonia 13.8 14.3 20.0 20.2 20.6 21.2 na 
Georgia 24.5 28.1 32.9 38.1 41.8 na na 
Hungary 31.0 31.6 32.8 33.1 33.1 na na 
Kazakhstan 29.0 29.2 29.7 30.1 30.3 30.5 30.6 
Kyrgyzstan 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.6 7.4 7.5 7.5 
Latvia 9.5 9.6 10.5 10.6 10.8 na na 
Lithuania 13.3 13.7 16.5 16.6 16.6 na na 
Moldova 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 na na 
Montenegro na na na na na na na 
Poland 13.5 13.9 14.0 14.2 na na na 
Rumania na na na na na na na 
Romania 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 na 
Serbia 7.7 10.2 17.4 20.2 21.4 23.1 na 
Slovak Republic 35.1 35.2 35.2 35.2 na na na 
Slovenia 4.7 4.8 4.9 6.4 6.5 6.5 na 
Tajikistan 6.8 7.3 7.9 8.0 8.6 na na 
Turkmenistan 0.6 0.6 na na na na na 
Ukraine 10.1 15.1 15.2 15.5 15.5 na na 
Uzbekistan 4.7 5.2 5.5 5.9 6.3 na na 
Source: Transition Indicators (http://www.ebrd.com); * - data not available  
Chapter 1 - Theory of privatization: does ownership matter? 
37 
 
1.3 Conclusions 
A range of theories and issues concerning ownership and privatization policy 
were considered in this chapter. The aim was to investigate as broadly as 
possible relevant theories related to the role of ownership in the performance 
of companies as well as the privatization process in TEs. This is done in order 
to better understand the background and better direct both the review of the 
empirical literature on the subject (in Chapter 2) as well as our own empirical 
investigation in the following chapters (Chapters 4 and 6).25 Given the large 
range of discussions on privatization, this chapter had to be selective rather 
than exhaustive, focusing on the main strands of literature on privatization.  
This chapter started by analysing the ownership debate focusing on the main 
arguments in favour and against state ownership. The theoretical literature 
reviewed here seems to suggest that ownership does matter apart from certain 
situations such as perfectly competitive markets and in the absence of any 
market failure. The underlying reasons for state ownership were that it was a 
remedy for market failures and an instrument for the attainment of non-
economic goals. Both of these reasons implicitly assumed that government is 
benevolent and that political markets are efficient. Both of these assumptions 
were challenged by opponents of public ownership. On the other hand, a range 
of theories including property rights theory, public choice theory, and principal 
agent theory were used to demonstrate that private ownership is expected to 
yield more efficient results compared to public ownership. This is especially 
the case in competitive markets which are more immune from substantial 
market failures. Property rights theory maintains that it is the ownership 
arrangements that explain the discrepancy between the performance state- and 
                                                        
25 Chapter 4 analyses the effect of ownership on technical efficiency in successor states of former 
Yugoslavia. Chapter 5 analyses the privatization induced performance changes of companies 
in Kosovo.  
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private-owned firms. According to this theory properly defined property rights 
provide an incentive to enhance efficiency. This is also due to market discipline 
to which private owned companies are subject. Public choice theory 
emphasises that government agents maximise their own utility function rather 
than pursuing public goals, and highlights the fact that, unlike private-owned 
companies, they are not subject to market discipline. Different from property 
rights theory, the public choice theory puts greater emphasis on competition 
rather than on ownership as the only factor affects performance and efficiency. 
Finally, the principal agent theory shows that the principal-agent relation in 
private companies is different from that in SOEs and that the agent can be made 
to work more efficiently (through monitoring and incentives) in private 
companies than in SOEs. Although these theories have been subject to a range 
of criticisms, they still provided a crucial supporting framework for 
privatization.   
This chapter also examined the privatization policy and the debates 
surrounding it, particularly in the context of TEs. Over the last three decades, 
thousands of companies have been transferred to private ownership around 
the world. The most important motive for divesting state owned companies 
was the well documented poor performance of former SOEs. Privatization in 
turn was seen as a key element in improving economic efficiency of these firms. 
In transition countries, privatization was part of the broader reform or 
transformation of these countries from centralised to market economies. This is 
especially important from the perspective of empirical analysis. Given that 
privatization was part of larger structural reforms, the empirical analysis must 
distinguish the effects of privatization from that of other simultaneous reforms 
which took place in these countries. Because of attribution problems, this is 
largely overlooked in the literature. Also, the type of owners that emerged after 
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privatization is important in determining the overall result of ownership 
transformation.  
The review of the literature in this chapter provides some insight into the 
theoretical framework for analysing the differences in the performance of state 
and private-owned companies. However, the major inference from this chapter 
is that theory alone is unlikely to provide conclusive answers about advantages 
and drawbacks of privatization. Therefore a review of the empirical work is of 
essential importance. Moreover, since most of the arguments are based on 
empirical observations, it is necessary to review this literature systematically. 
This is done in the next chapter. 
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Introduction 
As argued in Chapter 1, the theory underlying privatization debate is unlikely to 
produce a conclusive narrative about the impact of ownership transformation on 
companies’ performance. Therefore researchers have had to concentrate on empirical 
evidence in order to obtain more definitive conclusions. There is a large body of 
empirical literature analysing the impact of privatization on companies’ performance, 
especially in the context of TEs. Reviews of this literature report that the number of 
relevant studies in the TE context goes far beyond a hundred. Therefore, this Chapter 
does not intend to provide an all-inclusive coverage of this literature. Instead, the 
focus of this Chapter is on a selection of studies in order to analyse different types of 
empirical strategies; methodological issues; performance measures used; as well as 
sample coverage.  
By doing so, it will try to establish the analytical framework for estimating the impact 
of ownership in companies’ performance. The empirical strategy used in individual 
studies reviewed in this Chapter provide useful insights for the context that we intend 
to investigate in Chapter 4 (focusing on successor states of former Yugoslavia: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and Chapter 
6 (focusing on Kosovo alone). Reviewing the empirical literature on privatization 
enables us to set the relevant hypotheses and expectations in these Chapters. 
Based on the research design, the empirical evidence on privatization can be broadly 
clustered into two major groups: longitudinal analyses of ownership transformation 
effects (comparison of performance indicators before and after privatization) and 
cross-sectional analyses of ownership effects (comparison of performance of 
companies with different ownership structures). There are also variants of these 
methods depending on the context of investigation and the data at hand. The results 
reported in various studies employing different methodologies, are not uniform. They 
range from insignificant results to significant positive and significant negative results 
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on the impact of ownership on companies’ performance. Heterogeneous results are 
found across countries, measures of performance, specifications, estimation 
methodologies, and types of new owners.  
The empirical work in this field also faces a number of potential problems which can 
be broadly narrowed down into three types. First, in relation to time periods covered, 
initial studies on privatization used very short time frame with most of the 
observations clustered immediately after divestiture. Secondly, in relation to quality 
of data, some studies have used small, often non-representative, samples of 
companies, with no clear distinction of types of owners and with data produced 
following different accounting standards. Thirdly, many studies have failed to control 
adequately for the selection bias problem, i.e. companies not being selected for 
privatization at random. These problems could have resulted in many studies 
suffering from biased results and can partly explain the reason for great variation in 
the reported results about the effect of ownership transformation on companies’ 
performance.26 However, despite the fact that empirical work in this field is beset with 
problems, many authors have managed to compare the performance of SOEs and 
privately-owned firms quite successfully.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 provides a broad summary 
of extensive surveys of this literature and points out the main methodological 
challenges. Section 2.2 reviews the studies that estimate the relationship between 
privatization and companies’ performance in single countries, while section 2.3 
reviews studies concerned with more than one country. Section 2.4 concludes by also 
considering the implications of this review for the empirical analyses undertaken in 
the following chapters.  
                                                        
26 Different results could also reflect genuine differences between countries and industries under 
investigation (Megginson and Netter, 2001).  
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2.1 The effect of ownership on companies’ performance: a 
review of the literature 
There is a large number of studies that analyse the impact of privatization on 
companies’ performance, especially in the context of TEs. There are also several 
extensive surveys of firm-level evidence on privatization.27 The overall results of these 
surveys range from those that do not find any significant effect of privatization on 
companies’ performance to ones that suggest that privatization improves companies’ 
performance. Also, in some limited cases, privatization is found to have negative 
effects on performance (see for instance Estrin et al., 2009).  
As indicated, studies looking at this relationship suffer from many problems, 
including: short time span of available data; small often non-representatives samples 
of companies with no clear distinction of types of owners and with data produced 
following different accounting standards; and finally most of the studies on this topic 
failed to correctly account selection bias problem. Given that the companies in the 
privatization programme were privatised in sequence (and not at once), there is a 
selection process involved which may or may not be significant, i.e. the selection may 
or may not be random.  Governments are usually tempted to privatize the best (or the 
easiest) firms first in an attempt to portray the process as successful. Also, foreign 
companies participating in the process are expected to cherry-pick and try to obtain 
shares of the best companies. Finally, if possible, companies might self-select if they 
want to go through privatization process or not (Megginson, 2005). Sample selection 
bias can also exist between alternative forms of privatization (EBRD, 1997). If this 
selection process is unaccounted for, then the estimates might be biased (Estrin et al., 
2009). Selection bias of ownership is usually overlooked in the research related to the 
effects of ownership on companies’ performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Kikeri 
                                                        
27 See for instance: Galal et al. (1994); Bevan, Estrin and Schaffer (1999); Sheshinski and López-Calva 
(1999); Shirley and Walsh (2001); Megginson and Netter (2001); Kikeri and Nellis (2002); Djankov and 
Murrell (2002); Megginson (2005); Estrin et al. (2009). 
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and Nellis, 2002; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Megginson, 2005; Estrin et al., 2009). 
Djankov and Murrel (2002)28, in their meta-regression analysis, note that the biggest 
methodological problem in estimating the effect of ownership on performance is the 
selection bias. They find that only one-third of the reviewed papers make some efforts 
to control for this problem. 
From an empirical point of view, there are broadly two approaches to analyse the 
effects of ownership transformation. The first approach, and by far more frequently 
used, is to compare performance indicators of companies under different ownership 
forms. If companies that are subject of comparison are not drawn randomly, then the 
results may be biased. The second, employing longitudinal data compares 
performance measures before and after ownership transformation. In particular, 
studies that analyse the impact of privatization on companies’ performance by 
comparing pre- and post-privatization indicators without controlling for aggregate 
fluctuations and regulatory reforms, despite their relative merits, are afflicted by 
biases of unknown direction and size (Megginson, 2005; Brown, Earle and Telegdy, 
2006).29,30 Besides, aggregate fluctuations and regulatory reforms may be specific for a 
particular group of companies (in a particular region or sector for instance) and in the 
absence of sufficient observations, such specific shocks  will not be accounted for, 
                                                        
28 The authors use meta-regression analysis to synthesise the empirical literature on privatization, 
including 125 empirical studies. 
29 Initially used by Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994), this methodology has been extensively 
employed to analyse this relationship in both transition and non-transition countries. For instance: 
Green and Vogelsang, 1994. 
30 In fact, some of the reforms associated with the transition process (such as price liberalisation and 
deregulation) are at times considered to be more important than privatization itself (see for instance, 
Yarrow, 1986; Kay and Thompson, 1986; Bishop and Kay, 1989; Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Allen and 
Gale, 1999). Others however, hold the contention that privatization is necessary for significant 
improvements in companies’ performance (see for instance, Vining and Boardman, 1992; Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Nellis, 1994; Brada, 1996; Shleifer, 1998). However, in any case, there is a 
general agreement that these reforms are important and failing to disentangle their effect from that of 
privatization process, might introduce bias in inference.  
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hence leading to biased estimates. Therefore, it is important to have adequate data in 
order to be able to employ econometric techniques that control for such problems. 
Before turning to the in-depth analysis of individual studies we briefly summarise the 
main findings of the most extensive surveys of this empirical literature. Following 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Estrin et al. (2009), while there are some disparities 
in the reported results, there seem to be a general agreement that foreign ownership 
is associated with the highest performance improvement in most TEs. Domestic 
owners and insider owners (management or employee) have been reported to induce 
less performance enhancement. Domestic owners and insider owners are also 
associated with insignificant or even negative results compared to SOEs. Competitive 
pressure has also been reported to have a complementarity effect with ownership. 
Furthermore, these surveys suggest that results are not uniform and there is 
significant heterogeneity between regions and countries.  
The impact of ownership is expected to vary depending on, among others, 
institutional and economic development of individual countries. Seeking to identify 
any such patterns that may exist, empirical evidence on the relationship between 
privatization and companies’ performance is analysed separately depending on the 
country, or sample of countries, that this evidence comes from. This is also done in 
order to follow the empirical strategy we use in following Chapters.31 Accordingly, 
evidence from single country studies is first reviewed, followed by that of mixed 
sample of countries. The focus is on TEs and in non-regulated industries. Also, this 
Chapter only reviews relevant empirical studies that were published after the year 
2000, that could have be identified by the author. Earlier studies have been extensively 
reviewed in surveys mentioned earlier. Moreover, they generally used shorter time 
                                                        
31 In Chapter 4 the impact of privatization on firm performance is measured jointly for 6 countries. In 
Chapter 5 only one country is analysed.  
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period of data and were beset with more methodological shortcomings. For a review 
of earlier studies, see surveys cited at the beginning of this section. 
2.2 Evidence from single country studies 
The empirical evidence on the impact of privatization on companies’ performance in 
TEs based on studies that focus on single countries does not appear to be conclusive. 
The results vary from country to country for many reasons, including the 
methodology employed, output measures used, differences between countries and 
industries under investigation. Details about methodology (including their efforts to 
control for selection bias problem), time period covered, sample size and results are 
presented in Table 2.1. For convenience, throughout this Chapter, asterisk (*) is added 
do denote studies that do not account for the selection bias problem.  
In a panel analysis with Slovenian firms, Orazem and Vodopivec (2004) find that that 
ownership has no impact on performance expressed in terms of productivity. 
Similarly, Bakanova et al. (2006)*, looking at  Belarusian companies do not find any 
support that private ownership will enhance company performance and that newly 
created firms will perform better than privatised firms or SOEs. Along the same lines, 
in a recent paper, Hagemejer, Tyrowicz and Svejnar (2014), using panel data from 
Poland, employing before-and-after framework with matched counterfactual, find 
that once controlling for selection bias, there is no significant impact of ownership on 
companies’   performance expressed in terms of improvement in value added. Their 
results seem to be robust across different specifications. Another study that controls 
for selection bias and finds similar results is that of Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar 
(2007). Using a large unbalanced panel dataset, this study finds that the effect of 
privatization is limited and that many privatized firms do not display a performance 
that is different from that of SOEs, apart from companies that are privatized by foreign 
owners. In fact, the same study, in some specifications, finds that SOEs have also 
displayed small positive effects in cases when the state retained control through the 
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golden share mechanism. Cull, Matesova and Shirley (2002)* also find negative effects 
associated with private domestic ownership. Simoneti et al. (2005) analysing 
Slovenian firms, found no significant difference in productivity growth between not-
listed private companies and companies controlled by the state. Simiarly, Domadenik, 
Prasnikar and Svejnar (2003) analysing Slovenian firms, using an instrumental 
variable approach, to control for selection bias, found that the impact of privatization 
on labour adjustment are insignificant. Warzynski (2003)* studying 300 Ukrainian 
companies, found that privatization has only a marginally significant positive effect 
on profitability but its effect on productivity change is not significant. 
On the other hand, in a panel analysis, Perevalov, Gimadii, and Dobrodey (2000), 
looking at Russian firms, find that privatization produced some improvement in the 
performance of companies expressed in terms of labour productivity and sales 
growth. Earle and Telegdy (2002) also find positive and significant improvement in 
labour productivity associated with privatization. Grigorian (2000) using two stage 
least square (2SLS) with instrumental variables (IV) regression on 5,300 Lithuanian 
enterprises finds significant positive impact of private ownership on labour 
productivity measures. Similarly, Dobrinsky at al. (2001)* using Cobb-Douglas and 
translog production functions find that private ownership is always associated with 
higher productive efficiency (expressed in terms of value added). Also, Jones and 
Mygind (2002) looking at Estonian firms, find that, relative to SOEs, private ownership 
is by 13–22% more efficient.  They also find higher positive effect of insiders’ 
ownership (management ownership) on sales growth compared to domestic 
outsiders, though both groups display better performance than SOEs. Brown and 
Earle (2002), looking at Russian manufacturing firms find that privatization and 
competition do not increase job creation. 
Salis (2006) takes a different approach from the conventional method by using 
matched difference-in-difference estimators.  This method takes a group of privatized 
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firms and compares their performance with a group of similar non-privatized firms 
(similar in terms of observable characteristics) to identify the difference in their 
impact.32 He finds that productivity of SOEs acquired by foreign companies improves. 
His study finds similar results when looking at employment growth figures. Foreign 
ownership is found to outperform other types of companies in terms of all indicators 
by all but one of the reviewed studies. Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2007) suggest 
that foreign owners display superior performance in terms of sales growth compared 
to all other types of owners. Pivovarsky (2001) and Cull, Matesova and Shirley (2002)* 
find that foreign ownership is associated with positive effects on productivity growth. 
Mickiewicz (2005) reports that foreign ownership also displays the best results in 
terms of employment increase. Konings and Xavier (2003) however report that 
foreign-owned companies had lower employment growth rates compared to domestic 
private and SOEs. Also, Maurel (2001) drawing on a large sample of Hungarian firms 
suggests that both foreign and private Hungarian firms are more efficient and invest 
more than state-owned firms. 
Looking at the method of privatization and the ownership that comes out of 
privatization, Miller (2006) suggests that mass privatization has resulted in lowest 
performance improvements compared to other methods. Mass privatization leads 
dispersed ownership which leaves companies with poor corporate governance 
mechanism. Thus ownership concentration becomes important as a mechanism of 
owners exercising control over their company. Perevalov, Gimadii, and Dobrodey 
(2000) also find that methods of privatisation do influence performance and the 
direction of impact is heterogeneous. In spite of this, firms with higher levels of 
ownership concentration, regardless of type of ownership, performed better than 
firms with dispersed ownership. Similarly, Andreyeva (2003), using a panel analysis 
of large sample of Ukrainian companies, found that the effects of performance 
                                                        
32 The method will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
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improvement associated with privatization were higher when ownership was 
concentrated by several private owners indicating that privatization to dominant 
outsider leads to more efficient results. Again, the highest positive effect is attained 
under foreign ownership.  
Also, several reviewed studies find that competition has a positive and significant 
effect on performance indicating complementarity between competitive pressure and 
ownership Grosfeld and Tressel (2002). This is also supported by the findings of 
Djankov and Murrell’s (2002) meta-regression analysis. There are also country level 
studies that compare the relative performance of SOEs with that of de novo private 
companies. Warzynski (2003)* and Mickiewicz (2005) suggest that de novo firms 
perform better than state firms.  The list of identified studies that have estimated the 
effect ownership on companies’ performance, and a summary of various features of 
these studies and their results, is presented below in Table 2.1. The fifth column of the 
table also comments on the efforts made by the authors for dealing with the selection 
bias problem. The period covered by these studies is not very long. Out of 25 reviewed 
studies only two of them cover a period of more than ten years. Three of them are 
cross-sectional studies, while 12 others cover less than five year (of which eight cover 
three or less than three years). Also, out of 25 reviewed studies five of them do not 
account for the selection bias problem and five of them make some limited efforts to 
control for it. Only five of the studies that cover more than 5 years make limited or no 
efforts to control for selection bias problem.   
Generally, single country studies find mixed results, ranging from negative, to 
insignificant and positive results. However, foreign ownership is almost always 
associated with improvement in performance. Also, methods of privatization that lead 
to higher concentration seem to be associated with better performance. 
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Table 2.1. List of studies that analyse single countries (in chronological order)                                                                                              3 
Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Hagemejer, 
Tyrowicz and 
Svejnar (2014) 
Poland 1995-2009 
Using 15 years of firm-level data for Poland, authors 
use before-and-after framework with matched 
counterfactual. They find that once the selection bias is 
accounted for, the productivity improvement becomes 
uncommon. Their results seem to be robust across 
different specifications.  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large. 
Value added 
Hanousek, 
Kocenda, and 
Svejnar (2007) 
Czech Republic 1996-1999 
The study uses large unbalanced panel dataset of 2,529-
2,949 observations. It uses fixed effect estimation 
employing Heckman selection model to control for 
selection bias problem. The study finds that the effect of 
privatization is limited and that many private owners 
do not display a performance that is different from that 
of SOEs. However, concentrated foreign owners display 
superior performance compared to all other types of 
owners. Also, in some specification, the study finds that 
state has displayed positive performance when it 
retained control through golden share. 
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large. 
Percentage change in 
sales 
Percentage change in 
profit over sales  
Percentage change in 
labour  
Salis (2006)  Slovenia 1996-1999 
Using matched difference-in-difference estimators, the 
study finds that productivity of SOEs acquired by 
foreign companies improves. Similar results are 
observed when looking at employment growth figures.   
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large. 
-Productivity 
-Output 
-Employment  
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Bakanova et al. 
(2006) 
Belarus 2004 
The study employs OLS and probit regressions using 
survey data which were collected in 2004 covering 402 
enterprises. The authors do not find any support for the 
hypotheses that (i) private ownership will enhance 
company performance and that (ii) newly created firms 
will perform better than privatised or state-owned ones.  
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for.  
-Employment growth 
-Sales per worker 
-Profit over sales  
Miller (2006) Bulgaria  1996-2003 
Using data from various sources, the authors compiled a 
list of balance sheet data of 2,515 enterprises. The study 
finds that mass privatization firms have performed less 
well than firms privatized by other means. Comparing 
firms within the mass privatization programme by 
ownership type, the study finds that firms with higher 
levels of ownership concentration, regardless of type of 
ownership performed better than firms with dispersed 
ownership. 
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem.  
-Return on assets 
Mickiewicz (2005) Poland 1996-2002 
Using panel data on large Polish firms, author finds 
that privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of 
employment growth and that, in the case of de novo 
firms, it is foreign ownership which display the best 
results. Author uses generalised method of moments 
techniques (GMM) which allows controlling for 
selection bias by using predetermined variables as 
instruments. 
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for. 
-Change in 
employment 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Simoneti et al. 
(2005) 
Slovenia 1994-2001 
Using a sample of 479 Slovenian firms the study tests 
the effect of a company being listed or not listed in 
comparison to being controlled by the government. The 
study employs Heckman two-stage selection model to 
address the selection bias issue. The study finds that 
listed companies display higher productivity compared 
to government controlled companies. The results for 
non-listed companies are insignificant.   
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large 
-Growth in 
productivity 
Orazem and 
Vodopivec (2004) 
Slovenia 1994-2001 
Using fixed- and random-effect estimators on 
unbalanced panel data of all manufacturing firms in 
Slovenia over the period 1994–2001, the study finds 
that ownership has no impact on performance.  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large. 
-Productivity 
Akimova and 
Schwödiauer 
(2004) 
Ukraine 1998-2000 
Using survey data of 202 enterprises conducted in 2001 
which covered the period between 1998 and 2000. The 
study finds that insider ownership has significant 
inverted U shape non-linear effect on performance. 
Outside ownership is found to have insignificant effect 
on performance while foreign ownership is also found to 
have inverted U shape non-linear effect on performance.  
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Sales per worker 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Andreyeva (2003) Ukraine 1996-2000 
Using a sample of over three thousand enterprises, the 
study estimates a production function using random-
effects and instrumental variable estimators. The study 
finds that firm performance improves significantly with 
privatization. The effects are found to be higher when 
ownership is concentrated by several private owners 
indicating that privatization to dominant outsider leads 
to more efficient results. 
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large.  
-Productivity   
-Sales  
Domadenik, 
Prasnikar and 
Svejnar (2003) 
Slovenia  1996-1998 
The study uses a sample of 130 privatized firms during 
the period between 1996 and 1998. It uses IV regression 
models. The results about the impact of privatization on 
labour adjustment found to be insignificant.  
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem. 
-Labour adjustment  
Konings and 
Xavier (2003) 
Slovenia 1994-1998 
Using unique firm level data, covering virtually the 
whole population of Slovenian manufacturing firms the 
study uses Heckman sample selection model. The study 
finds that privately owned firms had higher growth rates 
of labour than did state and foreign owned firms.  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample size 
is relatively large. 
-Percentage change in 
labour 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Earle and Estrin 
(2003) 
Russia 1994 
The empirical work is based on survey data from 
privatized and state-owned Russian firms. The authors 
found robust evidence of a positive impact of 
privatization on labour productivity.  
Limited efforts to 
control for selection 
bias.  
-Labour productivity 
Pivovarsky (2001) Ukraine 1998 
Using IV method, the authors find that ownership 
concentration by foreign firms and banks is associated 
with better performance of companies.  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for.  
-Productivity 
 
Warzynski (2003) Ukraine; 1989-1997 
Using survey data from 300 Ukrainian companies, the 
study finds that privatization has a marginally 
significant positive effect on profitability but its effect on 
productivity change is not significant. Study also finds 
that De novo firms perform better than state firm. 
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Percentage change in 
profitability 
-Percentage change in 
productivity 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Grosfeld and 
Tressel (2002) 
Poland;  1991-1998 
The study uses all listed firms in Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (about 200 non-financial companies). Using 
GMM estimation authors were able to account for 
selection bias problem. They found that ownership 
concentration has non-linear relationship with 
performance. Similarly, they found that competition has 
positive and significant effects on productivity growth.  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for.  
-Percentage change in 
productivity 
 
Cull, Matesova 
and Shirley (2002) 
Czech Republic 1993-1996 
Using 1017 observations from 392 firms, this study 
employs fixed effects estimators. The study found that 
foreign ownership is associated with positive effects on 
productivity growth. However, once this ownership 
becomes dominant, the results seem to become negative. 
Negative results are also found in case of dominant 
domestic owner and in case of private ownership.  
 
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Percentage change in 
productivity 
 
Earle and Telegdy 
(2002) 
Romania 1992-1997 
Using fixed effect estimation in 2,354 cases, the study 
finds that private ownership has positive and highly 
significant effect on labour productivity. The highest 
positive impact is found when controlling for outside 
ownership. Insiders and mass privatization are found to 
have small but positive impact on performance.  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for. 
-Sales per worker 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Konings and 
Lehmann (2002) 
Russia 1996-1997 
The study uses fixed-effects specifications of static labour 
demand equations. Results show that SOEs exhibit 
weaker wage employment trade-off than do privatized 
and partially privatized firms.  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for. 
-Labour demand 
Brown and Earle 
(2002) 
Russia  1985-1999 
The study uses census data for Russian manufacturing 
firms covering periods before and after privatization. 
They find that privatization and competition did not 
increase job flows, but they are associated with 
significantly higher covariance of employment growth 
with relative productivity.  
Limited efforts to 
control for selection 
bias 
-Growth of employment 
-Job reallocation 
Jones and Mygind 
(2002) 
Estonia 1993-1997 
The study uses large randomly selected sample of 
companies. Employing fixed-effects production function 
models, the authors found that depending on the 
particular specification (and relative to state ownership), 
(i) private ownership is 13–22% more efficient; and (ii) 
all types of private ownership are more productive, 
though managerial ownership has the biggest effects (21–
32%) and ownership by domestic outsiders has the 
smallest impact (0–15%). 
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for. 
-Sales 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Dobrinsky et al. 
(2001) 
Bulgaria 1994-1996 
Using Cobb-Douglas and translog production function, 
the study finds that private ownership is always 
associated with higher productive efficiency. 
No efforts are made to 
control for selection 
bias.  
-Value added  
Maurel (2001) Hungary 1992-1998 
Using a large sample of Hungarian firms over 7 years, 
the study employs fixed effects to estimate performance, 
while controlling, among others, for ownership. Reported 
results suggest that both foreign and private Hungarian 
firms are more efficient and invest more than state-owned 
firms. 
Limited efforts to 
control for selection 
bias 
-Sales 
Grigorian (2000) Lithuania 1995-1997 
Using 2SLS IV regression on 5,300 enterprises, the study 
finds significant positive impact of private ownership on 
labour productivity measures.   
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for. 
-Sales per worker  
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Perevalov, 
Gimadii, and 
Dobrodey (2000) 
Russia 1992-1996 
The study is based on 189 enterprises and uses 
conditional fixed effects logistic regression to control for 
selection bias. The results show that privatization 
produced little improvement in the performance of 
companies. When disaggregating the data, the study 
reveals that methods of privatisation do influence 
performance but the impact is not always positive.  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for. 
-Sales per worker 
-Percentage change in 
sales 
Source: Author’s own compilation  
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2.3 Evidence from mixed samples 
The empirical evidence on the impact of privatization on companies’ performance 
using mixed sample of countries is numerous. These studies use different output 
measures, different countries and time-spans as well as different methodologies. 
Similar to the previous section, this evidence is also not conclusive.  Carlin et al. (2001) 
in a panel analysis using data from 3,300 firms in 25 TEs find that privatization does 
not have any significant impact on performance expressed in terms of growth in sales 
and labour productivity. They maintain that sales or productivity growth of SOEs is 
statistically not different from that of privatized companies. Brown, Earle and Telegdy 
(2006) on the other hand find that results vary across different countries. Using the 
data for nearly the whole universe of former SOEs from Hungary, Romania, Russia 
and Ukraine, they find that privatization is associated with high significant positive 
effects in Rumania, while in Hungary and Ukraine the results are much lower, though 
still positive. In the case of Ukraine they become insignificant in some specifications, 
and in Russia the results range from negative to positive depending on the 
specification used.  
The reviewed papers also indicate that resulting ownership after privatization seems 
to explain some variation in performance. For instance, Sabirianova, Svejnar, and 
Terrell (2005), using a panel of large firms in the Czech Republic and Russia find that 
privatization to domestic owners did not substantially improve companies’ 
performance expressed in terms of value added. Companies privatized by domestic 
owners are found not to be able to catch up with global efficiency standards as proxied 
by foreign-owned firms. Similarly, Commander and Svejnar (2007) find that domestic 
private ownership does not have a significant effect on performance expressed in 
terms of value added. Also, Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000) using fixed 
effects panel estimation, find that companies owned by outsiders are more effective 
in terms of revenue growth compared to companies owned by insiders or SOEs. 
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Insider ownership is found to have the least performance improvement effects (Jones 
and Mygind, 2000)*.  
Most of the studies that control for foreign ownership find that the effect of 
privatization in case of foreign ownership is associated with higher performance 
improvements expressed by various indicators, including value added, sales and 
productivity (Angelucci et al., 2002*; Commander and Svejnar, 2007; Sabirianova, 
Svejnar, and Terrell, 2005; Jones and Mygind, 2000*). Faggio and Konings (2003) find 
that foreign ownership is also associated with improvement in terms of employment.   
Jones and Mygind (2000)* using large sample of companies in Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia suggest that, the effects of private ownership on productivity vary 
considerably over time and across countries and are always either zero or positive. 
Similarly, Claessens and Djankov (2002) analysing privatized and state-owned 
enterprises in seven TEs find that privatization is associated with significant 
improvement in sales and labour productivity and, to a lesser extent, with fewer job 
losses. Moreover, they find that the effect of privatization seems to increase in 
magnitude and significance over time. For instance, companies privatised for less than 
two years are found to have similar labour productivity to that of SOEs. However, 
companies privatised for more than three years clearly outperform SOEs. Their results 
are robust to different specifications. Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000) find 
that privatization increases the revenue of firms privatized to outsiders by almost ten 
percentage points.  They also examine the effect of the imposition of hard budget 
constraints and find that hard budget constraints alone are incapable of inducing 
performance improvements given that there is a lack of credible commitment by 
governments to properly impose such constraints to underperforming SOEs.  
Some of these papers try to control for selection bias problem by using various 
techniques however most of them are constrained by the availability good 
instruments that would allow them to control for this problem. Some of the studies in 
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fact fail to control for it while some, after identifying the selection bias, and in absence 
of proper instruments to deal with it, report only inconclusive results (see for instance 
Goud, 2003)*.   
Most of these studies report the importance of competition. For instance, Angelucci et 
al. (2002)* using Cobb-Douglas production function find that there is some 
complementarity between competitive pressure and ownership, and that competitive 
market structures are equally associated with better performance.  Commander and 
Svejnar (2007) and Carlin et al. (2001) also report that competition in the product 
market has important effects on companies’ performance.  
The list of reviewed studies covering more than one country and a summary of the 
features and results of these studies is presented below in Table 2.2. Again, the fifth 
column of the table also comments the efforts made by the authors for dealing with 
selection bias problem. Similar to single country studies, the period covered by these 
studies is not very long. Out of 12 reviewed studies three are cross sectional studies 
(either one year of data or pooled cross section). Six studies cover a period of less than 
five years and the remaining ones cover a period between six to eight years. No study 
covers a period of more than ten years.  Also, out of 12 reviewed studies three of them 
do not account for selection bias problem. Another five make some limited efforts to 
control for it. The narrow time span covered by the data and the limited efforts to deal 
with selection bias remain prevalent in empirical studies in this field. However, there 
is some improvement in recent studies compared to the ones produced before 2000. 
Similarly, multi country studies also find mixed results. This also reflects 
particularities of those countries (most probably the institutional framework at a 
particular time). The results also depend on whether the authors take various 
problems into consideration or not, as well kind of ownership (and corporate 
governance structure) comes out of privatisation. 
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Table 2.2. List of studies that analyse more than one country (in chronological order)                                                                                       4 
Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Commander and 
Svejnar (2007) 
26 TEs 2002 and 2005 
 
The study uses large randomly stratified sample of firms 
in 26 TEs. The data come from Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS); 2002 and 
2005 rounds. The study uses augmented Cobb Douglas 
revenue function also employing instrumental variable 
approach to account for selection bias. The results of the 
study show that foreign (but not domestic private) 
ownership and competition have an impact on 
performance – measured as the level of sales controlling 
for inputs.  
 
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large. 
-Value added 
Brown, Earle and 
Telegdy (2006) 
Hungary, Romania,  
Russia and  
Ukraine 
1994-2002 
 
The study uses panel data of nearly the whole universe 
of former SOEs (23,884 in all four countries) from both 
before and after privatization periods. It uses OLS; fixed 
effects; as well as fixed effect and firm-specific trends 
estimators. Pre-privatization data are used to control for 
selection bias. The results show significant positive 
effect of privatization on productivity in Romania, 
ranging from 15 to 50 percent. Positive and significant 
results are also estimated in Hungary however the 
range is lower than that of Romania. In Ukraine, the 
estimated results are positive but lower than in the other 
two countries. Moreover, results in Ukraine are 
sensitive to model specifications and in some cases 
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large. 
-Productivity 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
become insignificant. Lastly, estimated results from 
Russia range from negative to positive.  
 
Sabirianova, 
Svejnar, and 
Terrell (2005) 
Czech Republic and 
Russia 
1992-2000 
 
The study uses panel data on almost all industrial firms 
in each country, employing translog production 
function. Authors find that privatization to domestic 
owners did not substantially improved companies’ 
performance; domestic firms are not catching up to the 
(world) efficiency standard given by foreign-owned 
firms; and the distance of the Russian firms to the 
efficiency frontier is much larger than that of the Czech 
firms and continued to grow for most firms beyond 
1997 while remaining constant in the Czech Republic. 
Data from initial periods are used to control for 
selection bias. 
  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large. 
-Value added 
Goud (2003) 25 TEs  1999 
 
The study uses BEEPS 1999 data covering 4,104 firms 
in the sample from 25 TEs. Using a binomial logic 
regression model the author checks for selection bias. 
After finding the presence of selection bias, and in 
absence of proper instruments to deal with it, the study 
provides only inconclusive results about the direction of 
effect of ownership on companies’ performance.  
 
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Change in sales  
-Change in labour 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Faggio and 
Konings (2003) 
Poland, 
Estonia, 
Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, and 
Romania 
1993-1997 
 
The study uses data from 6,884 companies from five 
TEs. However, the ownership effects are not estimated 
for Estonia and Slovenia in absence of ownership 
information. The results are based on 6,144 observations 
and find that foreign-owned companies in Romania, 
Poland and Bulgaria have higher job creation and excess 
job reallocation rates compared to SOEs. Also, job 
destruction rates among these companies are lower.  
 
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem. 
-Percentage change in 
labour 
Angelucci et al. 
(2002) 
Bulgaria,  
Poland and 
Rumania 
1997-1998 
 
The study uses data from around 22,500 companies 
(around 2000 in Bulgaria, around 3000 in Rumania 
and the rest from Poland). It employs Cobb-Douglas 
production function using OLS as well as fixed- and 
random-effects estimators. The study indicates that 
there is some complementarity between competitive 
pressure and ownership. On the one hand, import 
penetration is found to be associated with better 
performance in Poland regardless on the ownership 
structure of the company. This effect is strengthened in 
case of foreign owned firms. On the other hand, in 
Bulgaria and Romania import penetration is associated 
with lower performance of domestic companies while 
competitive market structures are equally associated 
with better performance.   
 
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Sales 
-Value added  
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Claessens and 
Djankov (2002) 
Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, 
Hungary, 
Poland, 
Romania,  
Slovakia and 
Slovenia 
 
1992-1995 
 
The study uses data from 6,000 privatized and state-
owned enterprises in seven TEs over the initial 
transition period. Using fixed effects, cluster effects, and 
random effects, the study finds that privatization is 
associated with significant improvement in sales and 
labour productivity and, to a lesser extent, with fewer 
job losses. The effect of privatization seems to increase in 
magnitude and significance as the time since 
privatization passes. For instance, privatised companies 
for less than two years have similar labour productivity 
to that of SOEs. However, privatised companies for 
more than years clearly outperform SOEs. The results 
are robust to different specifications. 
  
The selection bias 
problem is accounted 
for and the sample 
size is relatively large. 
-Percentage change in 
labour productivity 
-Sales 
-Employment 
Carlin et al. (2001) 25 TEs 1996-1998 
 
The study uses data from 3,300 firms in 25 TEs looking 
at growth in sales and in sales per employee over a 
three-year period. Fixed and random effects estimators 
are used. The study results show that, controlling for 
other factor, privatization does not have any significant 
impact on performance. Sales or productivity growth of 
privatized companies is statistically not different from 
that of SOEs. However, de novo private companies have 
significantly higher sales growth but lower productivity 
growth. The study also finds that competition in 
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem. 
-Percentage change in 
sales per worker 
-Sales 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
product market also has important effects on companies’ 
performance.  
Walsh and 
Whelan (2001) 
Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Slovakia and 
Slovenia 
1990-1996 
 
The study uses data from 220 firm from four TEs. The 
authors control for pre-and post – privatisation effects 
on companies’ growth using group effects. Authors’ use 
pre-privatization data to control for selection bias. They 
find that majority outside ownership outperforms 
majority insider/state ownership, but only when 
controlling for EU export orientation of companies. In 
cases when EU export orientation is similar to both 
groups of companies, the results are significantly not 
different.  
 
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem. 
-Percentage change in 
labour 
Jones and Mygind 
(2000) 
Lithuania, 
Latvia and  
Estonia 
1994 and 1995 
 
The study uses large sample of companies in Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia employing generalized Cobb 
Douglas and translog production functions. Cross-
sectional and fixed and random effects methods are used 
in different specifications. Results suggest that even 
though effects of private ownership on productivity vary 
considerably over time and across countries, still 
productivity effects are always found to be either zero or 
positive. Results about specific ownership structures are 
mixed. For instance, in Lithuania all forms of private 
ownership have zero productivity effects. However, 
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Value added 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
estimates for Estonia indicate that outside and foreign 
ownership is preferred to insider ownership. In regards 
to insider ownership alone, in Estonia, results show that 
majority ownership of employees yield better 
performance than majority ownership by managers.  
 
Frydman, Hessel, 
and Rapaczynski 
(2000) 
Hungary,  
Poland and  
Czech Republic 
1990-1993 
 
The study uses data from 215 firms (90 of them state 
and 125 privatized) from the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland (the initial sample size is larger but many 
companies were dropped). These are survey data 
collected in 1994. Using fixed effects panel estimation, 
the study finds that companies owned by outsiders are 
more effective in terms of revenue growth compared to 
companies owned by insiders or SOEs.  
 
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem. 
-Percentage change in 
sales 
Frydman et al. 
(2000) 
Hungary,  
Poland and  
Czech Republic 
1994-1995 
The study uses data from 216 firms from the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland. It examines whether 
the imposition of budget constraints alone are sufficient 
to improve companies’ performance in these countries. 
The study finds that the threat of hard budget 
constraints is weak in absence of credible commitment 
from the government to enforce them for SOEs with 
weak performance. The study finds that privatization 
alone increases the revenue of firms privatized to 
outsiders by almost ten percentage points. 
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem. 
-Percentage change in 
sales 
Source: Author’s own compilation  
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2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the empirical studies estimating the effect of 
ownership on companies’ performance. As indicated, empirical research on the 
relationship between privatization and companies’ performance is very broad. 
Especially in the context of TEs, there is a vast number of empirical studies that 
try to determine the direction and importance of this relationship. Given that 
the privatization process in TEs was extensive, it provided an excellent 
laboratory for empirical research. This Chapter finds that there is a wide range 
of results arising from the fact that the studies are different in respect to their 
measures of ownership and performance, estimation techniques, the identity 
of the buyer, the extent of competition in the product market, institutional 
framework and time periods covered. The reviewed literature showed that 
privatization and companies’ performance are related; however, their 
relationship is not straight forward. So far, neither the theory nor the empirical 
literature were able to provide conclusive evidence about the direction and 
magnitude of the effect of privatization on companies’ performance.  
In general, studies reviewed in this Chapter suffer from many problems, 
primarily the selection bias problem. Early empirical studies tended to ignore 
this problem which might explain some of the variation in results reported in 
this literature. Estrin et al. (2009) expanding the survey by Djankov and Murrell 
(2002) find that when focusing only on the empirical research that tries to deal 
with the selection bias problem, the results become less diverse and 
privatization effects, in more cases, are found to have positive impact on 
performance. However, as indicated in this Chapter there is still significant 
variation across the relevant studies. 
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The review of the recent studies suggests that there is heterogeneity in results 
which can be partially explained by different characteristics of the original 
studies. It has been argued that the lack of a conclusive evidence in the 
literature can partly be attributed to the lack of attention to selection bias. 
Similarly, small, non-representative and barely comparable data, may also 
explain some of the heterogeneity of results in the existing literature. 
In order to deal with these problems, Chapter 4 will examine the relationship 
between ownership and performance at the micro level, using data collected 
for statistically representative samples using the same methodology, and data 
which allows us to control for selection bias.   
Studies that analyse the impact of privatization on companies’ performance by 
comparing indicators before and after privatization that do not control 
aggregate fluctuations and regulatory reforms are especially susceptible to 
estimation problems. Studies that focus on TEs have to make additional efforts 
to try and disentangle the effect of ownership transformation from the effect of 
other reforms that were typically carried around the same period. Also, the 
transition process is afflicted with aggregate shocks which, if are not accounted 
for properly, may erroneously be attributed to ownership transformation. The 
direction and size of the bias that may be introduced in such cases is unknown. 
Accordingly, unlike most of the previous studies, the analysis in Chapter 6 uses 
a large representative sample of companies with observations over a seven year 
period which also include companies that did not go through the privatization 
process hence providing a good benchmark to isolate the effects of aggregate 
shocks and regulatory reforms. The key proposition of the empirical models in 
the following Chapters is that ownership matters and it does account for 
differences in companies’ performance. This hypothesis will be further 
developed and empirically investigated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.  
  
Chapter 3 
Privatization in former Yugoslavia: from social to private 
ownership  
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 72 
3.1 Yugoslavia's market socialism and workers' self-management ....................................... 74 
3.2 The privatization process before the break-up of former Yugoslavia ............................. 84 
3.3 Privatization and ownership transformation in successor states of former 
Yugoslavia ...................................................................................................................................... 87 
3.4 Empirical evidence from the privatization process in successor states of former 
Yugoslavia ...................................................................................................................................... 97 
3.5 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 103 
 
  
Chapter 3 - Privatization in former Yugoslavia: from social to private ownership 
72 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the nature of ownership and its transformation 
in former Yugoslavia and its successor states.33 It starts by analysing social ownership, 
as a form of ownership very distinct from that in the rest of the communist bloc. It 
brings together different theories to analyse the model of the Yugoslav firm and the 
underlying ownership structures. This Chapter focuses only on the post-1952 period, 
as from this date, former Yugoslavia had completed her departure from the 
centralized system and begun to develop the decentralised market socialism model.34 
During this period, the management and decision-making rights over the companies’ 
affairs were largely transferred to employees and these competences were further 
increased in the following decades.35,36 The increased autonomy of companies had an 
impact on their decision-making and the goals they perused.37 The emergence of this 
type of economic organisation was soon accompanied by theoretical models hich 
aimed at the explanation and interpretation of the behaviour of Yugoslav firms and 
their performance (see for instance: Ward, 1958; Vanek, 1970; Horvat, 1982).  
                                                        
33 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ, hereafter referred to as former Yugoslavia) was 
formally a decentralized federation, consisting of six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and 
Vojvodina). As of 2014, there are 7 independent states formed after the break-up of the federation: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. This chapter 
does not include Kosovo as it will be discussed separately in Chapters 5 and 6.  
34  From the end of the Second World War until 1952 Yugoslavia had a soviet-type system of socialism 
with strong emphasis on central planning and industrialisation.  
35 During this period it was recognized that the allocation and ownership of resources by state and 
central planning was inefficient. This was especially reinforced because of the severe crises experienced 
by the Federation after the break from the Soviet Union. Hence it started a process of diminishing 
excessive centralization of state functions and devolving some of those functions to the lower levels of 
the federation (republican or provincial). This also ensured the needed support and legitimacy from 
the federal units (Gligorov, 2004). 
36 By mid-1960s, workers’ council had substantially increased their competences, especially in 
controlling the distribution of profits between wage and internal funds (Furubotn, 1971).  
37 It should be emphasised that, despite the massive decentralisation of power, the Centre (the federal 
government and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, LCY) retained important competences to 
satisfy broader economic, political and social goals and to maintain the power of LCY. 
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This Chapter also surveys the ownership transformation processes in the successor 
states of former Yugoslavia. The privatization process in the former federation based 
on the Act on Social Capital of 1989 started before that other transition economies. The 
extent of the ownership reform based on this legislation, however, was limited as the 
reforms were cut short by the breakup of the Federation. Despite their similar initial 
ownership structures, the successor states followed different paths in transforming 
social ownership, with some relying heavily on the previous federal legislation; some 
modified the legislation to allow for other methods, while the rest undertook heavy 
changes in privatization legislation. Further, this Chapter, using the limited existing 
literature, will investigate how the transformation of ownership has impacted the 
performance of emerging private companies.  
Since the aim of this Chapter is to provide a context for the empirical analysis of the 
following Chapter, the investigation is focused on the issues relevant to privatisation 
and firm performance only. As such, this Chapter does not seek to provide 
comprehensive discussions of the social ownership and its transformation. These 
aspects have been extensively analysed in the previous literature on the Yugoslav 
economy.38 Rather, this Chapter seeks to identify and analyse the key aspects of 
ownership and performance in this specific context and, as such, will inform the 
investigation that is undertaken in the following Chapter.  
The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 will provide the context of 
the ownership structure in former Yugoslavia. The main form of ownership in this 
country was social ownership; hence, this section starts by first exploring the Yugoslav 
firms in the self-management/social ownership setting. Concepts such as property 
rights and workers’ self-management, and issues such as saving and investment 
decisions, wage setting, maximization of income per worker or profit maximization, 
among others, will be discussed in this section. Section 3.2 explains the initial 
                                                        
38 For a comprehensive survey see Prout (1985), Lydall (1984), Estrin, (1991). 
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ownership transformation initiatives in the late 1980s based on the 1989 Act on Social 
Capital. Here the favoured position of the ‘insiders’ and the progress of this method 
of privatization until the beginning of the break-up of the federation are discussed. 
Section 3.3 analyses the process of privatization and ownership transformation in 
successor states of former Yugoslavia. It will focus on the common and distinctive 
features in transforming social ownership and legacies of privatization plans based on 
pre-1990 legislation. It will also present short analyses of the privatization process in 
each of the successor states, including some remarks on the resulting ownership 
structures after privatization. Section 3.4 reviews the limited empirical evidence on 
the impact of privatization on companies’ performance in these countries. Section 3.5 
concludes.    
 
3.1 Yugoslavia's market socialism: social ownership and 
workers' self-management 
The economic system of former Yugoslavia was distinct from that of other socialist 
countries and this distinction is rooted in her departure from the centralized model of 
socialism in early-1950s (Lydall, 1984). This departure gave enterprises higher degree 
of autonomy and, together with other novel features, became known as the self-
managed or the socialist market economy (Prout, 1985). The model of social 
ownership promoted the concept of industrial democracy through increasing the 
involvement of workers in all matters related to the operation of their enterprises. It 
was instituted by law as a top-down process rather than as a voluntarily or 
entrepreneurially driven phenomenon. In turn, it led to a lot of inconsistencies as the 
competences and relations of numerous agents were only loosely defined (Pejovich, 
1992). In an effort to channel these problems into formal structures, it was necessary 
to embark on numerous reforms from 1952 to the late 1970s. In some cases, when 
economic agents took advantage of increased freedom and behaved in an unexpected 
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manner (not deemed appropriate by the authorities), rigid regulations were imposed 
which allowed only for anticipated actions which in turn reduced the incentives for 
participation in autonomous decision-making (Horvat, 1982).   
The most fundamental reform of the soviet type system in Yugoslavia was the 
introduction of ‘social ownership’. Enterprises did not belong to either shareholders 
(as in market economies) or the state (as in the soviet system). They belonged to the 
‘society’ and left in trust with their employees. Employees were expected to look after 
the enterprise assets, maintain them and increase their value over time. They also 
became the main beneficiaries of enterprises – though not their owners. In practice, 
and over time, it became clear that while enterprises and their assets were the property 
of the society and everyone was an owner, in reality no one in particular was the 
owner, discharging the full functions of ownership.39 Of course, in extreme cases (such 
as the bankruptcy of an enterprise) the state became interested and involved in 
resolving the problems faced by enterprises (in the case of bankruptcy, for instance, 
by merging it with another enterprise and writing its debts off). In some sense, as it 
has been argued by Vanek (1970), social ownership was an extension or a variant of 
state ownership.  
The level of employees’ decision making rights and obligations evolved over time. 
Workers’ Councils of each firm were empowered to formulate annual plans, set 
production targets, levels of investment, most prices and wages, and were allowed to 
enter in contractual relations. Apart from prices of a narrow range of commodities 
which were kept controlled, the rest were gradually liberalized from the mid-1960s, 
increasing further the decision making power of enterprises and the scope for the 
operation of markets (Flaherty, 1988). At the same time limited trade liberalization 
reforms were enacted to abandon the state monopoly of foreign trade (common under 
                                                        
39 The functions of ownership include the right to possession (jus possidendi), the right to use (jus 
utendi), the right to benefit (jus fruendi) and the right to dispose (jus abutendi) property.  
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the Soviet system) and allow for more foreign competition, exposing the economy to 
the disciplining effects of competition. On the other hand, the means of production 
retained their public ownership (Furubotn, 1971). The greater autonomy of enterprises 
meant that the behavioural objectives of companies became an issue of central 
importance.  
Due to its specific features, a great deal of research was conducted to analyse the 
socialist market economy in general, and the specific Yugoslav variant in particular.40 
At firm level, different theories emerged explaining the behaviour of the labour-
managed firms. Ward in his seminal 1958 paper put forth a theoretical model based 
on the assumption that a labour-managed firm tends to maximise income per worker, 
and compares the operation of such an enterprise with that of a capitalist firm.41 The 
comparison between the labour-managed firm and the capitalist firm was done while 
implicitly assuming that the two have the same production function and that the 
supply of factors is the same in both settings (Milanovic, 1983).  This framework was 
used in much of investigations that followed.42  
Ward’s model can be summarised as follows. Consider a firm with one variable input 
with its production function q(L, K), where L is the number of workers and K the 
capital input which is assumed to be fixed.43 The firm operates in a competitive 
market, selling its product at price p and incurs some non-labour related fixed costs 
(C). A labour managed firm is then assumed to maximise per worker income (i): 
𝑖 = 𝑝𝑞(𝐿)−𝐶
𝐿
                (3.1) 
                                                        
40 See for instance Vanek (1970); Horvat (1982); Estrin and Bartlett (1982); Estrin and Svejnar (1985); 
Liotta (2001).   
41 Ward named this kind of enterprise the ‘Illyrian Firm’, clearly alluding to Yugoslavia. In subsequent 
literature this term was used to describe self-managed firm.   
42 For illustration, see Domar (1966), Bonin and Fukuda (1986), Vanek (1970), Estrin and Svejnar (1985), 
Ireland (1987).  
43  The production function y=f (L, K) is assumed to have positive but declining marginal product, i.e., 
y’(L)>0 and  y’’(L)<0 
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A company pursuing a profit maximising objective would, of course, maximize its 
profit:  
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑞(𝐿)−𝑊𝐿−𝐶       (3.2) 
Where W is the level of wages and L the level of employment. Expressions (3.1) and 
(3.2) show that wages can be greater or less than per worker income (w > or < i) 
depending on the level of profit (profit < or > zero). The Ward model assumes that all 
profit is appropriated by workers with each member taking an equal share. The level 
of employment is set so that the per worker income is maximized. 
Expression (3.1) can be rewritten as: 
𝑖 = 𝑝𝑞(𝐿)
𝐿
− 𝐶
𝐿
              (3.3) 
Where 𝑝𝑞
(𝐿)
𝐿
 is revenue per worker and 𝐶
𝐿
 is cost per worker. In Figure 3.1 (Panel A), 
revenue and costs per worker are plotted against the number of employees. 
𝑝𝑞(𝐿)
𝐿
 (for 
simplicity written as 𝑅
𝐿
  in the following diagrams) is the average revenue product of 
labour and has an inverted u-shape reflecting the fact that the law of diminishing 
return will set in at some point as employment increases.  𝐶
𝐿
, representing average costs 
per worker is a rectangular hyperbola asymptotic to its axes. Income per worker 
reaches the maximum when the difference between 𝑅
𝐿
 and 𝐶
𝐿
 is the greatest, which is 
the value of L1 for which the slopes of  𝑅
𝐿
 and 𝐶
𝐿
  are equal.  
Income per worker (i) is the vertical difference between 𝑅
𝐿
 and 𝐶
𝐿
  curves and is 
presented in Panel B of Figure 1. On this panel, we have also shown the marginal value 
product of labour curve (p.MPL). On the basis of the usual relationship between the 
average and marginal product curves, this curve passes through the maximum point 
of the i curve (which is actually the average value product of labour). The labour 
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managed firm is expected to operate at point A where income per worker is 
maximised, employing L1 workers and paying the maximum per worker income. A 
profit maximizing firm, on the other hand, would operate somewhere to the right of 
point L1, employing a higher level of workers and paying only the wage level. 
 
Figure 3.1.Behaviour of the Labour Managed firm (change in costs)  
Source: Author drawing from various sources   
The comparative static analysis of the labour managed firm produces some strange 
results, known as ‘perverse results’. For example, if fixed costs increase, the 𝐶
𝐿
 schedule 
in Panel A of Figure 3.1 will shifts upwards to 𝐶
𝐿1
. At the former optimum level of 
employment L1, the 
𝐶
𝐿1
 curve will be steeper than the 𝑅
𝐿
 curve. Consequently, the labour 
managed firm will increase the number of workers (and output) until the slope of 𝐶
𝐿1
 
equals the slope of 𝑅
𝐿
. This is also presented in Panel B of Figure 3.1. As a result of the 
change in 𝐶
𝐿
  curve, there will be a new schedule of income per worker (i1). The new 
optimum position is at point B where the i1 curve reaches its maximum (and also 
where it is intersected by the marginal value product of labour curve (pMPL), 
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somewhere to the right of the original level (point A). Thus an increase in fixed costs 
will motivate the firm to employ more workers. A profit maximising firm would not 
have changed its employment level as a result of this change. 
The effect of an increase in the output price is also unusual. This is presented in Figure 
3.2. Panel A of Figure 3.2 is very similar to Panel A in Figure 3.1 with 𝑅
𝐿
 and 𝐶
𝐿
 and the 
income per working maximising level of employment of L1 as in Figure 1. Suppose 
that an increase in demand leads to an increase in the market price p. The 𝑅
𝐿
  schedule 
in Panel A of Figure 3.2 shifts upwards to  
𝑅
𝐿1
. At the old optimum employment level 
of L1, the 
𝑅
𝐿1
 curve will be steeper than the 𝐶
𝐿
 curve. Consequently, the labour managed 
firm will decrease the number of workers (and consequently output) until the slope of 
𝑅
𝐿1
  equals the slope of  𝐶
𝐿
 , i.e., to L2. In Panel B, the increase in p results in an upward 
shift of the marginal value product of labour curve (pMPL)  to pMPL1.  
 
Figure 3.2 Behaviour of the Labour Managed firm (change in price)  
Source: Author drawing from various sources   
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The new schedule of income per worker (i1) has its maximum somewhere to the left 
of the initial maximum. There is of course a new marginal value product of labour 
curve (pMPL1) which passes through the maximum of the i1 curve (at point B), slightly 
to the left of the optimum position (point A). Thus an increase in output price leads to 
a decrease in employment and output. A profit maximising firm would have 
increased its output and employment in response to a price rise. The behaviour of the 
labour managed firm is often referred to as ‘perverse’. As Ireland (1987) points out, 
this behaviour is the result of the distorted incentives (income per head 
maximisation).44 
This basic model has been reinforced by many authors in subsequent literature (see 
for instance Domar, 1966 and Vanek 1970. Also, other extensions have been developed 
to include less restrictive assumptions, for instance multiple variable inputs and 
substitutability of inputs. Milenkovitch (1984) finds that the inclusion of these 
assumptions seems to decrease the ‘perverse’ behaviour of the labour managed firm, 
though it will still retain its sub-optimal output and employment levels compared to 
its profit maximizing counterpart.   
However, another group of authors have refuted this model on the grounds of 
underlying assumptions about the firm’s objectives. This strand of literature argued 
that maximizing income per worker does not reflect the objective of the Yugoslav 
labour managed firm (see for instance Horvat, 1972, 1976; Prasnikar et al., 1991). 
Horvat (1984; 1986) suggests that some of the behaviours predicted by the Ward 
model were never observed in Yugoslav economy. Also, Prasnikar and Svejnar (1991) 
asserted that labour managed firm can produce efficient results while at the same time 
                                                        
44 At macroeconomic level, this implies that there is no mechanism for clearing labour markets as no 
market wage exists, hence creating unemployment in the long run equilibrium. Unemployed workers 
cannot make themselves more attractive by lowering their supply price as if hired they receive 
proportionate share of firms net revenue. Meade (1972, 1974) proposes a way to remedy this by 
allowing firms to hire new workers on discriminatory terms. Another mechanism is the entry of new 
firms.  
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have more equitable allocative efficiency. The latter group of authors have also refuted 
the Ward’s model on the basis of the level of efforts that self-managed workers put 
into their jobs. Horvat (1986), Jones and Svejnar (1982) and Vanek (1970) ague that 
workers who are involved in decision making and manage themselves, are more 
productive and put greater efforts in their work due to the increased utility from self-
management. Horvat suggests that the workers council is in better position than the 
board of directors in a capitalist firm to monitor the affairs of the firm and the 
behaviour of the management. The council has the necessary information and has a 
strong motivation for correct decision making (Horvat, 1982; p. 251).  
Property rights theorists have also analysed the behaviour of the labour-managed 
firm. They assert that because of unclear property rights, the allocation of resources 
by labour managed firms is sub-optimal (Pejovich, 1992). This line of thought 
maintains that prevailing property rights arrangement in former Yugoslavia distorted 
the investment decisions given that the workers were not permitted to own capital. 
As the workers have only the right to use the firms’ assets while they are in 
employment, they have more incentive to increase current consumption rather than 
investments (or future consumption). Due to these ambiguous property rights, 
employees have the incentive to transfer future cash flows of the company to present, 
leading to sub-optimal level of investment. This, single period model, was extended 
to a multi-period model which assumes that workers’ objective is wealth rather than 
income maximization (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970).  
Given this objective, if the workers recognize that an increase in capital will improve 
productivity and higher income in the future, they will support diverting some of the 
present income to investment. In this case, the Ward hypothesis would be a special 
case of the basic wealth maximizing model. Assuming that the workers are rational, 
they will choose to invest in non-owned assets only if they have permanent working 
relations with their firm. However, when workers are laid off or leave the firm, they 
Chapter 3 - Privatization in former Yugoslavia: from social to private ownership 
82 
 
lose all claims on the future returns from the capital for which they have sacrificed 
income in previous periods. As they cannot capture the benefit from investment, they 
choose to invest less than their capitalist profit maximizing counterparts.  Property 
rights theorists also assert that the labour managed firm is expected to take greater 
risks as the failure is shared with the society at large, while the benefits are captured 
only by the firm. This type of moral hazard cannot be easily disciplined by a socialist 
state with soft-budget constraint in pursuit of higher employment and equity.45  
Several interventions to restore these perverse incentives have been put forward since 
the 1960s in successive liberalization packages.46 These reforms, apart from 
introducing markets at local/national level, also exposed the economy to foreign 
goods and services. Additionally, these reforms aimed at introducing harder budget 
constraints by allowing the banking sector to allocate investment funds based on 
market principles.47 Faced with foreign competitive pressure and with harder budget 
constraints, it was expected that companies would be forced to restructure and 
modernize in order to ensure their survival. Harder budget constraints in a bank 
lending relationship could induce investment in non-owned assets; however these 
constraints were never seriously imposed. Instead, the soft budget constraint regime 
was retained in order to maintain employment levels consistent with social goals 
despite inflationary consequences (Milenkovitch, 1984). The interventions of the 
                                                        
45 Some of the arguments of property rights theory about state ownership are also relevant here. For 
details see section 1.1.2 in Chapter 1.  
46 By then one of the ideas that became widely accepted was to speed up the entry of new firms, to boost 
the number of entrepreneurs in order to improve the dynamism of the highly concentrated and 
stagnant industrial structure. A further theoretical impetus came from the economics of self-
management (Vanek, 1970), where entry was crucial for ensuring allocative efficiency. 
47 In this regard, there was a perverse relationship between macro and micro level decision-making in 
former Yugoslavia. While the macroeconomic decision-making was administratively imposed, the 
microeconomic level was largely left to the market mechanism. The government decided the level of 
money to be spent in each sector and used the banking sector to allocate the money based on market 
principles (Pejovich, 1966). While the market based distribution of funds aims to minimize the 
distortions caused by administrative decisions at the macro level, it proved unable to eliminate them. 
Moreover, as long as the banks were to be socially owned, there was a problem in bank lending 
relationship as both borrowers and lenders were the same agents (Gligorov, 2004).   
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government distorted the disciplining effect of the market and, at the same time, 
restricted the autonomy of self-managed enterprises.  
In cases when investment was financed by bank loans, companies tended to over-
invest and over-consume accumulating large debts. When debt levels became 
unsustainable, companies were rescued by local governments or through mergers 
with companies in the same sector. While companies were not allowed to sell off their 
assets, they were not prevented from devaluating social capital by either (i) borrowing 
money that they could not repay or (ii) exhaust the machinery without accumulating 
depreciation funds.  This allowed enterprises, and their employees, to pursue their 
own individual interests further at the expense of the society.  
Richer and better performing regions were dissatisfied as they were paying 
proportionately higher taxes to support poorer regions which were plagued with 
systematic inefficiency (Flaherty, 1982; Milenkovitch 1971). Moreover, during the 
1980s the economy of former Yugoslavia was in the midst of an economic crisis which 
resulted, amongst other things, in cutting back inter-regional support to poorer regions at 
a time when more resources were needed (Hashi, 1992).48. Moreover, the economic 
decision-making was subordinated to political objectives which limited the level of 
democratic decision-making. High level of decentralisation of authorities to 
constituent units weakened the ability of the federal government to develop proper 
regional policy instruments aiming at reducing inter-regional difference. Moreover, 
the increasing autonomy resulting from decentralisation and reliance on market 
mechanism even expanded these difference (Hashi, 1992). Given the high levels of 
diversity, the disintegration of the country, was almost inevitable, and would emerge 
as a Pareto-improving option (Bolton and Roland, 1997). The liberalization of trade 
and globalization renders the size of the country (single market) as unimportant as the 
                                                        
48 The following section provides some insights about the economic crisis that former Yugoslavia faced 
during this period. 
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advantages of closed markets disappear.  Also due to high diversity, the incentives to 
disintegrate gradually emerged (Gligorov, 2004). These outcomes together with the 
absence of democratic decision-making and unresolved ethnic tensions, led to the 
ultimate dissolution of the federation and the ‘Yugoslav wars’ of the 1990s.  
 
3.2 The privatization process before the break-up of former 
Yugoslavia 
 
During the 1980s, former Yugoslavia faced major economic crises, with high 
unemployment, hyperinflation, huge trade imbalance and unable to service its large 
foreign debt. The unemployment levels reached 14 percent in 1989 with a few million 
additional people working abroad. At the same time, by then the surplus personnel 
had reached 20 percent of the labour force (Coricelli and Rocha, 1991).49 During this 
decade, the output barely grew; GDP of 1989 stood at essentially the same level as that 
of 1979 (Gligorov, 2004).50 It was accompanied by a substantial increase in poverty 
rates (Milanovic, 1991).51  The enterprises were experiencing huge losses accounting 
for over 15 percent of GDP.52  
The experience of this decade showed that successive reforms of the system had not 
been able to deliver the necessary changes to put the economy on the right track. It 
was recognized that the expansion of the social ownership has reached its limitation 
and further economic development had to be based on the expansion of the private 
                                                        
49 The surplus personnel resulted from the SOEs’ attempt to avoid bankruptcy through the non-
payment of salaries.  
50 As predicted by most of the theories discussed above, there was a constant pressure to increase wages 
while investment was relegated to the background. The necessary investment was largely financed by 
external borrowing, resulting in higher and higher inflation. Once the external sources were dried out, 
investment dropped significantly, plunging the economy in a prolonged stagnation (Gligorov, 2004).  
51 Compared to agricultural and mixed households, the urban population experienced the effects of 
increased poverty more due to greater deterioration of living conditions among SOE workers 
(Milanovic, 1991).  
52 During the 1980s, the average enterprise losses were around 3 percent of GDP, starting as low as 1.6 
percent in 1980 (Coricelli and Rocha, 1991).While these numbers are affected by many accounting 
issues, still they indicate a highly deteriorating trend.  
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sector. In an attempt to overturn this situation, the government of Prime Minister Ante 
Markovic initiated a series of radical economic reforms at the end of 1989, with the 
support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).53 These reforms required the 
implementation of an austerity package aiming to bring hyper-inflation under control, 
freezing wages, substantial reductions in government spending as well as divestiture 
of SOEs (Spencer, 2000).  
The credit to the industrial sector was frozen, facilitating the bankruptcy process. 
Through the so-called ‘exit-mechanism’, established under the provisions of the newly 
enacted legislation, the government would initiate bankruptcy proceedings if the 
company failed to meet the creditors’ claims.54 Also the creditors could convert their 
credits into controlling equity of the insolvent enterprise, while the government was 
prevented from stepping in. Within one year, the implementation of the reform 
brought the inflation down to virtually zero (Crnobrnja, 1994). However, the reforms 
also had negative consequences. The level of unemployment increased, output 
plummeted and bankruptcies rose.  
Privatization was a fundamental part of the reform package, which also included hard 
budget constraints aiming at limiting financial indiscipline of SOEs. The most 
significant step towards privatization was taken with the enactment of the Enterprise 
Law in 1988 which limited workers self-management, allowed the entry of private 
capital and the establishment of joint-stock companies. Also, all forms of property 
were to be treated equally in legal terms, and the establishment of all forms of 
companies was constitutionally allowed (including the establishment of an SOE). The 
                                                        
53 The arrangements with the IMF increased the role of the federal government as the main authority 
over economic affairs. This was also supported by the IMF who needed a central authority to implement 
reforms. However, as the role of the government in Belgrade increased, so did the national intolerance 
agenda (Magaš, 1993). 
54 If an enterprise was unable to pay its bills for 30 days running, or for 30 days within a 45-day period, 
the government would launch bankruptcy proceedings within the next 15 days (Kiss, 1994). During 
this period, also state property started to grow through debt-equity swaps exercised on insolvent social 
debtors.  
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privatization process per se was formalized on the basis of the Act on Social Capital of 
1989. This law attempted to define property rights and create a framework that 
allowed for privatization of assets. It favoured insiders by offering them shares at 
large discounts and long payment periods. Former and current employees were 
entitled to buy shares at 30 percent discount on the nominal share values, subject to a 
maximum value of DM20,000. Each year of employment with the company gave the 
worker an additional one percent discount up to ceiling level of 70 percent. Employees 
were entitled to pay for their shares in instalments, provided that they complete their 
payments within ten years. The remaining (unsold) shares of each enterprise were to 
be sold in public auctions to domestic and foreign enterprises or individuals 
(Franičević, 1999); though the continued existence of SOEs was not prohibited (Uvalic 
1997, p. 269). 
The Act on Social Capital declared the Development Funds as the owners of SOEs. As 
a consequence, any proceeds resulting from sale of shares could not be used for capital 
investments in the companies. Consequently, the initial results of the privatization 
were not satisfactory as companies continued to be critically undercapitalized and the 
resulting dispersed insider ownership structures made it difficult to embark on the 
badly needed restructuring process (Hillman and Milanovic, 1992).   
The continued economic crisis exacerbated the political stability of the country and 
threatened to aggravate the simmering ethnic tensions (Spencer, 2000). The 
privatization process based on the Act on Social Capital had barely taken off when the 
deteriorating political situation turned into armed conflict. It is estimated that less 
than 10 percent of SOEs underwent the privatization process while the rest retained 
their former status (i.e., socially owned) at the time of the dissolution of former 
Yugoslavia (Vujacic and Vujacic, 2011).  
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3.3 Privatization and ownership transformation in successor 
states of former Yugoslavia 
At the time of independence, the number of SOEs in the successor states of Former 
Yugoslavia was 14,682. There was a similar distribution of companies among 
republics apart from Montenegro and Macedonia, where the number of enterprises 
was significantly lower (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1. Number of socially owned enterprises (at the time of independence) in 
successor states of former Yugoslavia  5
 Country Number of SOEs and date 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3000 (in 1995 - Dayton Agreement) 
Croatia 3619 (in 1992) 
Macedonia 1288 (in 1993) 
Serbia and Montenegro* 3878 (in 1992) 
Slovenia 2897 (in 1992) 
Note: *Only around 10 percent were in Montenegro.  
Source: Countries’ Privatization Agencies 
 
After the break-up of Yugoslavia, successor states enacted new legislation in order to 
expedite the privatization process. However the process itself was slow due to the 
absence of relevant institutions to implement the process. In Slovenia, socially owned 
firms were privatized in a way that preserved the continuity of ownership and the 
survival of existing firms (Gligorov, 2004). An interesting approach for transforming 
social ownership was to sell or distribute a proportion of the companies’ shares to 
their employees, allowing the capital markets to determine the eventual ownership 
structure.  A sizeable portion of the economy remained in direct ownership of Funds 
for many years. Only after the start of break-up of the Federation, the privatization 
process in successor states created space for international participation (Mencinger, 
1996). 
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In Croatia, SOEs were initially nationalized and then sold to private owners (Gligorov, 
2004). This gave great discretionary power to the government and privatization 
agencies. The insiders continued to be favoured while outside investors were 
discriminated against, thus the inflow of foreign capital was deterred (Hiller and 
Drezga, 1996). By 1996 selective voucher privatization was also introduced which 
benefited only selected groups, mainly those affected by the war (Franicevic, 1999). 
Subsequent legal amendments created space for new methods of privatization 
extending to strategic selling and outsider ownership (Ostovic, 1996).  
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the privatization process was put on hold until the end of 
the war in 1995. By then the only privatization that had been carried out was that 
based on former federal legislation. Based on this, only around 5 percent of SOEs had 
been privatized (Bayliss, 2005).The actual privatization process did not restart until 
1997, after the Government nationalised all the remaining enterprises and their unsold 
shares. The method adopted was voucher privatization. By early 2001, less than 10 
percent of large-scale enterprises within the Federation had been privatised, while in 
Republika Srpska the figure was less than 5 percent (Donais, 2002). However, the 
majority of small-scale enterprises were privatized between 1989 and early 2000 (see 
Figure 3.3 for details). The privatisation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina faced a 
number of uncertainties, including information problems and a highly decentralised 
implementation process. There were further problems regarding the ownership status 
of enterprises, given unclear documentation of minority “internal” shares issued to 
employees under the pre-war privatisation legislation (EBRD, various years).  
In Serbia, the privatization process went through several phases after the break-up of 
the federation. The first phase was based on previous legislation. Insiders were very 
interested in purchasing shares as the instalments to be paid were not indexed for 
accelerating inflation (Milovanovic, 2007). Unlike all the other successor states of 
former Yugoslavia, Serbia retained ‘social property’ as one of the main property 
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forms, implying that privatization was in no way imposed on enterprises as obligatory 
(Uvalic, 2010). Still, by 1994, almost 43 percent of social ownership had been 
transferred to private owners. However, the revised legislation reversed the process 
renationalizing almost all previously privatized assets. This brought down the share 
of private owners to 1-2 percent (Vujacic, 1996, pp 398-9). In 1997 new legislation was 
passed which introduced free distribution of shares to employees (Hadzic, 2002). By 
2000, less than ten percent of social capital had been privatized (Begovic et al., 2000). 
The process intensified after 2001 along with the implementation of other transition 
reforms after the democratic revolution of October 2000 (Vujacic and Vujacic, 2011).   
In Montenegro, while part of the Serbia-Montenegro state, the new law passed in 1992 
which nationalized the social owned enterprises, was also applied in this country. 
Government controlled Funds became owners of the majority of shares with the 
workers retaining minority ownership in these companies (Cerovic, 2010). The model 
defined by the law was mass voucher privatization (distribution of shares to all adult 
citizens for free) (EBRD, 2001). By the end of the decade, when Montenegro had 
become an independent country, new legislation was passed which allowed for other 
forms of ownership transformation.  
In Macedonia, the law was passed in 1993 which allowed for revising the process 
based on former Yugoslav legislation. As a result only about 10 percent of previously 
privatizations were approved. The new legislation projected that 30 percent of shares 
were to be offered to employees on favourable terms, 15 percent were to be transferred 
to state pension funds and remaining 55 percent were available for sale to any investor 
on equal terms (foreign and domestic). The law was based on case-by-case selling and 
the methods to be used were different depending on the size of the company (Slaveski, 
1997; Suklev, 1996).  
To sum up, in all successor states, though to varying degrees, similarities with 
previous legislation were kept, showing path dependency from divestiture method 
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before the break-up of the federation which favoured workers and managers. Table 
3.2 summarises the privatization methods used in these countries. 
 
Table 3.2 Methods of privatization in successor states of former Yugoslavia  6 
Country Primary Method  Secondary Method 
Bosnia Voucher Direct sale 
Croatia MEBO Voucher 
Macedonia MEBO Direct sale 
Montenegro Vouchers Direct sale 
Serbia Auctions Direct sale 
Slovenia MEBO Voucher 
Source: EBRD (various years)  
Management and Employee Buyout (MEBO) was the primary method in Croatia, 
Macedonia and Slovenia while their adopted legislation allowed for other methods of 
privatization. Voucher privatization was an important method in Bosnia and 
Montenegro (as a primary method) and the secondary method in Slovenia and 
Croatia. Only in Serbia the primary method of privatization was through auctions; 
however the process was very slow, and accelerated only after the end of the Kosovo 
war in 1999.  
These privatisation methods, on the whole, resulted in dispersed ownership 
structures where no efficient corporate governance (CG) framework could be 
established. The bearers of the vouchers had no incentives in enforcing good GG on 
companies; nor had they the know-how or the capital to initiate the restructuring 
process by themselves. In the case of MEBO privatisation, insiders paid for the shares 
from company profits, using up investment resources. The resulting ownership 
structures, with little ownership control and little financial resources delayed the 
restructuring process and most of the companies, as in other transition countries, lost 
their competitiveness (EBRD, 1997).   
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Subsequently a process of concentration of ownership started to emerge through 
secondary privatization.55 Secondary privatization was also important for the entry of 
strategic investors given that the first stage of privatization, to a large extent, excluded 
the outsiders. In later stages of transition, ownership concentration was strengthened 
mainly by some incumbent owners increasing their shares. Incumbent owners were 
reluctant to seek equity financing from outsiders fearing the loss of control (Simoneti 
and Jamnik, 2000). Reliance on internal sources constrained companies from effective 
restructuring.  
By the end of the 1990s, countries had recognized that not only privatization was 
important, but that the resulting ownership structures also mattered. By then it was 
recognized that for companies to survive in a competitive setting, restructuring and 
establishment of the sound corporate governance are more important than mere 
ownership transformation. Empirical studies, almost unanimously suggest that 
companies privatized by foreign investors have been the best performers (for details 
see Chapter 2). To this end, governments engaged in facilitating increased foreign 
ownership while shifting the motivation of privatization away from social concerns 
towards improvements in corporate governance (EBRD, 1998). This is especially true 
for countries that started the process later (like Serbia) and tried to simultaneously 
divest SOEs and attract FDI, but also in countries where the privatization process was 
progressing slowly.   
The privatization process was an important instrument of attracting FDI into different 
sectors in transition countries (Hunya and Kalotay, 2000).56 With the liberalization of 
FDI increased in all successor states of former Yugoslavia- between 1998 and 2008, on 
average, the levels of FDI increased almost 14 times (EBRD, various years). This 
increase was triggered significantly by privatization related investment inflows, and 
                                                        
55 Secondary privatization refers to the evolution and changes of ownership structures in privatized 
companies after the initial privatization.  
56 Fore greater details on the relationship between FDI and privatization, see Chapter 2.  
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the dynamics of FDI was seriously affected by acceleration and deceleration of the 
privatization process (EBRD, 1998). However, while privatization has dominated FDI 
inflows, FDI has not been the dominant form of privatization.   
Using EBRD and World Bank data (various years), a significant positive relationship 
between level of privatization revenues and FDI inflows in successor states of former 
Yugoslavia is found. Figure 3.3 shows that in all countries, an increase in the level of 
privatization proceeds (expressed as percent of GDP), has been associated with an 
increase in FDI inflow.57 The figures also point out the positive trend of FDI inflow 
during the last decade. In Slovenia and Croatia, a flatter growth of the level of 
privatization revenues is observed in later stages of transition. This is mainly because 
these countries are entering the final stages of divesting SOEs. However, despite the 
small increase in the level of privatization revenues as percentage of GDP, the levels 
of FDI has continued to increase. This signals the increasing role of non-privatization 
related foreign investment inflow, which is found also in other advanced transition 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
57 Lower correlation coefficient is obtained in case of Croatia.   
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Figure 3.3. Privatization and FDI            3 
Source: Author’s calculations using EBRD and World Bank Data 
As for the scale of divestments achieved by successor states of former Yugoslavia, 
Figure 3.4 shows that while all countries succeeded in transferring the majority of 
small-scale enterprises to private owners between 1989 and early 2000, the large-scale 
privatization lagged behind.  
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Figure 3.4. Scale of progress in a) small- and b) large-scale privatisation         4 
Note: The 1-4 score is the ranking of the EBRD. The classification system for assessing progress in large-
scale privatization is: 1–minimal progress; 2–scheme ready for implementation; some firms divested; 
3–more than 25% of assets privatized; 4–more than 50% of assets privatized, and substantial progress 
on corporate governance; 4+ –more than 75% of assets in private hands; standards and performance 
comparable to advanced industrial countries. The classification system for small-scale privatization: 1-
minimal progress; 2-substantial shares privatized; 3-scheme ready for implementation; 4- Complete 
privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights; 4+- Standards and performance 
typical of advanced industrial economies: no state ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability 
of land. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on EBRD data  
 
In 1989 all countries started from the same social-ownership setting but the dynamics 
of the process did not follow the same path in all countries as shown in Figure 3.3. In 
Slovenia and Croatia, small-scale privatization reached levels of typical advanced 
industrial economy as early as 1996. In Macedonia, small-scale privatization was 
completed even earlier but was limited to companies with tradable ownership rights 
(short of tradability of land). In Montenegro, the scheme for small-scale privatization 
was ready for implementation as early at the initial stage of transition, but the progress 
has been sluggish with significant backslide in 1998 and 2001. During this period, 
Montenegro, together with some other transition countries scored the lowest score, 
marking minimal progress. Similarly Serbia did not make significant progress in 
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small-scale privatization and until 2002 it had a same level of progress it achieved in 
the beginning of the 1990s. Currently Serbia and Montenegro have a score of 3.67 
which is close to completely privatizing small companies with tradable ownership 
rights. The small scale privatization primarily focuses on companies largely operating 
in competitive non-regulated sectors.  
The large-scale privatization (privatisation through public offering of shares) 
continues to lag behind in all these countries. Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia were 
the first to achieve considerable progress and by mid 1990s they managed to privatize 
over 25 percent of assets. Since then, little progress was achieved- in Slovenia the same 
level of privatization was recorded even in 2010 while in Croatia and Macedonia over 
1/3 of assets were privatized by 2010. In other countries, and during the early years of 
transition, the extent of large-scale privatization was the lowest among all transition 
countries. The major steps were taken only after the year 2000. Montenegro and Bosnia 
managed to pick up in the following years privatizing over one third and over 25 
percent of assets respectively. In general, despite the acceleration of large-scale 
privatization in recent years, the successor states of former Yugoslavia still lag behind 
the best performers among transition countries.   
Despite delays in privatization, companies operating in non-regulated sectors were 
exposed to the disciplining effects of, both internal and external, competition since the 
beginning of transition. During this period, state control over companies’ affairs 
started to fade away, the soft-budget constraints were lifted and the threat of ultimate 
bankruptcy became credible. Under such circumstances, companies had to adjust their 
behaviour, by pursuing profit maximization, in order to be able to survive the new 
market conditions.  
Even some two decades after the beginning of transition, privatization in successor 
states of former Yugoslavia remained incomplete, despite the fact that the issue of 
social property was mostly resolved and, if it still exists (e.g., in Serbia), it is present 
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to a much lesser extent (EBRD, various years). Markovic reforms provided an 
interpretation of the concept of ‘social ownership’. That the society, represented in this 
case by Funds, owned the assets and workers had a major stake. In order words, 
unlike the popular belief in many successor states, enterprises did not belong to 
workers (they were declared the property of Development Funds which were under 
the government control); but with employees having a major claim to the socially 
owned assets (potentially up to 70% discount and up to DM 20,000). In recent years 
the share of private sector in employment and output has increased considerably in 
all countries. By 2010, the share of private sector employment ranged from 60 percent 
in Macedonia to 70 percent in Slovenia and Croatia (see Figure 3.5). In terms of output, 
the private sector accounted for a higher share in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia (84 
percent), which is similar to OECD countries, compared to Montenegro (65 percent) 
and Bosnia and Serbia (60 percent). While state involvement in economies of these 
countries is still through ownership links and its regulatory role, the main source of 
economic growth is the genuine private sector (EBRD, various years).   
 
 
Figure 3.5. Share of private sector in employment and output (2010)  5 
* Data for the shares of privates sector in employment for Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia were not 
available. 
Source: EBRD data; www.ebrd.com  
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3.4 Empirical evidence from privatization process in 
successor states of former Yugoslavia 
The empirical evidence on the effect of privatization on companies’ performance in 
the successor states of the former Yugoslavia is very limited and far from conclusive. 
The following section aims at reviewing selected empirical works that investigate the 
privatization induced performance changes in these countries as well as differences in 
performance among companies under different types of ownership resulting from 
privatization. This short review is limited only to companies operating in non-
regulated sectors.58 There are several empirical papers looking at the impact of 
privatization in Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro. However, to 
our best knowledge no rigorous empirical research has been conducted to date 
analysing the impact of privatization in Bosnian enterprises. Also, there is no 
empirical evidence that jointly analyses the impact of privatization across these 
countries. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence focusing on the impact of 
ownership on the technical efficiency of companies.59 
The studies considered here have reported mixed results.60 Similarly to Chapter 2, for 
convenience, an asterisk (*) is added do denote studies that do not account for 
selection bias problem. Glennerster (2003), finds weak evidence of privatization-
induced performance improvements in Macedonia. Most of the studies cited here 
show that insider-controlled companies perform relatively poorly compared to 
companies owned by outside investors (Prašnikar , Svejnar and Domadenik, 2000*; 
Glennerster, 2003; Zalduendo, 2003*; Zelic, 2005*). Prašnikar et al. (2002)* finds no 
significant differences in total factor productivity between different groups of firms in 
                                                        
58 It should be noted that there are some studies analysing the impact of privatization on the 
performance of companies in regulated sectors; especially in the banking sector. These studies are not 
included as they are not in the focus of this thesis.  
59 The following chapter will fill this gap by analysing the impact of ownership on company 
performance in successor states of former Yugoslavia and contribute to better understanding the impact 
of ownership on companies’ efficiency.  
60 The main characteristics of these studies will be shown below, in Table 3.3. 
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Slovenia and Macedonia. Simoneti and Gregoric (2004) analyse the effect of the 
increasing managerial control on Slovenian firms’ performance. They find the 
evidence of positive effect only for companies with dominant ownership and 
companies which are listed.  
Studies that analyse the impact of foreign ownership provide consistent findings. 
Pervan, Pervan and Todoric (2012) find that, in Croatia, foreign controlled listed firms 
perform better than domestically controlled firms while Smith, Cin and Vodopivec 
(1997) find that, in Slovenia, a one percentage point increase in foreign ownership is 
associated with a 3.9 percent increase in value added. Similarly, Bliss, Polutnik and 
Pahar (2007)* looking at Slovenian companies and Zelic (2005)* looking at Serbian 
companies, maintain that de-novo private companies outperform both SOEs and 
privatized companies. Zalduendo (2003)* argues that apart from private ownership, 
market-based economic institutions and elimination of hard-budget constraints have 
served to strengthen corporate performance. Table 3.3 recapitulates the main features 
of these studies presenting the country of analysis, sample description, study period, 
methodology as well as a summary of empirical findings. The fifth column of the table 
also comments the efforts made by the authors for dealing with selection bias problem. 
Out of 9 reviewed studies six of them do not account for endogeneity problem. The 
rest make only some limited efforts to control for it. This might have introduced bias 
in their estimates so their results should be interpreted with caution.    
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Table 3.3. Selected studies on the impact of ownership on performance (in chronological order) 7 
Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Pervan, Pervan 
and Todoric (2012) 
Croatia 2003-2010 
Using 1,430 observations of listed Croatian firms 
from the Zagreb Stock Exchange drawn from the 
period 2003-2010, the paper analyses the 
relationship between firm ownership (ownership 
concentration and type) and performance 
expressed in terms of return on assets. Authors 
employ dynamic panel analysis. The study finds 
that (i) ownership concentration is negatively 
related to performance, i.e. listed firms with 
dispersed ownership perform better than firms 
with concentrated ownership; (ii) foreign 
controlled listed firms perform better than 
domestically controlled firms; (iii) majority of state 
owned firms perform worse than privately held 
firms.   
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem. 
-Return on assets  
Knezevic Cvelbar, 
Domadenik and 
Prasnikar (2008) 
Slovenia 1998-2002 
Using a panel data analysis, the study analyses the 
performance of companies with different 
ownership. The study finds that outsiders do not 
appear to be more efficient owners than insiders, 
whereas the state is identified as an inefficient 
owner, especially in the case of direct state 
ownership. 
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Sales growth 
Bliss, Polutnik and 
Pahar (2007) 
Slovenia 1995 to 2004 
Using 30,000 Slovenian firms drawn from the 
period 1995 to 2004, the study analyses the 
performance differences between privatized 
enterprises and newly-established firms. The study 
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Total factor 
productivity growth 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
finds that de novo private firms perform better 
than privatized firms.  
Zelic (2005) Serbia 2002-2003 
Using a sample of over 15,000 enterprises, the 
paper examines the effect of various privatization 
methods on performance of Serbian enterprises. 
Using cross-sectional analysis, the study finds that 
(i) private ownership yields higher investment 
levels than social ownership; (ii) voucher 
privatization, leading to inside ownership, 
provides worse results in terms of investment 
compared to privatization by sale. Sill, these 
companies perform better than those that did not 
go through privatization; (iii) de novo private 
firms outperform all other forms of ownership.   
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Level of investment  
Simoneti and 
Gregoric (2004) 
Slovenia 1995 to 1999 
Using a panel of 182 Slovenian firms drawn from 
the period 1995 to 1999, the study looks at the 
performance effect of companies privatized by 
managers. The study finds no insignificant 
evidence of any positive effects of the managerial 
control on Slovenian firms’ performance. Some 
positive effects are found in terms of firms’ 
financial performance (but not total factor 
productivity) in cases of listed companies.  
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem.  
-Total factor 
productivity  
-Financial 
performance 
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Glennerster (2003) Macedonia 1996 to 1999 
Using fixed-effects panel data regression, the study 
finds weak but significant evidence that 
privatization improves performance in terms of 
sales, employment and profits even in cases of 
predominant insider ownership. Companies sold 
to outsiders perform better than firms privatized 
by employees.  
Limited efforts to 
account for selection 
bias problem. 
-Sales 
-Employment 
-Profits  
Zalduendo (2003) Macedonia 1994 to 2000 
Using OLS estimates, the study finds that private 
ownership is associated with improvement in 
companies’ performance expressed in terms of 
profits as share of sales. Also, high concentration of 
ownership improves corporate performance.  
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Profits as share of 
sales 
Prasnikar et al. 
(2002) 
Slovenia and 
Macedonia 
1996-1998 
The study analyses the difference in productivity 
between with dominant internal or external 
ownership after privatization. The study finds that 
in case of Macedonia the differences between firms 
that chose internal or external privatisation 
method became smaller while in case of Slovenia 
the difference is insignificant.  
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Total factor 
productivity 
Prasnikar, Svejnar 
and Domadenik 
(2000) 
Slovenia 1996 to 1998 
Using firm-level panel data of 127 large- and 
medium-size firms drawn from the period 1996 to 
1998, the study examines the difference between 
insider and outsider ownership in the post-
privatisation restructuring. The study finds that (i) 
firms where outside investors have had the 
predominant influence on the decision-making 
The selection bias 
problem is not 
accounted for. 
-Restructuring  
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Study Country Period covered Methodology and results  
Efforts to deal 
with selection bias 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
process have entered the process of restructuring 
earlier. 
Smith, Cin and 
Vodopivec 
(1997) 
Slovenia 1989 to 1992 
Using a sample of 22,735 Slovenian firms drawn 
from period of 1989 to 1992, the paper examines 
the impact of foreign and employee ownership on 
(a) performance and (b) likelihood that a former 
SOE is acquired by foreign company or insider 
employees. Using two-stage Tobit least-squares 
procedure, the study finds that (i) a 1 percentage 
point increase in foreign ownership is associated 
with a 3.9 percent increase in value added, and for 
employee ownership with a 1.4 percent increase; 
(ii) firms with higher revenues, profits, and exports 
are more likely to be acquired by foreign investors 
and insider employees.  
The selection bias 
problem is 
accounted for and 
the sample size is 
relatively large. 
-Value added 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
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3.5 Conclusions  
This Chapter highlighted the major features of the social ownership in former 
Yugoslavia and its transformation in her successor states. The Chapter explained that 
social ownership as a form of ownership distinct from that in the rest of the socialist 
bloc attracted great attention from researchers. This gave rise to an interesting and 
long running debate on whether such a system can allocate resources efficiently.  Two 
important lines of arguments dominated the discussions in opposing social 
ownership. The first represented by Ward who asserts that, in terms of technical 
efficiency, labour managed firm is sub-optimal as it will employ and produce less 
compared to a profit maximizing firm.  The second line is that of property right 
theorists who argue that because of unclear property arrangements, consumption will 
be preferred to investment leading to sub-optimal levels of investment. Despite the 
fact that these two lines of arguments were disputed, they clearly make a case that in 
absence of disciplining effect of the market, the labour managed firm is bound to be 
technically and allocativelly inefficient. However, another line of arguments 
supporting social ownership was also present. This strand of literature argued that 
the underlying assumptions of the Ward model and those of the property rights 
theory did not reflect the case of the Yugoslav labour managed firm.  
This Chapter has argued that, despite many attempts, reforming the socialist system 
in former Yugoslavia proved impossible. Radical reforms (similar to those that were 
successfully employed in transition economies) were undertaken during the end of 
1980s. However, the developing political situation particularly the rise of Milosevic in 
Serbia and the growing nationalist tendencies in Croatia and Slovenia, interrupted 
and undermined these reforms. The disciplining measures were not credibly upheld 
and were traded off for social considerations. Also, the continued economic crisis 
aggravated political stability and intensified ethnic tensions. This ultimately led to 
decades of armed conflicts in the region and the disintegration of the federation. 
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Further, this Chapter showed that despite their similar pattern of social ownership, 
the successor states followed different paths in transforming social ownership, with 
some relying heavily on the previous federal legislation; some modifying the 
legislation to allow for other methods, while the rest undertaking heavy changes in 
privatization legislation. The state and employees were recognised as stakeholders or 
beneficiaries in almost everywhere though the share of each varies in different 
countries. The theoretical background of social ownership largely leans towards the 
idea that companies in former Yugoslavia pursued non-profit maximising objectives. 
However, in all the successor states,   after the start of the transition process (primarily 
due to the disciplining effect of competition, depleted state control, imposition of hard 
budget constraints and the credible threat of bankruptcy) companies had to adjust by 
pursuing profit maximization in order to be able to survive the new market 
conditions.  
This Chapter has also reviewed the limited empirical literature that investigate how 
the transformation of ownership impacted the performance of emerging private 
companies. The studies discussed provide mixed evidence about the impact of 
privatization on companies’ performance. However, those that control for foreign 
ownership maintain that companies privatized to foreign owners perform better. 
Also, de-novo private companies are found to outperform both SOEs and privatized 
companies. The empirical evidence related to effects of privatization on companies’ 
performance is beset with estimation problems.. In all reviewed studies, limited or no 
effort was made to address the endogeneity (selection) problem. Overlooking the 
endogeneity problem might have introduced bias in estimates. The data used in these 
studies are clustered around the time of divestiture which limits the analysis. There is 
also no empirical evidence that jointly analyses the impact of privatization across these 
countries. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence focusing on the impact of 
ownership on technical efficiency of companies. The following Chapter will fill this 
gap by analysing jointly the impact of ownership on company performance in 
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successor states of former Yugoslavia and by contributing to better understanding the 
impact of ownership on companies’ efficiency employing Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
while controlling for selection bias.  
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Introduction  
The aim of this Chapter is to measure the efficiency of companies in successor states 
of former Yugoslavia focusing on the effect of ownership.61 As argued in Chapter 3, 
the successor states of former Yugoslavia, despite their similar patterns of ownership, 
followed different paths of transforming their SOEs and the transition reforms 
progressed at varying speeds. However by early 2000, these countries, by and large, 
had managed to transform their economies and institutions to match those of other 
TEs. By then the main source of economic growth was the genuine private sector. Also, 
the remaining SOEs, particularly those in competitive non-regulated industries, had 
to operate under similar conditions as the de-novo private companies and subject to 
hard budget constraints, largely pursuing profit maximizing objectives. Centred on 
this premise, this Chapter will compare the efficiency of companies with different 
ownership structures operating in reasonably similar conditions.  
The measurement of efficiency has been a topic of considerable interest in economics 
but the empirical measurement of efficiency is rather recent (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). This is mainly because of the dominance of neoclassical economics where the 
inefficient behaviour is ruled out and companies are considered to be fully optimizing 
agents. However, inefficiency does exist in the real world and most companies, even 
though they try, are not fully efficient. Therefore the measurement of efficiency and 
                                                        
61 The study includes: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. 
Kosovo was not part of the analysis as it was not covered by the previous rounds of the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted by World Bank and EBRD, which 
constitutes the main source of data for this Chapter. Chapters 5 and 6 will try to fill the gap for Kosovo 
by testing some of the theoretical propositions related to ownership which are also highlighted here. 
Unfortunately, the results are not directly comparable due to the fact that the Kosovo data include only 
private companies (de-novo and privatized), whereas the data for other successor states of former 
Yugoslavia include both private companies (de-novo and privatized) and SOEs. As a result, Chapter 6 
examines whether there are any differences in performance related to ownership transformation, 
whereas this Chapter tests for differences between mean efficiency scores among companies with 
different ownership structures. It also accounts for differences in performance of companies privatized 
by different types of owners, specifically domestic private investors and foreign investors. It is expected 
that the ownership should account for differences in performance of companies.  
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the analysis of the gap between efficient and inefficient companies has become an 
important area of research for both economists and policy makers.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the dominant methodology used in the existing empirical 
literature on the impact of ownership on companies’ performance compares either 
pre- and post-privatization performance of selected privatized firms, or the 
performance of state firms with either de novo private or privatized firms operating 
under reasonably similar conditions (for more details, see Chapter 2).62 These 
approaches usually consider performance measures such as turnover, employment 
and labour productivity. Recently, other approaches have been introduced in 
empirical literature which analyse the efficiency of companies with different 
ownership structures applying more advanced econometric techniques.63 Utilising a 
production function, these studies estimate the efficiency (or inefficiency) of 
companies compared to a suitable benchmark, or frontier. In this Chapter, the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis is used to investigate the impact of ownership on the 
efficiency of companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia. The Chapter also 
employs a Heckman selection model in an attempt to address the selection bias 
problem, which is endemic in the research related to privatization and has been 
largely overlooked as argued in Chapter 2. 
There are only few studies that compare the efficiency of firms with different 
ownership structures by employing Stochastic Frontier Analysis and, to our 
knowledge, only one of them deals with TEs.64 Moreover, there is no empirical 
                                                        
62 Chapter 6 will combine these two approaches by using policy evaluation econometrics.  
63 These approaches focusing on efficiency estimation include both parametric and non-parametric 
methods. The most used technique of the former approach is Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) while 
of the latter the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).   
64 Kocenda, Hanousek and Masika (2011) use SFA to assess the financial efficiency and the ownership 
of Czech firms. However, even this study is limited in terms of justifying the choice of appropriate 
functional form and distributional assumptions that this methodology requires. Also, it does not 
properly control for selection bias. There are some studies analysing the efficiency of companies in 
transition countries but they focus on regulated markets, primarily in banking sector. See for instance, 
Staikouras, Mamatzakis, and Koutsomanoli (2008) focusing on the banking sector of 6 TEs; 
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evidence that evaluates the impact of ownership on companies’ performance in all 
successor states of former Yugoslavia. Therefore this Chapter contributes to the 
existing empirical literature by analysing the impact of ownership on the efficiency of 
firms across these countries using SFA, while controlling for factors that influence 
efficiency and for selection bias.  
In this Chapter, efficiency refers to technical efficiency and is measured at a specific 
point in time. The dataset consists of cross sectional pooled data on private enterprises 
(owned by either foreign or domestic investors) and SOEs from six countries of former 
Yugoslavia. It is based on three waves of BEEP survey, in 2002, 2005 and 2009 covering 
over 3,800 observations. BEEPS is a firm-level survey of a representative sample of 
enterprises conducted by the World Bank and EBRD in a large number of countries 
(More detailed explanation about BEEPS is provided in Section 4.3.1). As in most cases 
of using survey data, there are missing observations in the dataset. Missing data are 
dealt with using the ‘Multiple Imputation procedure’. This is another important 
contribution to the existing empirical investigations using BEEPS data. So far, to the 
best knowledge of the author, papers analysing the impact of ownership on 
companies’ performance have ignored the missing observations without any 
discussion of the rationale for this action.65 The maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the stochastic frontier function, 
employing the Limdep 9.0 software for the estimation procedure. The stand-alone 
software NORM was used for the imputation procedure.  
The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 briefly presents the concept 
of efficiency. Here the analytical framework and basic terminology of the efficiency 
literature, upon which the empirical model is built, is introduced. Section 4.2 discusses 
                                                        
Mamatzakis, Staikouras Koutsomanoli (2008) focusing on banking system of 10 TEs and Kosak and 
Zoric (2011) focusing on 8 TEs. 
65 The author has also contributed towards improving the BEEPS datasets by identifying errors in the 
data which were reported to the World Bank and were subsequently corrected by the latter.   
Chapter 4 - The impact of ownership on Efficiency of companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia 
111 
 
the estimation of the stochastic frontier model. Here particular attention is paid to 
methods of measuring efficiency focusing on differences between deterministic and 
stochastic techniques, deciding on distributional assumptions and choosing the 
functional form. Section 4.3 discusses data and procedures carried out to handle 
missing data. Section 4.4 discusses the model, presents some empirical considerations 
and results. Section 4.5 presents the limitations of the model and Section 4.6 concludes.   
 
4.1 The concept of efficiency  
This section briefly summarises the influential theoretical and empirical contributions 
that led to the expansion of the empirical measurement of efficiency. The concept of 
efficiency has been discussed for a long time, however its empirical measurement is 
fairly recent in economic literature. This is mainly because of the dominance of 
neoclassical economics which considers producers as full optimisers (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). The starting point in the discussion of efficiency is the very definition of 
the production function which began with the work of Cobb and Douglass (1928). 
Imposing limits on output and inputs leaves open the possibility for some producers 
to be more or less efficient than others. Hicks (1935) analysing the behaviour of 
monopolies argued that these firms do not attempt to be fully efficient as they do not 
face the pressure of competition; he labelled it the ‘quiet life’ of monopolies. In other 
words, the non-competitive setting allows monopolies not to strive for full 
optimization.66 Also, Leibenstein (1966) argued that there is some inefficiency built in 
                                                        
66 Also, the property rights literature (among others, Alchian, 1965) argued that state owned companies 
are inherently less efficient than private counterparts. See Chapter 1 for details. Alchain and Kessel 
(1962) offer a different explanation for the apparent superior efficiency of companies in competitive 
markets. They maintain that since monopolies operate in either regulated settings or unregulated but 
threatened by regulation or antitrust actions, they are constrained not to strive for full efficiency. If 
these companies earn profits in excess of regulated ones or if their profits are offset by the regulatory 
or antitrust environment, then they simply tolerate some level of inefficiency. 
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the production process arising from agency and related incentive problems.67  
Koopmans (1951, p.50) introduced the modern definition of technical efficiency:  
“[A] producer is technically efficient if an increase in any output requires a reduction 
in at least one other output, or an increase in at least one input, and if a reduction in any input 
requires an increase in at least one other input or a reduction in at least one output.”  
Following this definition, Debreu (1951) and Shepherd (1953) were the first to 
introduce the distance functions as a way of measuring the distance between the 
current position of a company and a frontier. Before that the empirical analysis of 
efficiency had been based on least squares methodology which allowed points to be 
above and below the fitted function, thus estimating the mean efficiency. This 
literature raised theoretical issues which paved the way for the development of the 
research on empirical measurements of efficiency.  
The modifications suggested by frontier models fostered the use of different 
techniques which allowed all points to be on one side of the fitted function by 
enveloping the data. The introduction of the distance functions in the context of 
efficiency was a crucial development in the literature of the efficiency measurement 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Farrell (1957) is considered to be the first to have 
treated the production function as a frontier. Also, Farrell is considered as the first to 
have distinguished two basic forms of efficiency: technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency. While the former reflects the ability of the company to obtain maximal 
output given a set of inputs (i.e. avoiding waste), the latter reflects the optimal mix of 
                                                        
67 He argued that two otherwise identical firms rarely produce the same output levels given the same 
set of inputs. He identified a range of factors that influence this inefficiency, including among others, 
the asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, agency problems, monitoring difficulties and 
motivation. He labelled it ‘x-inefficiency’. This concept was criticized on the grounds that it reflected 
an incompletely specified model rather than a failure to optimize (see for instance, Stigler, 1976; de 
Alessi, 1983). Nevertheless, Libenstein’s arguments are largely considered valid and fit neatly into the 
agency literature (Greene, 2008). Moreover, it is almost impossible to construct a model as suggested 
by his critics.  
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inputs or outputs, given their respective prices.68 Economic efficiency is a product of 
these two types of efficiency (Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 2008) (see Figure 4.1). The 
theory of efficiency postulates that the best performing company operates on the 
frontier that is specified by the behavioural goal (as cost minimization, revenue or 
profit maximization).   
 
  
Figure 4.1. Decomposition of economic efficiency                  6 
Source: Author’s own drawing   
 
While this Chapter is concerned only with measures of technical efficiency (due to 
data limitations on prices of inputs and outputs), still we briefly summarise the 
concept of economic efficiency, of which the technical efficiency is a part. Figure 4.2 
illustrates the concept of economic efficiency using input oriented measure of 
technical and allocative efficiency. Economic efficiency is calculated as a ratio of 
potential to actual performance. Consider a company producing a single output using 
inputs X1 and X2. The QQ curve represents an isoquant, i.e. the combination of inputs 
to produce a certain level of output. The CC curve represents an isocost, and the ratio 
of factor prices. A company operating at point A is inefficient as it uses more inputs 
                                                        
68 Influential authors in the efficiency literature, including Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), Coelli, et al. 
(2005) and Greene (2008) among others, refer to the decomposition of economic efficiency into two 
components as the Farrell decomposition, introduced in Farrell (1957).  
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to produce a unit of output. This company would have been technically efficient if it 
were to operate at point Q’. Its technical efficiency is measured by OQ’/OA, which is 
the radial distance of the company from the isoquant. Given factor prices, represented 
by the slope of the CC line, Q’ is not the best position for a company to operate at 
(point A* represents such position).  The radial distance from the isocost, OC’/OQ’, 
represents the allocative efficiency. Both ratios are less than unity, representing some 
degree of inefficiency. The overall economic efficiency is the product of technical and 
allocative efficiency and is given by the following ratio: 
 Econ Efficiency = OQ’/OA x OC’/OQ’ = OC’/OA                       (4.1) 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The measurement and decomposition of economic efficiency                       7 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on multiple sources 
 
In terms of its measurement, the technical inefficiency of company A is measured as 
(1-OQ’/OA) which measures the proportion of inputs that could be reduced without 
reducing the output level. The further a company gets from the isoquant, its technical 
efficiency becomes smaller and smaller. Conversely, the closer it gets to the isoquant, 
its technical efficiency approaches unity. Therefore the technical efficiency ratio will 
fall between zero and one. Similarly the allocative inefficiency of company A is 
measured as (1- OC’/OQ’) and ranges between 0 and one.  
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In line with the notion of frontier, developed by Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957), a 
series of empirical work, including Aigner and Chu (1968), Seitz (1971), Timmer 
(1971), Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974) appeared in the literature. While all these 
papers contributed to the development of the field, the contemporary research on 
econometric estimation of efficiency started with the seminal papers simultaneously 
published by Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977) who proposed the stochastic frontier model as a practical framework for testing 
theoretical propositions set forth previously.  
4.2 Estimation of efficiency  
The estimation of the efficiency involves the comparison of a company’s performance 
relative to the optimal performance located on the frontier (Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 
2008). Since it is impossible to observe directly the optimal position of each company, 
in a deterministic setting, the best performer in the industry is used as a proxy for the 
optimal output level (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Greene, 2008; Fried, Lovell and 
Schmidt, 2008).69 The distance from the frontier specifies the level of inefficiency of a 
firm. The basic principle of the frontier analysis is therefore a more sophisticated form 
of benchmarking a sample of companies against a ‘best practice’. The main aim of the 
recent research has been to identify the sources of inefficiency and to separate their 
effect from the environmental factors which are not in companies’ control (Fried, 
Lovell and Schmidt, 2008).  
 
4.2.1 Estimation approaches  
In with the context of the frontier analysis, two methodological approaches to 
estimating efficiency have appeared in the literature: parametric and non-
                                                        
69 The frontier in deterministic approaches is determined by analysing the position of the best performer 
in the industry while in stochastic approaches, the frontier is randomly placed by the whole collection 
of stochastic elements which might enter the model outside the control of the firm (discussed in greater 
details later in this section).  
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parametric.70 Both approaches are rigorous benchmarking applications that use 
distance functions to measure efficiency (Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 2008). The 
pioneering work in both areas appeared in the late seventies (Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt, 1977 and Charnes et al., 1978). Even though both techniques were originally 
developed to study technical efficiency, today they are also widely used for the 
estimation of economic efficiency. 
 
Parametric techniques are generally built upon the stochastic character of the data 
employed. The predefined functional form does always incorporate a disturbance 
term that is composed of two parts: the inefficiency component and the random error. 
The random error component accounts for the measurement errors or other external 
events. Omitting the random error term would implicitly misidentify the random 
shocks and leads to wrong measurements as inefficiencies. Due to the twofoldness of 
the error term, the parametric techniques have been referred to as the ‘composite error 
term’ models in the efficiency literature. In practice, several parametric techniques 
                                                        
70 Parametric approaches are sometimes referred to as econometric techniques; the non-parametric 
approaches are based upon mathematical programming. Some early parametric techniques include 
deterministic methods such as Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) and Modified Ordinary Least 
Squares (MOLS which are modifications of OLS. COLS, introduced by Winsten (1957), is a frontier 
version of OLS as it bounds the data from above. As a two-step procedure it initially uses OLS 
regression to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of the slope parameters and the constant term 
but biased estimate of the intercept parameter. In the second step, the biased intercept parameter is 
shifted up by adding to the intercept term the largest negative OLS residual so that the frontier is 
defined by the best performing company. Since only the intercept is changed, the frontier is a parallel 
shift of the OLS regression. As such it does not necessarily envelope the data as closely as possible 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). MOLS, suggested by Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974), is also a two-
step procedure with the first step being similar to COLS. In the second step, the estimated intercept 
parameter is shifted up by adding the mean of the assumed one-sided distribution. The OLS residuals 
can then be used to provide consistent estimates of the technical efficiency of each producer as in the 
case of the COLS model. However, in MOLS, some companies might be above the estimated production 
function creating problems of interpretation; i.e. some of the resulting efficiency scores might be greater 
than unity. In both COLS and MOLS the deviation of the estimated efficiency from the theoretical 
maximum is attributed solely to the inefficiency (i.e. ignoring random shocks). That is contrary to OLS 
that attributes the whole deviation to the random shock. These parametric techniques are largely 
considered as not appropriate for measuring inefficiencies, and as such they will not be discussed any 
further in this Chapter. Therefore, the parametric techniques discussed later in this Chapter refer only 
to stochastic techniques.  
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have been developed, the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) being the most widely 
used.  
 
Other parametric techniques include Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) and Distribution 
Free Approach (DFA). TFA, developed by Berger and Humphrey (1991), is less 
restrictive than SFA but provides less information. The approach specifies the 
functional form but does not require distributional assumption for the error 
components. This approach identifies companies in the top and the bottom quartile of 
the distribution. Companies located in the top quartile are assumed to be relatively 
efficient and jointly form the thick frontier. Companies in the bottom quartile are 
relatively inefficient compared to this frontier. TFA assumes that variations in 
residuals within each quartile represent the random error whereas the distance 
between the quartiles represents the average inefficiency score. As such, TFA does not 
allow for estimation of inefficiency scores for each company. However, Bauer et al. 
(1998) suggest a model adjustment so that company specific efficiency scores can be 
calculated. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) suggest that TFA does not yield precise 
estimates; however, it does provide an insight into the probable magnitude of 
inefficiencies.  
 
On the other hand, DFA, introduced by Berger (1993), assumes that the random 
component of the composed error term averages out to zero over time in the context 
of panel data. A production function is estimated for each period of the panel data 
sample with the residuals of each regression consisting of the inefficiency component 
and the random error term. Since the random error is assumed to average out over 
time, the average of the residuals for each firm is therefore assumed to represent the 
average inefficiency term. Berger (1993) suggests that a five year period is typically 
needed to estimate DFA. Due to their limitations, TFA and DFA approaches are ruled 
out in this Chapter. While the former is found to lack econometric rigour and unable 
Chapter 4 - The impact of ownership on Efficiency of companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia 
118 
 
to yield precise estimates, the latter requires panel data which is not available for our 
analysis. Therefore, in the remainder of this Chapter, the term parametric technique i 
refers exclusively to SFA.  
Non-parametric techniques, which by construction are deterministic, use 
mathematical programming to observe the best practice frontier. The most frequently 
employed method is the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Stavarek, 2006; Coelli, 
1996; Barr and Siems, 1994). In DEA mathematical linear programming is used to 
construct the best practice frontier against which the inefficiencies of particular firms 
are measured. This is done without parameterizing the technology but by making 
comparisons of companies’ efficiency with the observed best practice (Greene, 2008). 
Two widely used types of DEA models are with constant returns to scale (CRS DEA) 
and with variable returns to scale (VRS DEA).  
The essential difference between non-parametric and parametric techniques is the 
very small restriction imposed on the specification of the form of the frontier. 
Technically, the main difference between the non-parametric and parametric frontiers 
is the issue of the random error.  Non-parametric techniques do not allow for the 
random errors (like errors in measurement or accounting). However, it is more than 
probable that in reality these errors do occur. Non-parametric techniques do not take 
special account of these errors and they are simply treated as inefficiencies. As the 
estimated frontier encompasses all obtained observations including outliers, random 
shocks and firm-specific effects are grouped together and are jointly interpreted as the 
level of inefficiency. As Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas (1994) note, due to extensive 
omission of the stochastic properties of the data, the application and interpretation of 
the deterministic frontiers of non-parametric approaches remains questionable. In 
non-parametric approaches, the frontier is rather a surface, formed by a piecewise 
linear combination of ‘best practice observations’ thus leading to a convex production 
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possibilities set (Coelli, 1996). Due to the specification of the frontier there are no a 
priori assumptions about the functional form. 
 
In both approaches, the models include measures of output and inputs for each 
company – and these have to be specified at the start. Starting from a non-parametric 
deterministic approach, the production frontier can be written as:  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽)𝑥𝑇𝐸                                                       (4.2) 
Where 𝑌𝑖 is the quantity of actual output of company 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼; 𝑥𝑖  is the vector of 
inputs used by company 𝑖; 𝑓(𝑥𝑖, 𝛽) is the production frontier and 𝛽 representing the 
vector of technology parameters to be estimated. Therefore the technical efficiency 𝑇𝐸𝑖 
of company 𝑖 can be written as:  
𝑇𝐸𝑖 =
𝑦𝑖
𝑓(𝑥𝑖,𝛽)
                                                           (4.3) 
where 𝑇𝐸 is defined as a ratio of observed output to maximum feasible output. A 
particular company (𝑦𝑖) therefore would have achieved its maximum feasible output 
𝑓(𝑥𝑖, 𝛽) if, and only if, 𝑇𝐸 equals to unity. Alternatively, if the efficiency coefficient 
falls short of unity, the company is technically inefficient. The closer the company is 
to unity, it is considered to be more efficient. This equation represents a deterministic 
output frontier. In other words, the whole deviation from the maximum feasible 
output is attributed to inefficiency. As discussed earlier, this ignores the fact that 
output can be affected by random shocks, which are out of the company’s control, and 
data errors. In order to account for random shocks and data errors, a stochastic 
production frontier needs to be introduced. As a starting point, the output frontier is 
specified as a stochastic frontier following Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). The idea 
is to decompose the residual term of the parametric frontier production function into 
two components: a symmetric random error and an inefficiency term, thus: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽) + 𝜀𝑖                                                    (4.4) 
Chapter 4 - The impact of ownership on Efficiency of companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia 
120 
 
𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                                                         (4.5) 
Where 𝑣𝑖 is the random shock and 𝑢𝑖 is the company specific inefficiency. In a 
stochastic frontier model technical efficiency 𝑇𝐸 of company 𝑖 can be defined as: 
𝑇𝐸 =
𝑦𝑖
𝑓(𝑥𝑖,𝛽)+𝑣𝑖
                                                        (4.6) 
Which defines efficiency as the ratio of the observed output of each company to the 
maximum feasible output in an environment accounting for 𝑣𝑖. Similarly, a company 
is considered as technically efficient if the efficiency score equals one; that is no 
reductions in inputs can be made to produce the same level of output. Maximum 
likelihood techniques and the method of moments can be used to estimate stochastic 
frontiers. Then, using the Jondrow et al. (1982) technique, the inefficiency term can be 
separated from the residuals. Technical inefficiency is therefore defined in an output-
expanding fashion indicating the maximum amount by which output can be increased 
given the production technology and observed inputs.
 
The estimated inefficiency 
component can then be used to obtain producer-specific estimates of efficiency. A 
measure of producer-specific efficiency is therefore provided by: 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = exp {−𝑢𝑖}                                                            (4.7) 
The estimation of efficiency using a stochastic production frontier requires an 
assumption regarding the distribution of the error term. Distributional assumptions 
are essential in decomposing the error term into two components, i.e. the statistical 
noise and the genuine inefficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The independent 
distribution of these two components of the error term makes it possible to capture 
firm-specific inefficiency scores. Different distributional assumptions and their 
importance are discussed in greater detail in sub-section 4.2.2. 
In this Chapter, the estimation of deviations between actual (estimated) and target 
(optimal) output will be carried out by employing Stochastic Frontier Analysis. As 
discussed, this technique, simultaneously developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
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(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), decomposes the error term in the 
regression model into a two-sided random error which captures the random events 
outside the control of the firm and the one-sided inefficiency component. There are 
two main reasons why the stochastic frontier approach is chosen over other non-
parametric approaches to perform the estimation of the efficiency scores. First of all, 
since large data sets are employed in this Chapter, some statistical noise is expected. 
Secondly, the data used are survey data which carries with it the risk of inaccuracies. 
This method would enable us to avoid measurement errors, appearing possibly due 
to the above mentioned factors, being assigned as inefficiency of a particular company 
in the dataset.  
 
Following the aim of this Chapter, and in order to have efficiency estimates which are 
comparable across the countries under investigation, a single frontier approach is 
employed. This technique permits the comparison of efficiency scores in different 
countries measured against a common frontier. This method requires additional 
efforts to control for different economic environments in which firms operate (Green, 
2008). Failing to account for heterogeneity is likely to affect the stability of efficiency 
results (Bos et al., 2005; El-Gamal and Inanoglu 2005; Mester, 1997; and Berger and 
Mester, 1997). In this regard, country dummies are included to control for the 
countries’ heterogeneity. Consequently, the estimated efficiency scores can be 
compared, and conclusions can be drawn as to whether companies in one country are 
more efficient than companies in others.  
Since it is very likely that efficiency varies across companies or time, one must 
ascertain the determinants of this variation by either including other explanatory 
variables in the model or by adopting a two stage approach. In the latter setting, 
efficiency measures are obtained in the first stage which are further regressed against 
a vector of explanatory variables in the second stage (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2003). 
Many authors argue that using a two-step procedure will introduce an estimation bias 
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in the second step given that in the first step exogenous influences are not accounted 
for (for details see: Caudill and Ford, 1993; Caudill, Ford and Gropper, 1995; Wang 
and Schmidt, 2002 and Greene, 2008). Wang and Shmidt (2002) argue that this is a 
similar issue to the omitted variable problem in linear regression models. In general, 
it is argued that when heterogeneity in the model is parameterized in terms of 
observables, then those features should be included in the model at the first step. In 
other words, a single step procedure is largely preferred. In this investigation, a one-
step procedure is used in which other firm-specific covariates are included right from 
the start.  
 
4.2.2 Functional form and Distributional assumption 
Even though parametric techniques have often been praised for their ability to 
separate the random error component, they are built upon the concept of an a priori 
specification of the functional form of the frontier and assumptions about the 
distribution of the inefficiency component of the error term.  
 
Functional form: As with the choice of the estimation method, there is no consensus 
in the efficiency literature on which functional form to employ when estimating the 
frontier. In order to estimate the stochastic frontier model a functional form needs to 
be pre-specified for the shape of the frontier function.  Recent literature on efficiency 
modelling is characterized by a variety of functional forms of the stochastic frontier. 
The functional forms range from the most simple Cobb-Douglas Functions (Coelli, 
1996) to adjusted Cobb-Douglas forms (Schure and Wagenvoort, 1999) and more 
complex Translog Functions (Podpiera and Podpiera, 2005; Bonin, Hasan, Wachtel, 
2004; Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas, 1994). As Greene (2008) has noted, the Cobb-
Douglas and Translog models significantly dominate the literature on stochastic 
frontier and the econometric estimation of inefficiency.    
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The major advantage of the Cobb-Douglas functional form is its simplicity, however, 
at the same time that feature causes two problems. Hasenkamp (1976) argued that 
Cobb-Douglas form cannot accommodate multiple outputs without some difficulties. 
In addition, if the true structure of (single-output) production technology is more 
complex than its Cobb-Douglas representation, the unmodelled complexity will show 
up in the error term, perhaps leading to biased estimates of the inefficiency term. On 
the other hand, Translog functional form, firstly introduced by Christensen, Jorgensen 
and Lau (1971), is a more flexible specification. The restrictions on the stochastic 
frontier function are relaxed with the application of a Translog production function 
compared to the Cobb-Douglas (Coelli et al., 2005). The Translog form does not 
impose assumptions about constant elasticities of production nor elasticities of 
substitution between inputs. From the production point of view companies can be 
seen as institution transforming multiple inputs into multiple outputs. The first 
consideration while choosing the appropriate functional form is therefore its ability to 
accommodate this multi-production nature of the company. Given that Cobb-Douglas 
and Translog specifications are nested models, the likelihood-ratio (LR) test can be 
conducted to select the best specification for the production function for a given data 
set.  
 
Distributional assumption: To estimate the production frontier, additional 
assumptions regarding the distribution of the error term are required. Distributional 
assumptions are essential in decomposing the error term into the two components 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). There is no consensus in the literature regarding the 
choice of the distributional assumption for the 𝑢𝑖 component, though there is an 
agreement that it is one-sided and positively skewed as 𝑢𝑖 > 0. The most commonly 
used distributional assumptions for 𝑢𝑖 include:  
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1. The half normal distribution: ui~iid N
+(0, σu
2) first introduced by (Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt, 1977); 
2. The exponential distribution: ui~iid G(λ, 0) exponential with mean λ (Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt, 1977 and Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977) 
3. The truncated distribution: ui~iid N
+(μ, σu
2) truncated normal (Stevenson 1980) 
4. The Gamma distribution: ui~iid G(λ, m) gamma with mean λ and degrees of 
freedom m (Greene, 1980 and Stevenson, 1980). 
Earlier works mostly used half normal and exponential distributions, later studies 
began using other distributions such as truncated normal and gamma. Coelli et al., 
(2005) argue that half-normal and exponential distribution yield inefficiency scores 
clustered around zero and efficiency scores clustered around 1, given that the mode 
of these distributions is zero. Unlike the half-normal and exponential distributions, 
the truncated normal and the gamma models are flexible and allow for a wider range 
of distributional shapes even though they have computational complexities. The 
truncated normal distribution allows the mode of 𝑢𝑖 to take either positive or negative 
values. Stevenson (1980) proposed two-parameter truncated normal distribution in 
order to generalize half-normal distribution. Greene (1990) generalizes the one-
parameter exponential distribution, by including an additional parameter to be 
estimated, thus providing a more flexible distributional shape.71  
While the choice of the distributional assumption is still an on-going debate, most of 
the results suggest that the estimates of inefficiency are reasonably robust to functional 
form and choice of distributional assumption (Greene, 2008). Based on Greene (1990), 
and using the Christensen and Greene (1976) electricity data, Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000) find that rank correlations for estimates of inefficiencies scores from the four 
distributions is in the range from 0.75 (exponential and gamma) to 0.98 (half normal 
                                                        
71 For more details on the properties of these distributions see: Kumbhakar and Lovel (2000) and Greene 
(2008). 
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and truncated normal). Similarly, Greene (2008) compares the results for the four 
distributions and, with respect to efficiency estimates, finds that exponential and half-
normal distributions are virtually identical, with correlation coefficients reaching up 
to 0.99. Some empirical studies find that under different distributional assumptions 
similar efficiency scores and rankings are obtained (for details see Greene, 1990; 
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000 and Kumbhakar and Lovell 2003). If the results are 
similar then the potential bias arising from improper distributional assumption 
diminishes significantly. Coelli et al. (2005) argue that the choice of the distributional 
assumption is influenced by theoretical considerations related to the research at hand. 
Similarly, Ritter and Simar (1997) argue in favour of using simple distribution, such 
as normal or exponential, in cases where the efficiency ranking and scores are similar 
across different distributional assumptions.  
 
4.3 Data (handling missing data)  
The following section presents the data used in this analysis and the procedures to 
handle the missing data. The basic analytical framework and terminology of data 
imputation and methods of replacing missing data including multiple imputation are 
discussed. The Section also presents the source of data, description of variables and 
summary statistics. It also provides a discussion on the multiple imputation procedure 
by presenting a non-technical summary of the procedure in the NORM software used 
in this Chapter and the diagnostics of multiple imputation runs.  
 
4.3.1 Data 
The dataset used in this Chapter is based on the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), a joint initiative of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank (WB). The surveys 
were conducted in three rounds, in 2002, 2005 and 2009. In the first two rounds of the 
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BEEPS the sample was structured to be representative in each country with specific 
quotas in terms of size, sector, ownership, export orientation or years in operation i.e. 
non-random sampling. In 2009 a stratified random representative sampling method 
was used, with three levels of stratification: industry, establishment size and region. 
Enterprises that operate in sectors subject to government regulation and supervision, 
that receive subsidies, firms operating in primary industries, or those that employ 
over 10,000 employees were excluded from the survey in all three rounds. The sub-
sample used in this Chapter cover the six successor countries of Former Yugoslav 
Federation, namely, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro 
and Macedonia.72 The distribution of the sample between manufacturing and service 
sectors, in all three rounds of the survey, was determined according to sectors’ relative 
contribution to GDP in each country.  
As with most survey data, the BEEPS dataset contains many missing observations, 
and until recently, this issue was largely ignored. Even when it was not overlooked, 
insufficient attention was paid to the problem (Peugh and Enders, 2004). Analysts 
mainly used ad hoc practices without sound theoretical grounding to handle the 
missing data (Schafer and Olsen, 1998). The use of ‘complete cases only’ was the main 
method of handling missing data, sometimes justified by the fact that the dataset is 
large and that the results will not be affected by dropping the missing observations 
and losing some of the data. Since in most situations the missing observations are 
spread throughout the dataset (missing data on different variables in different years), 
the proportion of missing data usually becomes very significant when several 
variables were used in a regression. Dropping observations with missing values 
involves making a strong implicit assumption about the missingness mechanism and 
if this assumption does not hold, the estimation bias might be introduced.73 Even when 
this assumption holds, while the results will be unbiased, they will still be inefficient 
                                                        
72 Until 2005, the data for Serbia included that of Montenegro as well.  
73 The assumption related to the missing data mechanism is explained in the following sub-section.  
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as some of the already available information is discarded (Baltagi, 2001). Other simple 
methods of handling the missing data used in empirical research include substitution 
of missing observations with plausible values (for instance by means or regression 
predictions). These methods, despite their simple computational attractiveness, are 
beset with well documented, weaknesses.74 
Recently, other approaches to address the missing data issue have been developed 
and this topic is now an active area of continuous research.75 These approaches range 
from simple deterministic single imputation to more advanced stochastic multiple 
imputation methods. Durrant (2005) argues that the choice of the appropriate 
technique depends on the data available, the application and the purpose of the 
analysis. In general, the Multiple Imputation (MI) method is largely favoured to other 
techniques and is considered as the most convenient and flexible method for analysing 
data with missing values (Schafer, 1999). In this chapter, Multiple Imputation has been 
used as the technique for handling missing data. For the application of the MI 
technique the stand-alone software NORM developed by Schafer (1999) was 
employed.76  
 
4.3.2 Data Imputation 
Researchers working with the BEEPS dataset (or indeed other large datasets) have 
usually ignored the problem of missing data (also referred to as missing values), citing 
as the reason the computational complexity of advanced techniques for handling this 
problem (Little and Rubin, 1987; Wayman, 2003). As a consequence, a substantial 
amount of information is lost which can possibly introduce bias in estimation results. 
                                                        
74 For details see: Little and Rubin (1987) and Schafer (1999). Other methods for handling missing data 
are discussed in subsequent sections.  
75 For details see: Rubin, 1976; Little and Rubin, 1987; Little, 1992; and Horton and Laird, 1999 among 
others. 
76 We used NORM because the empirical work of this Chapter (for which the dataset is imputed) is 
carried out in Limdep which cannot compute multiple imputations and run SFA at the same time.   
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Bernard and Meng (1999) suggest that, in general, there are three types of concerns 
that arise with missing data: (i) loss of efficiency; (ii) complication in data handling 
and analysis; and (iii) bias due to differences between the observed and unobserved 
data. Different approaches and methods for handling missing data have been 
proposed (explained later in this section) to address these concerns.  
Irrespective of the methods used to handle the missing data, initially it is important to 
understand why the data are missing. Determining the reasons for missingness is 
crucial in deciding how to deal with the missing data. The distribution of missing 
values, or data mechanism as it is termed in statistical literature, is usually 
distinguished according to the probability of responses and fall into three standard 
categories: 
- Missing completely at random (MCAR) when the probability of an observation 
missing is unrelated to both observable and unobservable data. In this case 
missing observations are not different from non-missing observations and the 
only drawback in using complete cases is the reduction in the inference power 
resulting from discarding important information (Collins, Schafer and Kam, 
2001; Baltagi, 2001). 
- Missing at Random (MAR) when the probability of an observation being 
missing is related to observable data but unrelated to unobservable data. For 
instance, if the probability of answering a particular question is related to 
another observable variable. This assumption is less restrictive and more 
common in empirical research than that underlying MCAR (Azar, 2002; 
Royston 2005). 
- Not missing at random (NMAR) when the non-response process is related to 
unobservable variables.  
For instance, consider a dataset with a number of variables (a1,...., an, X). The data for 
the variable X are said to be MCAR if the probability that a value of X is missing is not 
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related to the value of X itself or to any other variables in the dataset. The data are said 
to be MAR if the probability that a value of X is missing is not related to the X itself 
but is related to the values of other variables (a1,....an). For example, if larger companies 
do not report their level of revenues, we can say that size of the company is a good 
predictor of the missingness; in this case it can be assumed that data are MAR. Finally, 
the data are said to be NMAR if the probability that a value of X is missing is related 
to the value of X itself, i.e. to unobservable variables. For example, if companies with 
higher level of revenues do not report their revenues.   
Generally if the missing data depend on observable variables (MCAR and MAR), the 
process is termed ‘ignorable’ and if the missing data depend of the on unobservable 
variables (NMAR) the process is termed ‘unignorable’. In former cases, the 
missingness is observable and the mechanism leading to missingness does not need 
to be modelled. In the latter case, the missingness is unobservable and, therefore, the 
mechanism leading to missing data cannot be ignored and the missingness property 
should be modelled (Little and Rubin, 2002).77  
Schafer (1997) suggests that examining the ignorability assumption and its 
appropriateness, especially MAR, is of crucial importance.  However, in most cases, 
the assumption that data are MAR cannot be tested.78 Van Buuren, Boshuizen and 
Knook (1999, p. 686) explain that the verification of the MAR assumption requires 
external information about the distribution of missing values; for instance, as Schafer 
and Graham (2002) suggest, by obtaining follow-up data from non-respondents. 
However, these authors argue that small departures from MAR are inevitable. Recent 
research shows that small violations of MAR usually have only a minor impact on 
estimates and standard errors (Schafer and Graham, 2002). Schafer (1997) suggests 
                                                        
77 For a more detailed approach to modelling NMAR, see Little and Rubin, 2002.  
78 On occasion, the MAR condition is known to hold exactly. When missing data are missing by design 
(when the intention of the investigator is not to record all potential variables for all subjects), they tend 
also to be MAR. For details, see Schafer (1997).  
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that even when the missing data are not precisely MAR, still ignorable procedures 
tend to be better than ad hoc procedures such as case deletion as the former 
approaches remove all of the nonresponse bias explained by observable data whereas 
ad hoc procedures may not. All approaches that deal with missing data (including 
complete case analysis) assume, at least implicitly, the ignorability process. Given that 
ignorability (MCAR and MAR) holds, multiple imputation procedure is 
recommended. Alternatively, ignoring missing data might yield biased estimates if 
the MCAR assumption does not hold. The latter assumption is frequently not met in 
practice (Muthén, Kaplan and Hollis, 1987). In contrast, multiple imputation should 
yield unbiased estimates also under MAR assumptions, which holds more commonly.   
Broadly speaking, there are several methods of dealing with missing data ranging 
from (i) complete case analysis, i.e. methods that ignore the missing observations, (ii) 
single imputation methods, and (iii) the more advanced multiple imputation methods.  
Methods that ignore missing values use only complete cases and if there is any 
missing observation for one variable of a particular unit of analysis, the entire unit is 
omitted (commonly known as “listwise deletion” or “complete case analysis”). This 
approach is the simplest and yields reasonable results in cases when a small amount 
of data is missing. However, if the remaining cases are not representative of the entire 
sample the results will be biased (Wayman, 2003). Especially in cases with higher 
number of variables, and because the missing observations are usually spread 
throughout the dataset, a great share of information is lost. Moreover, if the data are 
not MCAR, complete case analysis might introduce bias into inferences.  
Single imputation methods are widely used in research primarily due to their 
computational simplicity. These methods include, among others, deterministic single 
imputation mean substitution, hot-deck imputation, nearest-neighbour imputation, 
and predictive mean matching imputation (for discussion see Schafer and Graham, 
2002; Durrant, 2005). These methods generally use regression analysis in complete 
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cases and internalise these regression equations to predict the values of missing cases. 
Empirical evidence that utilizes different imputation techniques suggests that single 
imputation methods can yield unpredictable results and are not based on strong 
theoretical grounds (see for details Little and Rubin, 1987; Schafer, 1997). However, in 
cases where the number of missing observations is small and the missing mechanism 
is ‘ignorable’, single imputation methods perform reasonably well. Shafer (1997) 
regards the use of these methods in cases when the percentage of missing observations 
does not exceed ten percent as acceptable. In cases when this percentage is higher, 
more advanced methods are suggested (Little and Rubin, 2002).  
The multiple imputation approach is an increasingly popular strategy for analysing 
data with missing values (Rubin, 1987; Allison, 2002). It has a strong theoretical 
grounding and superior ability to address the uncertainty dimension of the imputed 
values. It can be described as a three step procedure: imputation, analysis and 
combination steps (Figure 4.3). The key idea behind the multiple imputation is that it 
creates m different completed datasets replacing missing values with plausible 
random values, or imputations (von Hippel, 2003). Then, m completed datasets are 
analysed separately and finally the results from m datasets are combined using 
Rubin’s (1987) formula.  
Within the Multiple Imputation framework, both dependent and independent 
variables can be treated, despite the fact that researchers are often reluctant to impute 
values on the dependent variable. However, Schafer and Graham (2002) suggest that 
missing values on independent variables (predictors) and missing values on 
dependent variables (outcomes) do not fundamentally differ. Schafer and Graham 
(2002, p. 148) even caution their readers:  
"Not to believe general statements such as, ‘missing values on a dependent variable can 
be safely ignored,’ because such statements are imprecise and generally false." 
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Young and Johnson (2011) suggest that all variables in the imputation model should 
be treated as a multivariate response. An imputation model does not represent 
structural or causal relationships among variables. The imputation model is merely a 
device to preserve important features of the joint distribution (means, variance and 
correlations) in the imputed values (Schafer and Graham, 2002). If the dependent 
variable is omitted from the imputation model, then the correlation between the 
dependent variable and any of the independent variables is assumed to be zero 
(Graham 2009). This assumption will systematically bias coefficients downward 
(Little and Rubin 2002; Graham 2009). One of the important standards of Multiple 
Imputation, therefore, is that every variable to be included in the analysis model 
should also be included in the imputation model, including the dependent variable 
(Schafer and Graham 2002). In addition, in a subsequent analysis of the imputed data, 
some variables may be treated as dependent in one equation and as independent in 
another (Schafer and Graham, 2002; Young and Johnson, 2011). 
 
Imputation  Analysis  Combination 
Creating m datasets using data 
augmentation iterative process 
 
Estimating m datasets 
(estimation method specified 
by the researcher) 
 
Combining results 
using Rubin’s (1987) 
formula 
Figure 4.3.  MI as a three step procedure  8 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on multiple sources  
In the imputation step, the number of repeated imputations m is a matter of choice 
between efficiency and practicality. Rubin (1987) suggest that two to ten imputations 
suffice under most realistic circumstances. Shafer (1997) finds that after first few 
imputations the marginal gains rapidly diminishes. Rubin (1987) shows that the 
efficiency of estimates based on m imputations is approximately (1 +
𝛾
𝑚
)−1, where γ 
represents the rate of missing information. Table 4.1 shows the percentage of 
efficiency achieved for different rates of missing information and number of new 
imputed datasets (m).  
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Table 4.1. Percentage of multiple imputation efficiency based on the number of 
imputations (m) and fraction of missing data (γ) 8 
m γ=0.1 γ =0.3 γ =0.5 γ =0.7 γ =0.9 
3 97 91 86 81 77 
5 98 94 91 88 85 
10 99 97 95 93 91 
20 100 99 98 97 96 
Source: Schafer and Olsen, 1998  
As can be seen from Table 4.1, the efficiency improvements of MI increasingly 
diminishes after the first few datasets (m). In cases where the percentage of missing 
information is very high, the improvements of efficiency diminish more slowly. 
Schafer and Olsen (1998) suggest that three to five imputations are generally sufficient 
to obtain efficient results.  
The analysis step is subject to research at hand and the estimation method is specified 
by the researcher. This step is described in Section 4.5 of this Chapter. In the 
combination step, the average of the squared standard errors of the m estimates and 
the calculated variance of the m parameter estimates across the generated imputations 
is combined (for a formal discussion of these issues see Rubin, 1987). After estimating 
regressions with each imputed datasets, estimates and standard errors are saved. 
Suppose that ?̂?𝑗 represents the estimated coefficients from dataset j (j=1,2,…m), and 
𝑈𝑗 represents the standard errors accompanying ?̂?𝑗, then the overall estimate is the 
average of the individual estimates (4.8): 
?̅? =
1
𝑚
∑ ?̂?𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1                                                       (4.8) 
 
For calculating overall standard errors first the (4.9) within- and (4.10) between-
imputation variance (B) is obtained in order to be able to calculate the (4.11) total 
variance.   
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?̅? =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑈𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1                                                       (4.9) 
 
𝐵 =
1
𝑚−1
∑ (?̂?𝑗 − ?̅?)
2  𝑚
𝑗=1                                       (4.10) 
 
𝑇 = ?̅? + (1 +
1
𝑚
) 𝐵                                               (4.11) 
 
Then, the overall standard error is the square root of total variance (T). Confidence 
intervals are obtained by taking the overall estimate plus or minus a number of 
standard errors, where that number is a quantile of Student’s t-distribution with 
degrees of freedom (4.12): 
𝑑𝑓 = (𝑚 − 1) (1 +
𝑚?̅?
(𝑚+1)𝐵
)
2
                                  (4.12) 
A significance test of the null hypothesis Q=0 is performed by comparing the ratio 𝑡 =
?̅?/√𝑇 to the same t-distribution.  
As mentioned earlier, empirical evidence suggests that in cases when the MAR 
mechanism is a plausible assumption, the use of multiple imputation is recommended 
(Schafer and Olsen, 1998). Multiple imputation using Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) technique is found to yield good results even in cases where the percentage 
of missingness reaches 50 percent. We return to MI procedure of our own example in 
Section 4.3.4, after describing the variables and providing a summary statistics of the 
data to which MI is applied.  
 
4.3.3 Description of variables and summary statistics 
 
Following the MI procedure and the reconstruction of the full dataset, the next stage 
of the estimation process is the identification of the inputs and outputs of the 
production process. However, there is no consensus in the empirical research on the 
choice of inputs and outputs which the specific production functions incorporate 
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(Coelli et al., 2005). The measurement of output and inputs is straightforward in cases 
when physical output and input quantities are available. However, usually these data 
are not directly observable, especially in cases when companies operate in service 
sectors and produce multiple products or services. Consequently, different proxies are 
used as measures of inputs and output. In this analysis, following the methodology 
employed in most of the relevant works on the subject, value-added is used as a proxy 
for output (see Coelli et al., 2005 for a discussion on output measures). It is a measure 
of the total value of deflated sales less the value of all the intermediate inputs (non-
labour and non-capital inputs). Added value data are more commonly used when 
sectoral analysis is undertaken (Coelli et al., 2005). Other inputs are measured in 
physical or monetary values, according to the availability of the data. 
Correspondingly, capital input is measured by the deflated book values of a firm’s 
capital.   Labour input is measured by the total number of employees. Monetary values 
are deflated using appropriate Producers Price Index at a two digit level of industry 
disaggregation. The model specification includes also squared and cross-product 
terms of capital and labour. These measures are included to accommodate the 
requirements of the Translog specification (Specification 4.15).  
Country dummies are included to adjust the frontier against which the efficiency 
scores are estimated. A set of control variables are included to isolate the effect of 
ownership, including variables controlling for SOEs, private companies controlled by 
foreign owners and private companies controlled by domestic owners. Also, two 
interaction dummies are included to control for privatized companies to foreign 
owners and to domestic owners. Sector dummy and two year dummies are also 
included.  Additional dummy variable (Urban) is included as an instrument in the 
selection model (specification 4.13). The definition and notation used for variables are 
provided in Table 4.2. Output and input variables are transformed into natural 
logarithm form. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of value added. Five 
imputed datasets were created which were then used for the estimation of stochastic 
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frontier analysis. All model specifications were run with the five imputed datasets and 
the results are combined using Rubin’s formula (see Section 4.3.2 for details of 
combining results using this formula).  
 
Table 4.2. Variable description for the stochastic frontier (and selection) models 9 
Name of the variable Description Notation 
Dependent variable/s 
 
  
Value  Added 
 
Continuous variable calculated as difference 
between deflated sales and non-labour and 
non-capital inputs. Transformed into natural 
logarithms. 
 
lnOut 
Independent variables 
 
  
 
Capital Input 
 
Continuous variable measured by the deflated 
book values of capital. Transformed into 
natural logarithms. 
lnCap 
Labour Input 
 
Continuous variable measured by total 
number of employees. Transformed into 
natural logarithms. 
lnLab 
 
Squared term of capital 
Measured by the following expression  
0.5 *( lnCap*lnCap) 
1/2 (lnCap)2 
Squared term of labour 
Measured by the following expression  
0.5 * (lnLab*lnLab) 
1/2 (lnLab)2 
Cross-product term of 
capital and labour 
Measured by the following expression   
(lnCap*lnLab) 
lnCaplnLab 
Bosnia 1 if a company is from Bosnia and 0 otherwise BiH 
Croatia 1 if a company is from Croatia and 0 otherwise Cro 
Macedonia 
1 if a company is from Macedonia and 0 
otherwise 
Mac 
Montenegro 
1 if a company is from Montenegro and 0 
otherwise 
Mng 
Serbia 1 if a company is from Serbia and 0 otherwise Ser 
Slovenia 
1 if a company is from Slovenia and 0 
otherwise 
 Slo  
(base category) 
Manufacturing 
1 if the company operates in the particular 
sector and 0 otherwise 
Man 
Construction 
1 if the company operates in the particular 
sector and 0 otherwise 
Cons 
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Wholesale and retail 
1 if the company operates in the particular 
sector and 0 otherwise 
Whol 
Transport 
1 if the company operates in the particular 
sector and 0 otherwise 
Trans 
Hotel and Restaurants 
1 if the company operates in the particular 
sector and 0 otherwise 
Hot 
Other Services 
1 if the company operates in the particular 
sector and 0 otherwise 
Other services 
(base category) 
Years 
Year dummies controlling for years 2002, 2005 
and 2009 (2002 is the base year) 
2002, 
2005, 
2009 
State owned 
State ownership (state holding controlling 
stakes – over 50%) 
SOE  
(base category) 
Private foreign owned 
Private and privatized companies (foreign 
owner holding controlling stakes – over 50%) 
PriFo 
Private domestic 
owned 
Private and privatized (domestic private 
sector holding controlling stakes – over 50%) 
PriDo 
Privatized to foreign 
company** 
Privatized companies only (the new owner is 
foreign private company) 
PrivatizedF 
Privatized to domestic 
company ** 
Privatized company only (the new owner is 
domestic private company) 
PrivatizedD 
Urban*** 
1 if company operates in a large city (over 
50,000 inhabitants) and 0 otherwise 
Urban 
* Continuous variables. All accounting data is converted into U.S. dollars using period average 
exchange rates, based on monthly series from the International Monetary Fund, nearest to the end date 
of each respective financial account to allow for comparison across countries. 
** Used for specification 4.16 to depict the impact of different new owners on companies’ efficiency.  
*** Used as an instrument in the selection model (specification 4.13).  
Source: Author’s own compilation  
 
Initially, the data were examined for severe outliers using interquartile range (IQR) 
test. Only the severe outliers with values more than three times the interquartile range 
of a quartile were excluded. More precisely, if A1 and A3 denote the first and the third 
quartiles (approximate 25th and 75th percentile), the observation x was considered an 
outlier to be excluded if the value of x < A1 – 3IQR or x>A3 + 3IQR. Summary statistics 
of the original data is provided in Table 4.3.   
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Table 4.3. Summary statistics of the data  10  
Variable Fraction (%) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
% of 
missing 
(# of 
missing) 
 1 0      
Value added - - 3,390,022 13,800,000 1,213 285,000,000 26.85 
(1021) 
Capital - - 2,046,563 9,237,346 366 154,000,000 34.48 
(1311) 
Labour - - 122 361 1 10,000 0.37 
(14) 
Bosnia 19.56 80.44 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Croatia 15.29 84.71 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Macedonia 19.35 80.65 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Montenegro 3.05 96.95 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Serbia 24.66 75.34 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Slovenia 18.08 81.92 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Manufacturing 27.24 72.76 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Construction 10.37 89.63 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Wholesale and 
retail 
34.75 65.25 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Transport 6.87 93.13 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Hotel and 
Restaurants 
6.11 93.89 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Other Services 14.66 85.34 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Year 2002 25.69 74.31 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Year 2005 30.46 69.54 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Year 2009 43.85 56.15 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
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State owned 11.98 88.02 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
All private 
foreign 
10.13 89.87 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
All private 
domestic 
77.89 22.11 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Privatized to 
foreign 
company 
6.29 93.71 0.10 0.42 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Privatized to 
domestic 
company  
42.64 57.36 0.57 0.76 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Urban 35.69 64.31 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 0 
(0) 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on STATA printouts  
The summary statistics show that the output of companies ranges from just over 1,200 
USD to 285 million USD. Companies in the sample are dominated by small firms.79 
Around 44 percent of observations are from the year 2009 while in 2005 and 2002 the 
proportion of observations is 30 and 26 percent respectively. Companies from Serbia 
represent around 25 percent of the whole sample though it should be noted that for 
the first two waves of the survey, data from Serbia includes Montenegro as well. 
Companies mainly engage in trade and services, with the share of manufacturing and 
construction activities being just over 37 percent. They are mainly private, 
domestically owned. Just over 10 percent of companies are state owned companies.  
The rate of missing values is fairly low; however the largest number of missing values 
occur for the most important variables for the estimation of the production function: 
output, capital and labour. The rate of missingness in these variables is around 27 
percent for output, around 34 percent for capital and around 0.4 percent for labour. 
We treat our missing data as item non-response which occurs when, for some reason, 
the respondent participating in the survey does not respond or has no valid answer 
                                                        
79 See Figure 4.4, panel c for the distribution of companies according to size.  
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for some of the questions.80 Since we lack knowledge of the missing values themselves, 
the MAR assumption is not testable. However, further investigation of the 
missingness pattern shows item nonresponse is higher the larger the companies are. 
Therefore the size of the company (expressed in terms of number of employees) seems 
to predict the missingness. Therefore we assume that the missing data are MAR. The 
size of the company, as a covariate that predicts the missingness, is also included in 
the analysis.  
Since in most cases the missing observations are spread throughout the dataset 
(missing data on different variables in different cases), the proportion of missing data 
usually becomes very significant. Table 4.4 summarises the matrix of missingness 
pattern. It shows that if a complete case analysis had been employed, a significant 
fraction of observations would have been lost (around 44 percent). There are 2,128 
complete case observations or 55.97 percent of possible 3802 observations. Other 
columns in Table 4.4 show the pattern of missingness for each variable and the number 
of cases with particular number of missing observations. Number 1 means that the 
data is observable, while number 0 means that the data is missing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
80 Other types of nonresponses include unit non-response and wave non-response. The former arises 
when a selected respondent refuses or is unable to participate in the survey while the latter, which is 
related to longitudinal data, arises when one or more waves of data are missing for a respondent that 
has provided data for at least one wave (for more see Schafer and Graham, 2002; Durrant, 2005).   
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Table 4.4. Matrix of missingness pattern             11  
Variable 
Count of observations with specified pattern? 
2128 
 
comple- 
te cases 
359 
 
with 
missing 
value 
added 
2 
 
with 
missing 
labour 
2 
 
with 
missing 
value 
added 
and 
labour 
650 
 
with 
missing 
capital 
651 
 
with 
missing 
value 
added 
and 
capital 
1 
 
with 
missing 
labour 
and 
capital 
9 
 
with 
missin
g value 
added, 
labour 
and 
capital 
Value added 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Labour 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Capital 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Bosnia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Croatia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Macedonia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Montenegro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Serbia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Manufacturing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Construction 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Wholesale and 
Retail 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Transport 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Hotel and 
Restaurants 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other Services 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2005 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2009 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
State owned 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
All private 
foreign 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
All private 
domestic 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Privatized to 
foreign 
company 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Privatized to 
domestic 
company 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Urban  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on the NORM software printouts  
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As discussed earlier, ignoring missing values is based on a stronger assumptions 
about the missing data mechanism. However, even if the assumption holds, due to 
the missingness pattern, a great proportion of data can be lost. The use of MI is 
justified as, on the one hand, the variables with missing data are important to the 
subsequent analysis and, on the other hand, the missing values have serious potential 
biasing effects.  
4.3.4 Imputation procedure 
The specification used for MI (i.e. variables and observations) is exactly the same as 
the specification for the main research question (i.e. Equation 4.16) in order to preserve 
the associations among variables and also avoid problems of misspecification.81 . In 
the normal model, a multivariate normal distribution for the data is assumed. 
Therefore the first step before imputation procedure was to approximate the 
normality of the data to be imputed by transforming them into natural logarithms. 
The survey data used are not normally distributed: some are bounded between zero 
and one, others are skewed. In this case, discrete variables were completely observed 
and only continuous variables which are heavily skewed to the right should be 
imputed. Non-normality of the data is handled through transforming the variables 
with missing observations by taking natural logarithms is recommended when data 
are skewed to the right (Graham, Cumsille and Elek-Fisk, 2003).  
  
                                                        
81 For details on missingness specification see Meng (1995) or Schafer (2001). 
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a) Output 
 
b) Capital 
 
c) Labour 
 
Figure  4.4. Histogram of variables before and after transformation 9 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on LIMDEP outputs 
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As Figure 4.4 shows, the transformation to natural logarithms was found to give good 
approximation of variables to normality. Moreover, any deviation from normality y 
(for the variables to be imputed) should not harm the imputation process too much 
(see Schafer, 1997 and Gelman et al., 2005). 
For the application of the multiple imputation technique we rely on the stand-alone 
software NORM developed by Schafer (1999a). A detailed description of software and 
its computational routines can be found in Schafer and Olsen (1998) and Graham and 
Hofer (2000). However, we summarise the imputation procedure carried out in 
NORM in non-technical language. In brief, data imputation in NORM is a two-step 
procedure, (i) the Expectation–Maximization (EM) algorithm and (ii) Data 
Augmentation (DA) procedure.82  
Running the Expectation–Maximization algorithm obtains maximum-likelihood 
estimates of parameters from incomplete data.83  EM uses the relationship between 
data parameters and the missing values. If the parameters of the data are known, then 
predicting unbiased missing values is simple. Likewise, estimating the model 
parameters would be simple if the missing values are known (Schafer and Olsen, 
1998). The EM algorithm takes advantage of this interdependency by iterating 
between the following two steps: (i) predicting the missing values based on estimated 
values for the parameters and (ii) use these predictions to update the parameter 
estimates. These steps are repeated in an iterative fashion until the sequence of 
parameters converges, i.e. the difference in covariance matrix from one iteration to the 
next becomes insignificant (Dempster et al., 1977). The speed of convergence is related 
to the rate of missing information. If the level of information about the parameters in 
the missing observations is high relative to the observed observations, then the 
                                                        
82 The formal definition and key properties of EM are reviewed by Little and Rubin (1987) and Schafer 
(1997). 
83 EM introduced by Dempster, Laird and Rubin, (1977) has been updated and extended in recent years 
improving the convergence of these algorithms (van Dyk and Meng, 1997). 
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convergence is slow and vice-versa. In our case EM algorithm converged after 79 
iterations.  
The second step is the Data Augmentation (DA) process. It is a special type of Markov 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) iterative simulation procedure that fills the missing 
observations and estimates the unknown parameters. Unlike EM, the iterative process 
in DA is stochastic. However, as with EM, DA randomly imputes the missing data 
based on the assumed values of the parameters and the parameters are updated from 
a Bayesian posterior distribution based on the observed and imputed data (Schafer 
and Olsen, 1998). Again, the speed of convergence is related to the rate of missing 
information but the convergence in the case of DA is different. Since DA is a stochastic 
procedure, it converges in distribution rather than in a single set of values as it does 
in EM. In case of DA, the convergence can be interpreted as a lack of serial 
dependence, i.e. the simulated missing data and parameters at convergence are 
statistically independent of those at the initial step. It is important to determine the 
sufficient number of cycles between imputations to ensure that they simulate two 
random draws from the population. Schafer and Olsen (1998) suggest that DA nearly 
always converges in fewer cycles than EM, therefore the running the EM algorithm 
prior to running DA is recommended as it gives some idea as to how many cycles are 
necessary.84  
As shown in Figure 4.5 (panels a and b), the investigation of time-series and 
autocorrelation plots did not suggest any convergence problems. Figure 4.5 shows the 
diagnostic plots for the worst linear function from 1,000 steps of data augmentation 
for the sample data used in this Chapter. The upper plot in panel a) is simply a plot of 
the value of the worst linear function at each step of data augmentation. Ideally, one 
                                                        
84 Running EM algorithm before DA is recommended also because the resulting parameter estimates 
provide good starting values for the DA procedure. 
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would see a pattern in this upper plot that looks something like a rectangle (Schafer 
and Olsen, 1998). The plot shown in this panel (panel a) is reasonably good.  
 
Figure 4.5. Diagnostic plots from a data augmentation run   10 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on NORM outputs  
 
The lower plot (panel b) is the plot of the autocorrelation of a parameter estimate (in 
this case the worst linear combination). When the autocorrelation dips below the red 
line (and stays there), there is evidence that this value of the number of steps of data 
augmentation between imputed data sets is sufficient to produce a non-significant 
autocorrelation between estimates. That is, setting the number of cycles to this value will 
be sufficient for multiple imputation. We use 200 cycles even though the convergence 
is achieved earlier (For EM it is achieved at 79 iterations). Schafer and Olsen (1998) 
suggest that allowing large number of cycles does not cause any problem as the 
simulated values are stationary after convergence. In fact they recommend larger 
number of cycles, as a safety margin, to ensure complete independence of the imputed 
values. Finally, following these steps, 5 new complete datasets with 3802 observations 
each were created. The multiple imputation procedure enabled us to increase the 
sample size by around 44 percent. 
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4.4 Empirical considerations and results 
4.4.1 Discussion of the model  
As mentioned earlier, the aim of this Chapter is to measure the mean efficiency of 
companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia capturing the effect of ownership. 
It intends to answer the following questions: 
- Whether domestic de-novo private companies perform better then SOEs; 
- Whether privatized companies (to foreign or domestic companies) perform 
better than SOEs; 
- Whether foreign companies have higher mean efficiency scores compared to 
domestic de-novo private companies and SOEs; 
- Does the sector of operation explains any of the differences in output 
performance of companies with different ownership structures; 
- Whether there are any differences in output performance of companies across 
successor states of former Yugoslavia;  
- Whether there was an improvement of output performance across years. 
 
There are several strands of literature related to ownership-efficiency nexus including, 
among others, property rights theory, public choice theory and parts of the agency 
theory. These theories have been extensively reviewed in Chapter 1, and therefore will 
not be repeated here. Yet, despite their shortcomings, all of these theories support the 
hypothesis that private ownership improves efficiency through better incentives and 
more effective disciplining mechanisms. As discussed in Chapter 2, although 
empirical research mainly finds that better performance is associated with private 
ownership, it is by no means conclusive as the resulting performance may vary across 
countries, measures, specifications, and new types of owners.  
This Chapter therefore seeks to explore the impact of the ownership status on 
efficiency using the stochastic frontier analysis and estimating firm-specific efficiency 
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scores for companies in the six countries under consideration. The key proposition of 
the empirical models in this Chapter is that the ownership and other firm and country 
specific characteristics explain differences in output performance and mean efficiency 
scores.   
4.4.2 Addressing selection bias  
Before progressing any further, it is important to discuss the issue of selection bias 
which is usually overlooked in the research related to the effects of ownership on 
company performance (see Chapter 2 for more detailed discussion on this topic). 
Attempts to control for selection bias in applied research in social sciences have 
become extensive in the last three decades; largely employing Heckman (1979) sample 
selection models. Sample selection models are a well-developed class of econometric 
models that have been widely employed especially in estimating linear regression 
models.85 Yet, the extension of these methods to non-linear models is more recent 
(Greene, 2008a). The basic structure of a selection model assumes that the observed 
data are not drawn randomly from the population. Instead, the data are assumed to 
be drawn only when a related companies’ characteristic has a certain value/threshold. 
If this systematic relation is not accounted for, then bias is introduced in the estimates. 
A general solution to the selectivity problem relies upon an auxiliary model of the 
process of selection (Greene, 2006). 
 
Heckman’s (1979) selection model is a two stage model in which the first stage is the 
selection equation and second stage is the substantive equation of interest. The first 
stage in this case assesses the probability of being selected into privatization by using 
predictors to determine the selection.  The second stage then examines the effects of 
the independent variables on the outcomes of interest. The most widely used 
                                                        
85 A selected sample is a general term that describes a non-random sample (Wooldridge, 2002).  
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approach is to add the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR), obtained from the selection equation, 
into the second stage to correct for selection problem.86 Greene (2008a), however, 
argues that such an approach is inappropriate for non-linear models such as stochastic 
frontier.87 He proposes an alternative approach for a class of nonlinear models in 
Greene (2006) that relies on a simulation based estimator. This Chapter uses these 
estimators to account for sample selection in the stochastic frontier model. The sample 
selection estimator for SFA was only made available in Limdep 9.0 (Greene, 2007).  
Initially we test for selection bias using Heckman selection model for a class of 
nonlinear models as proposed by Greene (2006) to note if there are systematic 
differences between companies that were not privatized and those that were. Here the 
selection into privatization is estimated in the selection model using maximum-
likelihood probit model employing exogenous variable that effect the decision to be 
selected for privatization. The main assumption required to guarantee reliable 
estimates of selection for privatization is the existence of at least one additional 
regressor in the decision equation. This regressor is required to be independent of the 
error term (Wooldridge, 2002).  The challenge here is to find strong instruments that 
can explain selection for privatization, but not be a determinant of ﬁrm performance 
except through its impact on ownership. The problem with our dataset is that such 
instruments are not easily available by design. Also, some potential instruments were 
not available in all three rounds of surveys. However, we managed to find an 
instrument that proxies the extent of competition in product market where companies 
                                                        
86 Mill’s ratio is the ratio of the probability density function to the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function. In the first stage (selection equation), the inverse Mill’s ratio is computed for each 
observation. For details see (Wooldridge, 2002).     
87 Greene (2008a) points out that none of the authors that used Heckman selection model in the context 
of Stochastic Frontier Analysis formally modified their stochastic frontier models to accommodate the 
results. He argues that sample selection bias arises as a consequence of the correlation between the 
unobservables in the main equation and those in the sample selection equation - thus, the ambiguity in 
adding an IMR to a model that contains no such unobservables. A study analysing the Slovenian 
context (Simoneti et al., 2005) also uses Heckman selection model in non-linear setting by adding the 
IMR to the second stage equation but it does not use Stochastic Frontier Analysis.  
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operate. Governments are expected to sell companies that operate in more competitive 
markets before going to companies in less competitive industries. To measure product 
market competition, a dummy variable is used which takes the value of 1 if company 
operates in large cities (with 50,000 or more inhabitants) and zero if it operates in small 
cities. The idea is that, ceteris paribus, the more competitive a market in which the 
company operates (proxied by the number of inhabitants), the more likely it will be 
that government will be induced to privatize the ﬁrm. Moreover, more competitive 
markets reduce the advantages of retained state ownership by the government.  
The selection model is given by the following specification:  
 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝛽0 + τ1𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏 + 𝛽𝐾𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 
+𝛽𝑂𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑀𝑎𝑛 + 𝛿2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙 + 𝛿4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛿5𝐻𝑜𝑡 + 𝜌1𝐶𝑟𝑜 + 𝜌2𝐵𝑖𝐻 +
𝜌3𝑆𝑒𝑟 + 𝜌4𝑀𝑛𝑔 + 𝜌5𝑀𝑎𝑐 + 𝜑12005 + 𝜑22009                           (4.13) 
 
Where response probability P is the selection status, i.e. the probability of being 
selected for privatization, taking the value of 1 that company is privatized and zero 
otherwise, conditional on the set of explanatory variables. These variables include 
Urban, as a proxy of market competition as well as other covariates that are also 
included in the second step, or main, equation (specification 4.15). These variables 
include inputs, labour (lnlab) and capital (lncap), and output measure (lnout) as well 
as time-invariant factors such as sector, country and year dummies.  The correlation 
between the error terms of the two equations (4.13 above and the second stage model 
4.15), i.e., the coefficient rho produced by the software, provides a method of testing 
the specification of the selectivity model against the simpler model (Greene, 2008a).88   
                                                        
88 The Limdep printouts of the selection model, assuming normal distribution, are presented in 
Appendix 1. The selection model is run in all five imputed datasets (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5) and are 
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The results of the selection model are very similar to the results of the frontier 
regression without correcting for selection, specification 4.15 on its own (respectively 
Column 3 and Column 1 in Table 4.9).89 The absence of selection bias is further 
confirmed as the correlation between the error terms of the two equations, as indicated 
by rho, is not statistically significant (shown at the bottom of Column 3 in Table 4.9). 
Rho has a potential range between -1 and +1 and can give some indication of the likely 
range of selection bias. A correlation with an absolute value of 1 would occur if the 
regression coefficients of the selection model and the regression coefficients of the 
substantive model were estimated by identical processes (i.e., potential selection bias). 
Conversely, a value of rho closer to zero would suggest that data are missing 
randomly or the regression coefficients of the selection model and the regression 
coefficients of the substantive model were estimated by unrelated processes (i.e., less 
evidence of selection bias). The results show that Rho coefficient is close to zero (0.001) 
with a p value close to one (0.97). We can hence reject the hypothesis that there is 
sample selection problem and interpret the SFA specification number 4.15 
independently.  
4.4.3 Functional form and distributional assumption  
As already established, the estimation of the stochastic frontier requires pre-specified 
functional form of the production function. As argued in section 4.2.2, there are 
different functional forms used in the literature to model production functions starting 
from a simple Cobb-Douglas formulation progressing to a more complex Translog 
form. Since Cobb-Douglas specification is nested in the Translog form the choice of 
the most appropriate functional form between the two can be tested using the 
generalized likelihood-ratio (LR) statistic as suggested by Battese and Coelli (1993). 
LR test is defined by:   
                                                        
correspondingly presented in Appendices 1.1 – 1.5. The overall results are combined using Rubin’s 
formula.  
89 The choice of the functional form and distributional assumptions is justified later in the chapter.  
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𝐿𝑅 = −2[𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑟 − 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑢]  … … … … … ... … …   (4.14) 
 
where 𝑙𝑛𝐿 stands for likelihood ratio of restricted (r) and unrestricted (u) model 
respectively. The null hypothesis states that there is no significant difference between 
the two specifications. LR test has an approximate chi-square distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of degrees of freedom 
between the two models (i.e., the number of variables added to the model).   
The following specification (4.15) is used as the model to be estimated but several tests 
were conducted to consider the restrictions on the parameters:  
𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝐾𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽𝐿𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏 +
1
2
𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝
2 +
1
2
𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏
2 + 𝛽𝐾𝐿𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏 +
𝛿1𝑀𝑎𝑛 + 𝛿2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙 + 𝛿4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛿5𝐻𝑜𝑡 + 𝜌1𝐶𝑟𝑜 + 𝜌2𝐵𝑖𝐻 + 𝜌3𝑆𝑒𝑟 + 𝜌4𝑀𝑛𝑔 +
𝜌5𝑀𝑎𝑐 + 𝜑12005 + 𝜑22009 + 𝜃1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝐹𝑜 + 𝜃2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝐷𝑜 + (𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖)          (4.15) 
Where:  
- 𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡 represents the output expressed in terms of Value Added 
- 𝛽𝐾 and 𝛽𝐿 are the estimated coefficients of Capital and Labour input 
- βKK and βLL are the estimated coefficients of squared terms of the inputs and βKL is 
the estimated coefficient of cross-product of inputs 
- 𝜀𝑖 = (𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖) is a vector of composed error term consisting of two independent 
elements  
  𝑣𝑖 is the independently distributed error term that represents random variation 
in output due to factors not under companies’ control as well as the effects of 
omitted explanatory variables, measurement errors, and statistical noise.   
 𝑢𝑖 is non-negative firm-specific technical inefficiency representing the 
stochastic shortfall of companies’ output from the production frontier due to 
inefficiency.   
- 𝛿i, 𝜌𝑖, 𝜑𝑖 and 𝜃𝑖 denote estimated coefficients of a set of dummy variables 
controlling for industries, countries, years and ownership respectively.    
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Initially, simple Cobb-Douglass frontier function (including only logs of capital and 
labour inputs) was fitted in five imputed datasets (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5) followed by 
a Translog formulation (including Cob-Douglass elements, squared and cross-product 
terms of the inputs).90 The LR test was conducted to test for the most appropriate 
formulation. The results of the LR test are presented in Table 4.5.91 The LR test in all 
datasets suggests that the use of Translog function is preferable to a simple Cobb-
Douglas specification.  
Table 4.5. Generalized likelihood Ratio Test for functional form of the stochastic frontier 
model 12 
Database Null hypothesis LR Test  Chi square 
value*** 
Result 
M1 𝛽𝐾𝐾 = 𝛽𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝐾𝐿 = 0 19.76 16.27 Reject H0 
M2 𝛽𝐾𝐾 = 𝛽𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝐾𝐿 = 0 16.51 16.27 Reject H0 
M3 𝛽𝐾𝐾 = 𝛽𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝐾𝐿 = 0 32.16 16.27 Reject H0 
M4 𝛽𝐾𝐾 = 𝛽𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝐾𝐿 = 0 25.88 16.27 Reject H0 
M5 𝛽𝐾𝐾 = 𝛽𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝐾𝐿 = 0 31.23 16.27 Reject H0 
***Chi square values at 0.1 percent level.   
Source: Author’s own compilation based on LIMDEP outputs  
 
Other LR tests were conducted to consider the restrictions on the parameters in the 
model specification 4.15. Table 4.6 presents the LR test for joint significance of other 
explanatory variables: dummies controlling for Sector, Country, Time and 
Ownership. In all five imputed datasets the H0 was strongly rejected favouring the 
unrestricted model which includes time, environmental and firms-specific covariates.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
90 The Limdep printouts of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog specifications are presented in Appendix 2. 
The Cobb-Douglas and Translog specifications are run in all five imputed datasets (M1, M2, M3, M4, 
M5), and are correspondingly presented in Appendices 2.1 – 2.5. In all cases the Cobb-Douglas 
specification is presented first followed by the Translog specification. In all these specifications, normal 
distribution is assumed. Specifications with other distributional assumptions are presented in 
Appendix 4. The discussion about the distributional assumptions is presented in the following sections.  
91 The LR tests presented in Table 5 are based on the frontier functions assuming normal distribution of 
the 𝑢𝑖. Frontiers were also fitted assuming other distributional assumption (truncated, exponential and 
Gamma) and the results were similar.  
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Table 4.6. Generalized likelihood Ratio Test for the significance of other variables 13 
 Null hypothesis LR Test  Chi square 
value*** 
Test statistic 
M1 δi=ρi=φi=θi=0 928.682 36.12 Reject H0 
M2 δi=ρi=φi=θi=0 939.37 36.12 Reject H0 
M3 δi=ρi=φi=θi=0 986.89 36.12 Reject H0 
M4 δi=ρi=φi=θi=0 1073.12 36.12 Reject H0 
M5 δi=ρi=φi=θi=0 958.33  36.12 Reject H0 
***Chi square values at 0.1 percent level.   
Source: Author’s own compilation based on LIMDEP outputs 
Finally, a single restriction on ownership parameters was imposed as these covariates 
are the focus of this research. The LR test, presented in Table 4.7, for no effect of 
ownership was strongly rejected in all five imputed datasets indicating that the 
ownership explains some the variation of companies’ performance. 
Table 4.7. Generalized likelihood Ratio Test for the significance of ownership 14 
 Null hypothesis LR Test  Chi square 
value*** 
Test statistic 
M1 θi=0 53.65 13.82 Reject H0 
M2 θi=0 66.19 13.82 Reject H0 
M3 θi=0 35.90 13.82 Reject H0 
M4 θi=0 65.31 13.82 Reject H0 
M5 θi=0 57.02 13.82 Reject H0 
***Chi square values at 0.1 percent level.   
Source: Author’s own compilation based on LIMDEP outputs  
An alternative specification (4.16) was also run to include an interaction term to jointly 
depict the effect of privatization and the type of new owner. The interaction term 
analysed the effect of privatization on companies privatized to a foreign owner and to 
a domestic owner. The results are presented in Table 4.9 (Column 2). Limdep printouts 
of this specification are presented in Appendix 3. This specification is run in all five 
imputed datasets (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5), and are correspondingly presented in 
Appendices 3.1 – 3.5. 
𝑙𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝐾𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽𝐿𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏 +
1
2
𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝
2 +
1
2
𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏
2 + 𝛽𝐾𝐿𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏 +
𝛿1𝑀𝑎𝑛 + 𝛿2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙 + 𝛿4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝛿5𝐻𝑜𝑡 + 𝜌1𝐶𝑟𝑜 + 𝜌2𝐵𝑖𝐻 + 𝜌3𝑆𝑒𝑟 + 𝜌4𝑀𝑛𝑔 +
𝜌5𝑀𝑎𝑐 + 𝜑12005 + 𝜑22009 + ζ1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐹 + ζ2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐷 + (𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖)      (4.16) 
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Following the discussion in section 4.2.2, another matter to be considered before fitting 
the frontier functions is the distributional assumption about the 𝑢𝑖. In order to avoid 
misspecification, Translog frontier function (in five imputed datasets) was fitted with 
all four distributional assumptions (normal, truncated, exponential and gamma).92 
The estimated efficiency scores were then compared to identify eventual differences. 
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Greene (2008), rank correlations for 
estimates of inefficiencies from the four distributions can be used to compare the 
estimated results. Also, the use of scatter diagram gives a graphical insight to the 
eventual differences.  
Along these lines, Pearson and Spearman rank correlations for estimates of efficiency 
were calculated. These correlations were calculated for all five imputed datasets. As 
the results presented in Table 4.8 show, both Pearson and Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients indicate that the efficiency scores are highly correlated with correlation 
coefficients averaging around unity. The results are consistent across five imputed 
datasets and all correlation coefficients are significant at conventional levels of 
significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
92 The Limdep printouts of Cobb-Douglas and Translog specifications with truncated, exponential and 
gamma distributions are presented in Appendix 4 (Results with normal distributional assumption were 
presented in Appendix 2). These specifications with all distributional assumptions are run in all five 
imputed datasets (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5), and are correspondingly presented in Appendices 4.1 – 4.5. 
In all cases the Cobb-Douglas specification is presented first followed by the Translog specification with 
the following order of the distributional assumptions: truncated, exponential and gamma.  
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Table 4.8. Pearson and Spearman rank correlations for estimates of efficiency with 
different distributional assumptions for ui* 15 
M1 Normal Truncated Exponential Gamma 
Normal 1.0000 0.9795 (0.000) 0.9791 (0.000) 0.9623 (0.000) 
Truncated 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 (0.000) 0.9829 (0.000) 
Exponential 0.9999 1.0000    1.0000 0.9829 (0.000) 
Gamma 0.9711 0.9713 0.9713 1.0000 
 
M2 Normal Truncated Exponential Gamma 
Normal 1.0000 0.9810 (0.000) 0.9805 (0.000) 0.9615 (0.000) 
Truncated 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 (0.000) 0.9807 (0.000) 
Exponential 0.9999 1.0000    1.0000 0.9807 (0.000) 
Gamma 0.9675 0.9677 0.9677 1.0000 
 
M3 Normal Truncated Exponential Gamma 
Normal 1.0000 0.9818 (0.000) 0.9814 (0.000) 0.9599 (0.000) 
Truncated 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 (0.000) 0.9783 (0.000) 
Exponential 0.9999 1.0000    1.0000 0.9783 (0.000) 
Gamma 0.9643 0.9646 0.9646 1.0000 
 
M4 Normal Truncated Exponential Gamma 
Normal 1.0000 0.9789 (0.000) 0.9785 (0.000) 0.9613 (0.000) 
Truncated 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 (0.000) 0.9829 (0.000) 
Exponential 0.9999 1.0000    1.0000 0.9829 (0.000) 
Gamma 0.9717 0.9718 0.9718 1.0000 
 
M5 Normal Truncated Exponential Gamma 
Normal 1.0000 0.9812 (0.000) 0.9809 (0.000) 0.9606 (0.000) 
Truncated 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 (0.000) 0.9792 (0.000) 
Exponential 0.9999 1.0000    1.0000 0.9792 (0.000) 
Gamma 0.9662 0.9663 0.9663 1.0000 
*Note: Pearson correlations are presented above diagonal. Spearman rank correlations are presented 
below diagonal; p-values in brackets.  
Source: Author’s own compilation based on STATA outputs 
 
Equally, the scatter diagrams of efficiency scores across imputations and across 
distributional assumptions, presented in Figure 4.6, depict similar pattern of 
relationships.  
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Figure 4.6. Scatter diagrams of efficiency scores across different distributional 
assumptions  11  
Source: Author’s own compilation based on LIMDEP output 
 
Ritter and Simar (1997) argue in favour of using simple distribution, such as normal 
or exponential, in cases when the efficiency ranking and scores are similar across 
different distributional assumptions. Given these similar efficiency scores and 
rankings, established by Pearson and Spearman rank correlations as well as graphical 
representation, we use the normal distribution for inefficiency scores. Hereafter, all 
regression results presented in this Chapter are estimated assuming normal 
distribution of inefficiencies.  
4.4.4 Results  
 
The parameters of stochastic model and the inefficiency scores are estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimators. The software package Limdep 9.0 was used as the 
econometric software to carry out the estimations.93 The estimated parameters include 
𝛽𝑠, 𝜎𝑣
2, 𝜎𝑢
2,  𝜎2, 𝜆 and 𝛾.  The variances of parameters of symmetric 𝑣𝑖 and one-sided 𝑢𝑖 
are denoted 𝜎𝑣
2 and 𝜎𝑢
2 respectively. The overall model variance is given by  𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 +
                                                        
93 For obtaining descriptive statistics, Spearman rank correlations, Pearson correlations and Kernel 
density distribution graphs STATA 11 was used. Other graphs were produced using Microsoft Excel 
2010.  
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𝜎𝑣
2. The 𝜆 parameter denotes the deviation from the optimal frontier and is given by 
=
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
 . The measure of total variation of output from the frontier that can be attributed 
to the inefficiency is given by parameter 𝛾 =
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎2
 .   
The results from five imputed datasets in all three specifications were combined using 
Rubin’s formula (Rubin, 1987). The process for combining the results is described in 
detail in section 4.4.2. Combined results are presented in Table 4.9.94 The dependent 
variable is lnOutput in specifications presented in Column 1 and 2 of Table 4.9 and in 
the second stage of specification presented in Column 3. Most of the signs of the 
coefficients are as expected and statistically significant, including the variance 
parameters. We start by analysing the variance parameters (last four rows of Panel A 
of Table 4.9) which are the most important elements in testing the appropriateness of 
the stochastic frontier model.  
The estimated Lambda (𝜆) coefficient is statistically significant implying that there is 
inefficiency in the data and that the output variation is not purely random (Greene, 
2007). It demonstrates that the deviation from the frontier is significantly influenced 
by inefficiency. Lambda is a measure of the amount of variation stemming from 
inefficiency relative to noise for the sample. If significant, it suggests that the use of 
the Stochastic Frontier model is appropriate given that it shows the existence of the 
two error components. If Lambda is not statistically different from zero, it implies that 
the variance in production relative to the frontier is solely attributed to the random 
error, i.e. there is no inefficiency component in the disturbance term. In that case the 
model can be estimated efficiently by ordinary least square. In other words, firms 
operating on the frontier are accepted to be technically efficient and except for random 
disturbances, are receiving maximum output for the combinations of the inputs used. 
                                                        
94 The Limdep printouts of Translog specifications with normal distribution are presented in Appendix 
1.  
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The estimated variance parameter Gamma (𝛾), which should take values between 0 
and 1, is statistically significant and averages (across all imputed datasets) at 0.45. This 
suggests that 45 percent of the difference between observed output and the 
corresponding frontier is due to inefficiency. This reveals the importance of 
incorporating technical inefficiency in the production function. The statistically 
significant parameter Gamma confirms that that the systematic technical inefficiency 
effects are not zero and consequently not all firms operate on the frontier.  
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Table 4.9. Combined results from stochastic frontier estimation  16 
PANEL A 
dependent variable: lnOut    
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
 Specification 4.15 Specification 4.16 Specification 4.13 
 SFA SFA  SFA with selection 
  Coefficients P, 2-tailed Coefficients P, 2-tailed Coefficients P, 2-tailed 
lnCap  0.019 0.86 0.012 0.92 0.067 0.250 
lnLab  1.133*** 0.00 1.133*** 0.00 1.492*** 0.000 
1/2 lnCap2 0.019 0.14 0.020 0.15 0.037 0.128 
1/2 lnLab2 -0.028*** 0.05 -0.032*** 0.02 -0.015** 0.048 
lnCaplnLab -0.019 0.16 -0.018 0.19 -0.051 0.121 
_2005 0.422*** 0.00 0.412*** 0.00 0.564*** 0.000 
_2009  0.258*** 0.00 0.241*** 0.00 0.351*** 0.000 
Man -0.251*** 0.00 -0.242*** 0.00 -0.270*** 0.000 
Cons 0.028 0.81 0.008 0.95 0.027 0.772 
Hot -0.289*** 0.00 -0.286*** 0.00 -0.367*** 0.000 
Whol 0.278*** 0.00 0.304*** 0.00 0.311*** 0.000 
Mng -0.694*** 0.00 -0.710*** 0.00 -0.937*** 0.000 
Bos -0.788*** 0.00 -0.798*** 0.00 -1.014*** 0.000 
Cro -0.402*** 0.00 -0.393*** 0.00 -0.532*** 0.000 
Ser -1.038*** 0.00 -1.038*** 0.00 -1.320*** 0.000 
Mac -1.191*** 0.00 -1.190*** 0.00 -1.498*** 0.000 
PriFo 0.413*** 0.00 - - 0.682*** 0.000 
PriDo 0.053 0.45 - - 0.253 0.382 
PrivatizedF - - 0.093*** 0.01 - - 
PrivatizedD - - 0.009 0.72 - - 
Lambda (λ) 0.904*** 0.00 0.887*** 0.00 - - 
Sigma 0.973*** 0.00 0.967*** 0.01 - - 
Intercept 9.776*** 0.00 9.868*** 0.00 13.208*** 0.000 
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Gamma (γ) 0.448***      
PANEL B.       
                                                                                                                                                                                                 Probit selection model 
Constant - - - - -0.393*** 0.000 
lnCap  - - - - 0.118*** 0.000 
lnLab  - - - - 0.305** 0.010 
lnOut - - - - 0.514*** 0.000 
Man     0.093*** 0.000 
Con     0.508 0.388 
Hot - - - - 0.856*** 0.000 
Whol - - - - -0.164* 0.062 
Mon - - - - 0.200 0.211 
Bos - - - - 0.094 0.112 
Cro - - - - 0.838*** 0.000 
Ser - - - - 1.057* 0.078 
Mac - - - - 0.972 0.128 
Urban - - - - 0.105 0.160 
Rho(w,v) - - - - 0.001 0.970 
 
PANEL C: Summary statistics of efficiency  scores 
      
 
Number of    
observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum    
Normal distribution  3,802 .5716547 .0903016 .1680576 .8231664    
*** Significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level; *significant at 10 percent level of significance.    This panel includes the estimated results of 
the first stage PROBIT selection model.  
 Source: Author’s own compilation based on LIMDEP outputs
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Given that the Translog functional form is used, the interpretation of the technology 
parameters is complicated, because of the squared and cross-product terms of the 
inputs, and because the effect is “spread” among the cross products as well (Greene, 
2008). Also, the coefficients of these parameters are of secondary importance in 
efficiency analysis as the focus is on efficiency scores. Therefore for the sake of brevity 
detailed interpretation of technology terms is not presented.  
When looking at the evolution of output performance over time, an improvement 
pattern can be noticed in both Specification 4.15 and 4.16 (Column 1 and Column 2 of 
Table 4.9). The coefficients of variables 2005 and 2009 are positive and significant 
indicating that there was an increase in output compared to 2002 which is the base 
year. In terms of sector of operation, in both Specification 4.15 and 4.16, the estimated 
results suggest that manufacturing, and hotel and restaurants display lower output 
compared to ‘other services’ which is the base category. Conversely, wholesale sector 
has higher output compared to the base category. The coefficient for construction 
sectors is statistically insignificant. Specification 4.16, includes the interaction terms to 
depict the joint effect of privatization and the type of new owner. The interaction terms 
analysed the effect of privatization on companies privatized to a foreign owner and to 
a domestic owner. The results seem to suggest that a company privatized to a foreign 
owner outperforms SOEs and displays better output performance than companies 
privatized to domestic owners. However, even though the coefficient of the 
companies privatized to domestic owners is positive (compared to the SOEs), it is still 
statistically insignificant. Specification 4.15, excludes these interaction terms and 
presents only the coefficients of both private foreign and private domestic companies 
(comparing them with SOEs as base category). Coefficient of foreign owner companies 
is positive and significant indicating that private foreign companies have better 
performance compared to SOEs, while the coefficient of domestic private companies 
is statistically insignificant. In relation to the dummy variables controlling for 
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countries, they are all statistically significant at one percent level of significance. By 
having Slovenian companies as reference, the results seem to suggest that companies 
from all the other countries have lower output performance compared to Slovenian 
companies. 
As mentioned before, however, the focus of the analysis here is the firm-specific 
efficiency scores. We further analyse the efficiency score of the main equation 
(Specification 4.15). The SFA produces efficiency estimates or efficiency scores of 
individual companies. In panel C of Table 4.9, a summary of efficiency scores is 
presented. It shows that mean efficiency score is 0.57 and it ranges from around 0.17 
to 0.82 with a standard deviation of 0.1. Figure 4.7 presents the frequency distributions 
and Kernel density estimator of efficiency scores.  Graphical presentation suggests 
that there is a tendency for companies towards technically efficient operation (since 
efficiency scores are more clustered around 1); with a majority of them clustered 
around 0.6. Over 90 percent of companies fall in the range from 0.45 to 0.75. Only 
around 2 percent of companies have efficiency scores greater than 0.75 while over 8 
percent of companies have efficiency scores less than 0.45.  
 
 
Figure  4.7. Kernel density estimate and frequency distribution of efficiency scores (red 
dotted lines represent normal distribution)  12 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on LIMDEP outputs 
 
 
Chapter 4 - The impact of ownership on Efficiency of companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia 
164 
 
Before analysing firm specific scores of efficiency and inefficiency, it is important to 
note their properties by examining whether they lie within the confidence intervals.  
Horrace and Schmidt (1996) suggest that estimated inefficiencies can be used to obtain 
the conditional mean and variance of ui given 𝜀𝑖. Given the distributional assumptions 
for the error components ui~iid N
+(0, σu
2) and vi~iid N(0, σv
2), the conditional 
distribution of ui given 𝜀𝑖 is truncated with normal mean 𝜇𝑖
∗ and variance 𝜎∗. With that 
the conditional mean and variance of the inefficiency and efficiency terms are 
available, following Bera and Sharma (1999) the conditional confidence intervals for 
firm-specific technical efficiency and inefficiencies given 𝜀𝑖  can be constructed using 
the following system of equations: 
 
𝜇𝑖
∗ = −
𝜀𝑖𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎2
= −
𝜀𝑖𝜆
2
(1+𝜆2)
 … … … … … ... … …   (4.17) 
 
𝜎∗ =
𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣
𝜎
=
𝜎𝜆
(1+𝜆2)
 … … … … … ... … …   (4.18) 
Then the lower confidence bound (LCB) and the upper confidence bound (UCB) are 
defined as:  
𝐿𝐶𝐵𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖
∗ + 𝜎∗𝜑−1[1 − (1 −
𝛼
2
) 𝜑 (
𝜇𝑖
∗
𝜎∗
)] … … … … … ... … …   (4.19) 
 
𝑈𝐶𝐵𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖
∗ + 𝜎∗𝜑−1[1 −
𝛼
2
𝜑 (
𝜇𝑖
∗
𝜎∗
)] … … … … … ... … …   (4.20) 
 
Where 𝜑 (·) is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Greene 
(2008) suggests that the constructed confidence intervals are not of ui as they are 
termed in many papers. The confidence inteval does not bracket a particular ui, it is in 
fact characterising the conditional distribution of ui given 𝜀𝑖. Following these 
arguments and the set of equations discussed, we have been able to construct two 
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types of confidence intervals (one for efficiency and one for inefficiency scores). For 
brevity, here we present only confidence intervals for technical efficiencies.95 These 
plots are also more insightful in terms of the size of the intervals.  
Figure 4.8 depicts the confidence interval for technical efficiency from five imputed 
datasets (the vertical axis shows values of efficiency scores, ranging from 0 to 1; the 
horizontal axis shows the number of companies from 1 to 3,802). The diagram show 
that the efficiency estimates are within the confidence intervals and that the most 
efficient firms yield the shortest confidence interval. This confirms the proposition put 
forth by Bera and Sharma (1999) that when companies move towards the frontier, they 
not only increase technical efficiency but also reduce the production uncertainty, 
which is defined by var(ui|ei). As companies’ efficiency gets closer to 1, the confidence 
interval gets narrower (note the upper left hand corner of each diagram).  
 
Figure 4.8. Confidence interval for technical efficiency  13 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on LIMDEP outputs 
                                                        
95 Confidence interval for technical inefficiencies in all five imputed datasets are presented in Appendix 
5. Similarly, the figures show that the inefficiency scores are within the confidence intervals. 
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Since efficiency scores vary across companies, they can be related to companies’ 
characteristics, thus one can identify sources of inefficiency. Given that the impact of 
ownership on companies’ performance is the focus of this thesis, the following 
paragraphs focus on this relationship.  
To investigate the effects of the ownership on efficiency, the one-way ANOVA 
analyses are conducted. The null hypothesis of these tests is that the means of 
eﬃciency scores are equal across groups of companies with different ownership 
structures. This exercise uncovers the impact of ownership which was identified as 
having a major influence on efficiency. Here the theoretical proposition as to whether 
ownership accounts for differences in the mean efficiency scores according to different 
ownership structures are compared and tested. Table 4.10 summarises the ANOVA 
results of efficiency difference by three factors in all 6 countries included in this 
analysis. The results indicate that the mean efficiency score of SOEs is lower than that 
of private companies owned by either domestic or foreign investors. The mean 
efficiency score of SOEs ranges from 0.53 in Macedonia to 0.65 in Slovenia. The 
differences in mean efficiency scores between SOEs and private companies owned by 
domestic investors are very small. The range of the mean efficiency score of private 
companies owned by domestic investors is higher by only 0.01 or one percent 
compared to that of SOEs. On the other hand, the mean efficiency scores of private 
companies owned by foreign investors are higher ranging from 0.58 in Macedonia to 
0.7 in Slovenia.  A similar pattern is observed in all countries. The positive difference 
in the mean efficiency scores of private companies owned by foreign investors 
compared to SOEs is significant at one percent level in all countries. Similarly, the 
mean efficiency scores of private companies owned by foreign investors compared to 
private companies owned by domestic investors are higher and statistically significant 
everywhere apart from Montenegro. On the other hand private companies owned by 
domestic investors have higher, but statistically insignificant, mean efficiency score 
compared to SOEs.  
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Table 4.10. Summary of ANOVA results for differences in mean efficiency scores of firms with different types of ownership  17 
 Bosnia Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
Ownership type Mean  
efficiencies 
Mean  
efficiencies 
Mean  
efficiencies 
Mean  
efficiencies 
Mean  
efficiencies 
Mean  
efficiencies 
State Owned Companies 0.574 0.613 0.534 0.584 0.549 0.653 
Private (Owned by 
domestic investors) 
0.580 0.618 0.539 0.589 0.555 0.659 
Foreign (Owned by 
foreign investors) 
0.616 0.654 0.575 0.625 0.591 0.695 
One-way ANOVA F 
value 
P 
value 
F  
value 
P 
value 
F  
value 
P 
value 
F  
value 
P 
value 
F 
value 
P 
value 
F 
value 
P 
value 
Private foreign company 
compared to state 
owned company 
3.12*** 0.000 5.12*** 0.000 6.27*** 0.000 4.89*** 0.067 4.66*** 0.000 4.49*** 0.000 
Private domestic 
compared to state 
owned company 
5.19 0.422 4.22 0.388 2.38 0.298 5.31 0.832 4.79 0.349 2.56 0.783 
Private foreign company 
compared to private 
domestic company 
3.78*** 0.002 4.78*** 0.002 4.42** 0.039 4.55 0.266 5.16** 0.045 3.96*** 0.000 
*** Significant at 1 percent level; ** significant ant 5 percent level 
       Source: Author’s own compilation based on ANOVA outputs 
 
  
 
4.5 Limitations of the model 
Although this chapter has offered several important contributions to the existing 
literature, the limitations of the model presented here need to be acknowledged and 
discussed. Firstly, as the analysis has to rely on cross-section samples, by necessity it 
misses the dynamic assessment of the relationship between variables and, therefore, 
the results should be considered as indicative. Also, in absence of data on the pre-
privatization period, it was not possible to have a selection model which takes into 
account that period. Secondly, as the data for prices of inputs and outputs were not 
available, the model accounts only for technical efficiency. The availability of these 
data would have allowed analysing economic efficiency (technical and allocative 
efficiency). Decomposing the inefficiency component into technical and allocative 
inefficiency allows the identification of the type of inefficiency which is the main 
source of departure from the frontier (cost minimizing, revenue or profit maximizing). 
This would have been particularly important for policy recommendations. Finally, the 
BEEPS dataset was not available for Kosovo therefore the results are not directly 
comparable with those presented in Chapter 6 (which covers the situation in Kosovo).  
4.6 Conclusions 
Until recently, the economic literature largely ignored the concept of efficiency due to 
the dominance of the neoclassical economics in which companies are considered to be 
full optimisers, operating on their production possibility frontier (and thus efficient) 
because of competitive pressure. However, in recent decades the measurement of 
efficiency and the analysis of the gap between the actual and potential levels of output 
has become an important area of research for both economists and policy makers. The 
primary reason is to identify the sources of inefficiency and separate their effect from 
the environmental factors which are not in companies’ control.  
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This Chapter summarised influential theoretical and empirical contributions that led 
to the development and expansion of efficiency analysis. It presented the concept of 
economic efficiency and its decomposition into technical and allocative efficiency. 
Estimation methods, including parametric and non-parametric techniques, were 
discussed in order to provide a rationale for the choice of SFA as the appropriate 
method of estimation used in this Chapter. This method enables the estimation of 
firm-specific inefficiency scores in an environment allowing for external shocks and 
influences. Due to data limitations, the analysis of this Chapter was limited to 
technical efficiency. Using a Translog production function with inefficiency effects, 
the technical efficiency scores of companies in the successor states of former 
Yugoslavia were estimated. Also, variations in efficiency scores based on a range of 
environmental and firm-specific factors were explained. The results indicate that 
inefficiency was present in the surveyed companies, therefore, SFA proved to be an 
appropriate method for this exercise. Variance indicators suggest that almost 45 
percent of difference between observed output and the corresponding frontier is due 
to inefficiency. This reveals the importance of incorporating technical inefficiency in 
the production function.  
As the data are country representative and the estimation is conducted using a single 
frontier, the results can be compared across different countries.  By classifying 
according to the degree of mean efficiency score, Slovenian companies appear to be 
the most efficient followed by companies from Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia 
and Macedonia. In terms of the sector of operation, companies from the wholesale 
sector seem to have display better output performance followed by companies in 
construction, other services, manufacturing and hotels and restaurants. The coefficient 
for the construction sector is statistically insignificant.  
 
Having separate observations for several types of ownership (state, domestic private 
and foreign private), allows us to derive conclusions regarding the impact of each 
  
 
ownership type on companies’ efficiency. The results, in terms of the significance and 
sign of the variables, are overwhelmingly consistent with the theoretical expectation 
cited earlier and they are mostly significant. In all countries foreign owned companies 
outperform other companies (domestic private and state owned companies) and the 
results are highly significant. Similarly, privatized companies by foreign owners 
outperform SOEs and privatized companies by domestic owners. SOEs seem to have 
the lowest mean efficiency score although the difference with domestic private 
companies (de novo or privatized) is not statistically significant. The results also 
indicate that output performance has increased over the years compared to 2002.  
This chapter has also analysed the issue of incomplete data, employing a multiple 
imputation procedure for handling missing data. The multiple imputation procedure 
enabled us to increase the sample size by around 44 percent and avoid the restrictive 
assumption of missing completely at random, made in most similar studies, though 
generally not acknowledged. We expect that handling missing data has improved the 
precision of estimates.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 5  
Privatization in Kosovo: the context and the progress  
 
Contents 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 172 
5.1 Background of the Kosovo economy ................................................................................. 173 
The economy of Kosovo as part of former Yugoslavia ......................................................... 173 
The economy of Kosovo after the war ..................................................................................... 174 
5.2 Privatization in Kosovo ........................................................................................................ 180 
Privatization process based on Act on Social Capital ............................................................ 180 
Privatization process after the war ........................................................................................... 181 
5.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 190 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 5 – Privatization in Kosovo: the context and the progress 
172 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the privatization process in Kosovo. The 
discussion concentrates on the post-war period when the large-scale privatization 
process was initiated. But it also provides a brief background to ownership 
transformation that started in the late 1980s based on the Act on Social Capital in 
former Yugoslavia. In Kosovo, as in other parts of former Yugoslavia, the dominant 
form of ownership of companies was ‘social ownership’. Formally, enterprises 
belonged to the society and left in trust with the employees to operate them, look after 
and maintain the society’s assets, and benefit from them. This had created the de facto 
impression that enterprises belong to their employees, which of course was not the 
case in legal terms. 
The privatization process in Kosovo was distinct from that in other successor states of 
former Yugoslavia as well as from other TEs, at least in two ways. First, it was 
designed and largely implemented under the auspices of the United Nations interim 
administration without any significant involvement of a democratically elected 
national government.96 Secondly, the method of privatization after the 1999 war did 
not follow the legacies of Markovic’s reform in particular in terms of providing 
significant preference to workers or managers. The only method of privatization has 
been ‘sale to the highest bidder’ in an attempt to attract outside strategic investors, 
preferably foreign investors. Therefore, the ownership transformation process in 
Kosovo did not result in significant insiders’ ownership nor in dispersed ownership 
which was common in cases of mass distribution of shares.  
Kosovo was the last of the successor states of former Yugoslavia to embark on lar-
scale privatization, even though the privatization process was introduced in 1989. 
                                                        
96 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), governed Kosovo according to the Security Council 
Resolution 1244 until the declaration of independence in February 2008. Security Council Resolution 
1244 vested UNMIK with authority over the territory and people of Kosovo, including all legislative 
and executive powers and administration of the judiciary. 
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However, the number of companies in Kosovo that went through the privatization 
process in that period was very small and the process was soon brought to an end as 
the emergency measures of the Serbian Government were imposed from March 1989 
onwards. Although the privatization process in Kosovo started much later than in 
other successor states of former Yugoslavia, it progressed relatively fast so that it was 
almost completed at the same time as in most of these countries.  
This Chapter starts by analysing the state of Kosovo’s economy within the former 
Yugoslav federation until now. Also, this Chapter provides relevant background 
information on the privatization process in Kosovo and sets up the context of 
empirical investigation which is conducted in Chapter 6.  
 
5.1 Background of the Kosovo economy 
The economy of Kosovo as part of former Yugoslavia  
Kosovo was the poorest region of former Yugoslavia. In 1988, the per capita output in 
Kosovo stood at 28 percent of that of former Yugoslavia as a whole (Mitra, 2001). From 
a mainly agricultural economy after the Second World War, Kosovo started to 
transform its economic profile in early 1970s mainly due to significant 
industrialisation programmes supported by the federal government’s investment 
funds. As a result, between 1970s and 1990s, Kosovo’s economic activity was 
dominated by extractive industry and production of raw material and semi-finished 
products. However, most of the processing was conducted in other regions of former 
Yugoslavia (Riinvest Institute, 1998). During this period, as presented in Table 5.1, the 
share of industry rose to almost one half of Kosovo’s output while the share of 
agriculture fell from almost one third to one fifth of the output.  
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Table  5.1: Structure of Kosovo’s output (figures in percentages) 18 
Sector                Year: 1971 1988 1996 
Industry 33.3 47.4 33.8 
Agriculture 28.2 20.4 28.8 
Other 38.5 32.2 37.4 
Source: Riinvest Institute, 1998 (based on official statistics of former Yugoslavia) 
 
Following the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy and the imposition of the so-called 
‘emergency measures’ by the Serbian Government in 1989, 97 Kosovo experienced a 
decade of significant de-industrialization. During the 1990s, the economy suffered 
many years of poor, and sometimes destructive, policies, lack of effective domestic 
institutions, broken external trade and financial links, international sanctions and 
underinvestment (UNDP, 2012). During the first half of the 1990s, this resulted in a 
sharp decline in per capita income, which fell by an annual average of 13.4 percent, 
while GDP contracted by 50 percent (Mitra, 2001). The most severely hit sectors were 
industry and mining (Riinvest Institute, 2000). As a consequence of the fall in output, 
external trade links could not be maintained. During 1990s, over 150,000 Albanian 
workers were expelled from their jobs in public administration. This ignited a massive 
wave of migration which depleted the human capital of the country (Riinvest Institute, 
1998).  
The economy of Kosovo after the war  
After the war, the UN Security Council assigned the mandate to form a transitional 
government in Kosovo to UNMIK. Since then, and in joint efforts with the 
international community, Kosovo has made significant progress in the reconstruction 
                                                        
97 These measures included the suspension of Kosovar institutions (such as the Assembly, government, 
courts, Albanian speaking educational institutions, etc.), the dismissal of a large number of Kosovar 
employees (especially all the managerial personnel) and their replacement by Serbian employees 
brought from other parts of Yugoslavia – especially the Serbian refugees from the Wars in Croatia and 
Bosnia, dismissal of university professors and high school teachers who refused to refrain from 
teaching in Albanian, and the imposition of military control over Kosovo. The economic situation 
declined drastically during this decade because of mismanagement, lack of investment, and even the 
transfer of assets from Kosovo to Serbia. For more details, see Riinvest Institute (2001).  
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of the war-damaged economy and in establishing the legal and institutional 
framework that would facilitate a functioning market economy.  
The growth rates in the post-war period reached double digit levels mainly driven by 
international aid and remittances. However, following a decade of neglect many SOEs 
were no longer viable, and the industrial base of the country had been severely 
damaged. Many other SOEs downsized by significantly reducing their labour force. 
The resulting narrow production base is still reflected in high trade and current 
account deficit which are financed primarily through foreign aid and remittances. 
By 2005 growth rates though steady, became more sluggish, averaging at around three 
percent until now. This level of growth is not transformational, i.e. it is unable to 
address the pressing issue of unemployment which according to a recent labour force 
survey by the Kosovo Agency for Statistics (KAS, 2013), stands at 30 percent.  The 
estimates of the World Bank (2010) indicate that Kosovo needs to double its recent 
years’ growth rates to be able to address the unemployment issue and start to catch-
up with other countries in the region. Currently, Kosovo’s per-capita income stands 
at around two thirds of that of regional countries and at around one tenth of that of 
EU countries.   
The business environment in Kosovo has not been conducive. World Bank (2015) 
ranks Kosovo as 66th out of 189 economies in terms of the ease of doing business. 
Riinvest Institute (2013) finds that unfair competition, which is primarily a 
consequence of high informality and tax evasion, is ranked as the major impediment 
to doing businesses. This is followed by institutional barriers related to contract 
enforcement and access to finance. Unfavourable business environment impedes local 
businesses and also discourages foreign investors. 
Kosovo’s economy has maintained a positive growth and was largely immune from 
the first wave of the European financial crisis (2008-2010). This was primarily due to 
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her low level of integration in the world financial system. This limited exposure 
provided a buffer against the crisis. However, indirectly, some effects were felt in the 
real economy through the drop in remittances, exports and FDI. Kosovo has a very 
prudent fiscal policy and a stable budget performance. It runs a very low level of 
public debt and budget deficit. 
On the whole, the major concern for the Kosovo economy remains the reliance on 
unsustainable sources of growth which included foreign development aid, 
consumption, remittances and governance spending. Kosovo faces tough transition 
agenda as a result of its weak institutional structure and years of poor economic 
policies. However some progress has been made, especially in terms of trade and price 
liberalisation and some considerable progress in terms of privatization, to which we 
turn in the following section.  
The business environment in any country is an essential determinant of the success of 
privatization and of private sector development, strongly influencing economic 
growth, job creation and standard of living. Several studies based on annual surveys 
by the World Bank and Riinvest Institute have demonstrated that, during the post war 
period, the business environment has not been conducive to the private sector growth. 
The World Bank (2015) ranks Kosovo as 66th out of 189 economies in terms of the ease 
of doing business, below its neighbouring countries.98 Riinvest Institute (2013), using 
a large representative sample of Kosovo companies, finds that unfair competition is 
the main obstacle in doing business in Kosovo, followed by corruption. Similar 
findings are confirmed by Riinvest (2013a) in a study focusing on informality and tax 
evasion in Kosovo. This report finds that around 40 percent of sales is not reported for 
tax purposes while the number of employees is underreported by around 36 percent.  
 
                                                        
98 The overall ‘Doing Business’ ranking is based on the average ranking of a large number individual 
indicators on which countries are assessed. 
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Corruption, mentioned earlier, is an important element of the poor business 
environment and a major barrier to private sector development. Various international 
organizations reporting on corruption suggest that corruption is rife in Kosovo. 
Transparency International (2015) ranks 168 countries around the world, using a scale 
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Kosovo scored 33 points on this scale and 
was ranked as 103rd based on the level of corruption (Denmark with the lowest level 
of corruption is ranked as the 1st). The perceived level of corruption in Kosovo based 
on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is the highest 
amongst Western Balkan Countries.  
 
In the context of the privatization process, however, the level of corruption was 
expected to be relatively low primarily due to the method of privatization used (for 
details see the next section). By using the highest price as the only criteria to determine 
the winner, the discretion of the institutions and officials involved in the process was 
significantly reduced. This largely eliminated the subjective assessment of bids which 
gave officials some discretion over the choice of the winners in privatisation bids. The 
role of officials in the process has been recognized as a major problem in privatization 
methods used in other countries. However, despite the fact that the privatization 
method in Kosovo left less room for corrupt behaviour, Riinvest (2009) found that 
businesses perceive that the process was not immune from corruption.  
 
The obstacles to private sector development reflect the level of institutional 
development, primarily in relation to contract enforcement which is also ranked as a 
major impediment to doing business. The cost of finance, which also reflects the risks 
associated with a poor business environment and weak contract enforcement and 
investor protection, is also found to be a major obstacle to the growth of enterprises in 
Kosovo. Riinvest (2013) reports that the cost of finance is regarded as a serious obstacle 
to their growth by Kosovo businesses. Also of significant concern is the low level of 
credit in the Kosovo economy. According to CBK (2015), the level of domestic credit 
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provided by the financial sector as a percentage of GDP stands at around 36 percent, 
significantly lower than that of countries in the region. The significantly lower level of 
credit to the private sector may of course be the due to a combination of factors such 
as high interest rates; the perceived high level of contract enforcement risk; a highly 
concentrated banking industry; the prudential credit policy of the banks; and an 
undeveloped business sector that faces difficulties in accessing the formal banking 
sector.  
 
Another element of the business environment is the availability and quality of the 
public infrastructure in a country. Riinvest (2009; 2013; 2013a) find that Kosovo also 
faces significant infrastructural barriers with great impact on the companies’ 
performance, especially in the manufacturing sector.  These problems lower the 
competitiveness of firms through increasing their cost of production and 
transportation. Similarly, there are other barriers that firms face related to the quality 
of training and education of the labour force.  
 
Although the institutions of a market economy in Kosovo have all been built from 
scratch under the guidance of the European Union and the international community, 
the business environment has remained poor and in need of rapid improvement.  
Needless to say that there has been some good progress in selected aspects of the 
business environment (such as macroeconomic stability and low inflation) but these 
have been rather exceptional.  
 
Unfavourable business environment, apart from impeding local businesses, also 
discourages foreign investors. The level of FDI in Kosovo remains modest, but 
declining, averaging around €313 million during the last eight years (see Figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1. Levels of FDI in Kosovo (in million €)                              14 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on data from the Central Bank of Kosovo (2015) 
 
The process of privatization of SOEs in Kosovo showed a similar correlation with FDI 
as in other TEs, i.e.  FDI was predominantly related to the privatization process 
(although in Kosovo foreign investors were not the main group of investors in the 
privatization process). Approximately one in eleven privatized enterprises was 
privatized through FDI, either partially or completely. Of course it should be noted 
that one in three enterprises privatized through FDI involved the Kosovo diaspora 
(Riinvest, 2008). During its height, the privatisation process was accompanied by the 
accelerated growth of the level of FDI inflow. During 2005, 2006 and 2007, when the 
privatization process was at its peak, there was a significant inflow of FDI, reaching 
its peak in 2007 (CBK, 2015). The proportion of privatization proceeds from FDI stands 
at around 13 percent of total revenues (AKP, 2015).  
The structure of FDI in the privatization process shows that a large share (around one-
fifth) of FDI went into the manufacturing sector (CBK, various years). This reflects the 
relative concentration of social enterprises in the industrial sector. In particular, the 
privatization in mining and metal processing attracted more FDI. The level of FDI 
started to decrease with the slowdown of the privatisation process, especially after 
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2007 when the biggest companies were already privatized. The origin of FDI in 
Kosovo, including privatization-related FDI, is mainly from the European Union 
member countries, but there were also investors from the United States and to a lesser 
extent from other countries. This also reflects the geographical spread of countries 
with Kosovo diaspora. However, there have also been rare investors from Asian 
countries (Riinvest, 2008).  
The privatization method used in Kosovo did not discriminate against foreign 
investors and did not offer preferential treatment to insiders (which was common in 
other TEs). However, despite the fact that the privatization method in Kosovo created 
a level playing field for foreign investors, the process has attracted modest levels of 
FDI. This primarily reflects the conditions of the business environment of a post-war 
country. Moreover, as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008, the level of FDI was 
reduced across the region, and similar pattern was observed in Kosovo as well. 
The low and falling level of FDI in Kosovo is also related to the political status of 
Kosovo as an independent country and the perceived political risk arising from the 
fact that Serbia and a number of other countries (including Russia with a veto power 
in the UN Security Council) have still not recognised the independence of Kosovo.  
 
5.2 Privatization in Kosovo 
Privatization process based on Act on Social Capital 
The privatization process in Kosovo started in 1989 on the basis of the Act on Social 
Capital (the so-called Markovic Law, named after the last Prime Minister of former 
Yugoslavia) while Kosovo was still in the Yugoslav Federation. This method of 
privatization favoured insiders by offering them shares at large discounts and long 
Chapter 5 – Privatization in Kosovo: the context and the progress 
181 
 
payment periods.99 Contrary to other successor states of former Yugoslavia, the 
number of companies that went through this process of privatization in Kosovo was 
very small (around 20) and the process was soon brought to a halt by the imposition 
of emergency measures by the Serbian Government in 1989. Moreover, in most of 
these companies, the process was not properly completed. While all of the 20 
companies had changed their legal status from an SOE to a Joint Stock Company 
(which was the first step to full privatization as anticipated by the Act on Social 
Capital), in most cases, the shares were not distributed nor paid for by employees and 
managers. In the following decade, the Serbian regime privatized some of the Kosovo 
companies to the newly arrived Serbian employees as well as to banks and 
development funds in Serbia – an action which had no basis in the Yugoslav laws and 
were deemed illegal after the war by the UN Administration.  
Privatization process after the war 
After the war, SOEs were de facto operating without any proper control. UNMIK 
made its first attempts to re-establish controlling mechanisms similar to ones of pre-
1989.100 SOEs were supposed to regular financial reports Municipal councils. These 
reports were subject to Municipal councils’ approval. These councils were also in 
entitled to exercise controlling rights in case that SOEs violated the law. The exercise 
of controlling rights by the Municipal councils was poor, however they still 
maintained some authority over SOEs (KIPRED, 2005). In early 2000, the controlling 
rights were soon transferred at a central level, to the newly established Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI). DTI did not have the required capacities to exercise proper 
control over SOEs. In an attempt to re-establish the controlling mechanisms, DTI 
initiated a process of re-establishing the workers’ councils as an instrument of 
resolving conflicts in SOE’s. The workers’ councils were supposed to fulfil their 
                                                        
99 For more details on the privatization process based on Act on Social Capital, see Chapter 3, section 
3.2.  
100 The legislation of pre-1989 was considered as the ‘applicable law’ by UNMIK.   
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function as they did in the pre-1989 period. However, before long it became clear that 
instruments that were prerequisites for efficient operation of workers’ councils were 
dissolved. Transferring controlling rights to workers’ councils, in effect, left SOEs 
without any legal nor administrative control. As a consequence, SOEs started to rent 
out their assets coupled with asset stripping by insiders. From the legal point of view, 
this was also a violation of applicable law as defined by UNMIK. In absence of credible 
threat, SOEs continued this practice without fearing sanction for using social property 
for other than production purpose (Riinvest Institute, 2004; KIPRED, 2005). 
In the second half of 2000, UNMIK produced a proposal known as ‘The White Paper’. 
This document projected the establishment of a privatization agency and selling the 
enterprises to outside investors, with a possibility for employees to participate in the 
process by obtaining up to 30-40 percent of shares, as a complementary method in 
order to satisfy trade unions. The ‘White Paper’ also proposed the commercialization 
of SOEs (leasing of SOEs for a period of 10 years). The UN legal department did not 
support the idea of privatization on the grounds that UNMIK did not have a mandate 
to embark on ownership transformation. However, commercialization process was 
approved. The commercialization process was an attempt to foster private sector 
development and prevent further asset stripping in SOEs. It also avoided the issue of 
ownership. A number of companies101 were transferred to private sector investors on 
the basis of a 10-year lease in return for an annual fee (Riinvest Institute, 2002).102 But 
the policy was controversial and its scale remained limited.  
By the end of 2000, the DTI proposed a transformation of SOEs into Joint Stock 
Companies, based on the Act on Social Capital of 1989. This proposal anticipated that 
                                                        
101 This was a very simple process and did not involve converting the company to a joint stock company 
as a first step for privatization – unlike other transition economies where commercialization was the 
initial step to full scale privatization. 
102 Only 13 companies went through the commercialization process. Between them they committed 
nearly DM 83 million (€42 million) in investment. Annual concession fees, which are retained in trust 
for the eventual owners, totalled DM 1.8 million (€920,000).  
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majority of shares (60-70 percent) would go to employees on preferential terms while 
the remaining shares would be sold to outside investors. DTI expected that this 
method may be acceptable to the UN legal department as it was in line with the 
‘applicable law’. Also, the proceeds from selling shares to outsiders could serve as a 
capital inflow to these companies (Riinvest Institute, 2005). However, many concerns 
were raised by local and international experts about this method on the grounds that 
it would not be effective especially in attracting outside investors. Also, it was not 
supported by the UN legal department on the same grounds as was the ownership 
transformation based on the ‘White paper’.  
After a prolonged debate on the need for privatization and the choice of the suitable 
method, which had started immediately after the war, UNMIK assumed 
responsibility for the privatization process by passing a law on the creation of the 
Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) as well as the method of privatization in 2002. KTA 
became the agency responsible for the privatization of SOEs.103 The legislation foresaw 
that KTA would hold and administer SOEs in trust for the benefit of the legitimate 
creditors and owners. Serious privatization started in 2003 under the auspices of the 
Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), and continued after independence under the new 
Privatization Agency of Kosovo (PAK). The privatization process in Kosovo enjoyed 
popular support when it was initiated. As in other TEs, the process was seen as a 
political symbol of reform and addressing the inefficiencies of state sector. Riinvest 
Institute (2002) reports that 87 percent of SOEs’ managers supported privatization. 
The Kosovo Trust Agency inherited around 600 Socially Owned Enterprises and had 
to arrange for their privatization. The exact number of SOEs was not easy to determine 
                                                        
103 This law also established that a group of companies known as ‘Publicly Owned Enterprises’ (POEs), 
which included utilities, the airport and railways, would not be privatized until later. KTA also became 
responsible for the reform and restructuring of these companies in order to prepare them for later 
privatization. After independence, the government decided that, in principle, these companies would 
be privatized but the actual method and a timetable for their privatization are yet to be decided. In 
2010, Prishtina Airport was transferred to the private sector through a concession agreement. In 2012, 
Kosovo Energy Distribution and Supply company was also privatized.  
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because of the unclear definition of ‘social ownership’ and missing or destroyed 
official documentation (which was either destroyed during the war or removed by the 
Serbian government employees when they left Kosovo). While in most cases the 
records clearly indicated SOEs’ status, in some cases it was indicated that former SOEs 
were partially converted to Joint Stock Company status through share sales to 
employees or transferred to Serbian institutions (banks and funds) during the late 
1980s and early 1990s based on Act on Social Capital. For another group of companies, 
the records were unclear as to whether they are fully or partially socially or privately 
owned (KTA, 2002). SOEs employed an estimated 60,000 people, of which only about 
a third were active. Around 40,000 employees were inactive on unpaid leave (PAK, 
2015). SOEs in Kosovo operated in variety of sectors including: agriculture; 
manufacturing (including manufacturing of food; textile; leather; wood; basic metals 
and fabricated metal products); construction; trade and retail; tourism, among others. 
Figure 5.1 presents SOEs’ disaggregation by sector of operation.  
 
Figure 5.2. SOEs’ disaggregation by sector of operation (in percent) 15 
Source: Author’s drawing based on KTA data 
 
It is estimated that SOEs represented around 90 percent of Kosovo’s industrial and 
mining assets, around 50 percent of commercial retail space, and less than 20 percent 
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of agricultural land. Important technological and human assets were concentrated in 
these enterprises during the 1970s and 1980s but due to the events in the 1990s, the 
depreciation of assets and technologies, and changes in regional and international 
business environment, most of these enterprises were operating ineffectively and 
below their capacities and some ceased operations altogether (Riinvest Institute, 2008). 
The sole method of privatization used in Kosovo has been “sale to the highest bidder”, 
which was not used as the only method of privatization in any other TEs nor in the 
successor states of former Yugoslavia (Riinvest Institute, 2004).104 The use of highest 
price as the only criterion intended to lower the discretion of implementing agency 
and avoid some of the problems that arise in case of other methods.  
The method is also referred to as ‘Spin-Off’ and was designed to circumvent the 
problem of disputed ownership and claims against companies (coming largely from 
Serbia and the former Serbian employees who left Kosovo after the war) by creating a 
new company (known as ‘NewCo’) to which the assets and current liabilities (defined 
generally as the last three months of unpaid accounts payable and the last year of 
unpaid taxes) of the old company, but not its long term liabilities, were transferred 
and then put up for sale. Long term liabilities remained with the old SOE and were to 
be dealt with by the privatization proceeds which are held in an escrow account 
outside Kosovo. The old SOEs will be ultimately liquidated. Old employees (including 
Serb employees and those who had worked for the company before 1980s) have claims 
on the proceeds of privatisation. Also, various Serbian banks and funds had claims 
against the companies because of the illegal privatisations undertaken during the 
Emergency Measure (also explaining why they were deemed illegal by UNMIK – 
being discriminatory). These claims were an important barrier to privatisation until 
the idea of ‘spin off’ was put forward, together with the money being kept in an 
                                                        
104 However, direct sale methods were used as primary or secondary method in different TEs (see for 
details, Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). 
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escrow account abroad until the claims were dealt with. A special Chamber of the 
Supreme Court was set up with international judges to look into the legitimacy of 
these claims. According to PAK (2015), there are 88,851 claims put forward by 
creditors, employees and Serbian banks and funds. While over 90 percent of these 
claims were reviewed by PAK, only 19 claims in total have been finally resolved.  
Table 5.2 presents the process of transferring SOEs to NewCos. New owners did not 
have any responsibility towards current employees of the company, except in cases 
when companies were privatized through ‘Special Spin-Off’ which is next 
discussed.105 An old SOE could be transferred into more than one NewCos. SOEs were 
large, vertically integrated, companies and the process of privatization of these 
companies as they were seemed impractical. Therefore, some SOEs were split up in 
order to expedite the privatization process. Out of around 600 SOEs, 769 NewCos 
were established.  
Table 5.2. Spin-off process of transferring SOEs to NewCos. 19  
SOE  NewCo 
Assets 
Land 
Buildings 
Machinery 
Licences  
Leases 
 
transferred → 
transferred → 
transferred → 
transferred → 
transferred → 
Assets 
Land 
Buildings 
Machinery 
Licences (renewed)  
Leases 
Liabilities 
Current liabilities 
Long term liabilities 
 
transferred → 
not transferred 
Liabilities 
Current liabilities 
- 
Employees not transferred - 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
                                                        
105 KTA and later PAK also used liquidation process as a method of privatization. In effect, companies 
were span-off in similar fashion and were put up for sale to the highest bidder. The only difference was 
that companies that went through liquidation process were largely agricultural land and buildings with 
limited or no business activity attached to them.  
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In the case of a small number of large and important companies, referred to as ‘Special 
Spin-Offs’, the sale required the bidder to undertake certain employment and 
investment commitments. In many of these cases, the new owners did not honour 
their investment undertaking resulting in further negotiations with PAK and, in some 
cases, the reversal of privatization contract. PAK (2015) reports that on average 54 
percent of investment commitments and 85 percent of employment commitments 
were honoured.  
The privatization process in Kosovo did not discriminate between foreign and 
domestic owners. However, as in other TEs, in the early phases of transition, Kosovo 
was not an attractive destination for foreign investors. While FDI was dominated by 
privatization-related investment in early stage of transition, it was not the dominant 
type of resulting ownership. According to KTA official data, only one in eight SOEs 
were privatized by foreign investors, either completely or partially. However, almost 
one in three companies that were privatized through FDI were in fact privatized by 
members of the Kosovo diaspora.   
To date, over 90 percent of all SOEs have been privatized. Although the process was 
brought to a halt twice106, it made significant progress during 2005, 2006 and 2007, and 
after independence in 2009 and 2010, and was slowed downed in the later years, as 
the process was coming to an end. The acceleration of the privatization process 
coincided with improvements in exports, FDI and GDP growth rates. Privatization 
proceeds peaked in 2006 when they reached almost €160 million (Figure 5.1). In total, 
                                                        
106 First in late 2003 and 2004 by the intervention of then Director of KTA (who was eventually removed 
by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN for having obstructed this process), 
and later in 2008 in the preparation for, and the euphoria after, the independence. The suspension of 
the privatization process in 2003 had sent negative signals to potential investors by increasing 
uncertainty. In particular, provided that the suspension of the process had retroactive effects by 
impacting previous tenders that were published and carried out according to the rules and regulations 
that were in place until the suspension of the process came into effect.  
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privatization proceeds are over €643 million. They represent over 12 percent of 
Kosovo’s GDP (KAS, 2015).  
 
Figure 5.3. Level of privatization proceeds from privatization through spin-off and 
liquidation process 16 
Source: Author based on data from KTA.   
The proceeds from privatization have been kept in an escrow account, held abroad, 
pending the resolution of ownership claims against the privatized companies, an issue 
which was not resolved at the time of privatization – and has still not been resolved 
despite Kosovo’s independence. Former employees of privatized SOEs were entitled 
on a priority basis to a 20 percent share of the proceeds from privatization (PAK, 2015). 
Employees were eligible to participate in the 20 percent share only if they were 
registered as an employee with the SOE at the time of privatization, and have been 
employed for more than three years during any period of time (Riinvest Institute, 
2008). This process was coordinated with unions and has been very slow. PAK (2015) 
reports that only about 15 percent of the 20 percent share of proceeds has been paid 
out to eligible beneficiaries. The issue of social ownership was thus resolved by the 
proceeds being divided by the ‘society’ (represented by PAK) and the employees – 
very much in the same way as in other successor states. However, unlike the successor 
states, ownership of privatized firms was not transferred to interest groups close to 
parties in power or to the former elite.  
After privatization, a considerable number of companies remained inactive. Riinvest 
Institute (2008) finds that the proportion of inactive companies after privatization stood 
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at around 30 percent. However, when filtering out companies that went through the 
liquidation process (which were initially included in the sample), the percentage of 
inactive companies after privatization drops by almost two thirds to about 10 percent. Of 
those, the majority were in the wholesale and retail trade sector (around 43 percent), while 
the rest were in manufacturing sector (around 40 percent) and hotels and restaurants 
(around 17 percent). Further investigation of companies that were inactive after 
privatization was impossible due to data limitations. However, Riinvest Institute (2008) 
finds that in some cases, new owners treated these companies as a real estate investment 
and were kept inactive awaiting better market conditions for their property.  
The data gathered for the purpose of the empirical investigation of the following 
Chapter shows that the average capacity utilization in privatized companies was 
around 55 percent.107 However, over 40 percent have undertaken some form of 
restructuring. Companies that were privatized through special spin-off and those 
privatized by foreign owners were associated with faster restructuring. These data 
confirm the findings from a similar survey conducted in 2008 (for details see Riinvest 
Institute, 2008).108 The number of employees has shrunk by an average of 45 percent 
while the turnover of employees is reported to be very high. The data suggests that 
only one in three employees in the current workforce were part of the company prior 
to privatization.   
Despite the fact that the privatization process in Kosovo is almost completed, there 
has been no comprehensive empirical analysis of the privatization process. The data 
gathered for the purpose of the empirical investigation of the following Chapter also 
included a representative sample of de-novo private companies. The data suggests 
that impediments in the business environment have similar impact across all 
businesses, privatised and de-novo private. Therefore, the analysis of the impact of 
                                                        
107 The survey was conducted in 2012 by Riinvest Institute for Development Research. For further 
details, see Chapter 6, section 6.2.2.  
108 The author has been part of the research team that produced the report in 2008.  
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privatization on companies’ performance in Kosovo has to take into account aggregate 
shocks of the business environment to be able to isolate the effect of ownership 
transformation.  The fallowing Chapter addresses this issue by using a control group 
and employing methods of policy evaluation econometrics.  
5.3 Conclusion  
This Chapter highlighted the privatization process in Kosovo. This process was 
distinct from that in other TEs and in successor states of former Yugoslavia, due to its 
economic and political specificities. As a policy, it enjoyed popular support when it 
was initiated. Also, as in other TEs, the process was seen as a political symbol of reform 
and addressing inefficiencies of state sector. While the privatization method promoted 
foreign investors, the results in attracting FDI were modest. However, this also 
mirrors the conditions of the business environment in general in Kosovo.  
This Chapter also provided the context of the empirical investigation which is 
undertaken in the following Chapter. As mentioned earlier, even though the 
privatization process, there has been almost completed, there is still no empirical 
evidence focusing on the impact of ownership transformation on companies’ 
performance. This gap is filled in the following Chapter by employing policy 
evaluation econometric techniques, a combination of matching technique with 
difference-in-difference estimators, which arguably best addresses the selection issue 
and is able to disentangle the impact of external factors and shock from the impact of 
privatization.  
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Introduction 
The main objective of this Chapter is to analyse the changes in firm performance 
induced by the privatization process in Kosovo. It draws upon the theoretical 
propositions set forth in Chapters 1 and 2 as well as upon the context of investigation 
presented in Chapter 5. This Chapter analyses the relationship between ownership 
transformation and performance of firms using policy evaluation econometrics. As 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, the empirical literature on the topic of 
privatization broadly includes comparisons of performance indicators of companies 
before and after privatization or comparisons of the performance of privatized 
companies with either SOEs or de-novo private companies operating under roughly 
similar conditions. But if these two methods are combined, that is comparing ‘before-
and-after’ changes in the performance of companies that went through privatization 
with the ‘before-and-after changes’ in the performance of companies that did not, the 
results would be significantly improved. This is because the time-varying factors are 
also captured by the group of companies that did not go through privatization, since 
both groups are assumed to have been exposed to the approximately similar 
environment.  
The majority of papers using ‘before-and-after’ approach attribute the whole observed 
change in performance to the divestiture. In a stationary environment one would 
expect that this approach would yield reasonably good estimates. But in fact, the 
economic environment undergoes constant changes and therefore observed changes 
in companies’ performance could be driven by changes in the operating environment 
rather than mere ownership transformation. This methodology is especially weak in 
transition economies where the privatization process is part of wider systemic 
reforms. Changes might be a result of other reforms such as price and trade 
liberalization, among others, which are typical in countries in transition. To overcome 
this problem, this Chapter uses de-novo private companies matched with companies 
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gone through the privatization process in order to observe the difference in their 
performance as they are both subjected to similar business environment and systemic 
shocks.    
In the context of impact evaluation, it is challenging to know what would have been 
the performance of companies in the absence of privatization. Isolating the effects of 
privatization is especially very hard in TEs where the privatization process is part of 
wider reforms. Therefore, in order to be able to attribute the observed differences in 
performance to the policy itself, additional efforts are required. The majority of 
studies, especially for TEs, do not account for counterfactuals (what would have 
happened over time to mean outcomes for companies in the absence of privatisation). 
In order to address this issue, we use a technique which is a combination of Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) and Difference-in-Difference (DID) in order to identify the 
impact of privatization on performance measures. Here the privatization process is 
considered as ‘treatment’.109 This study compares the pre- and post-privatization 
performance of treated group (privatized companies) with the performance of non-
treated group (de-novo private firms) during the same time period. Using PSM the 
latter group of companies are matched so that they can be comparable with the former 
(explained in details later in the Chapter). Given that we use fixed effect estimation 
(which are by design within unit estimator), each treated company serves as a 
comparison point for itself. Non-treated companies in this case serve merely to 
capture the aggregate shocks and changes in the environment to which both sets of 
companies have been exposed to. For that purpose, PSM allows us to match non-
treated companies that are exposed to similar environmental conditions and have 
similar features with treated companies.  
                                                        
109 The term ‘treatment’ came from the medical sciences (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), and makes more 
sense when used in that context. However, in conformity with the bulk of the literature on the subject, 
the term is also used in this Chapter. 
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Using this econometric framework (matched difference in difference), changes in two 
performance measures, sales (measured by real sales) and the number of employees, 
are estimated. This Chapter uses a balanced panel firm level data from 600 de-novo 
private and over 133 privatized SOEs in Kosovo (over the 2005-2011 period). The 
Chapter contributes to the existing empirical literature in at least two ways. First there 
is no comprehensive analysis of the impact of ownership transformation in Kosovo’s 
privatized SOEs. Secondly, the matched difference-in-difference technique, has not 
been widely used in studies on privatisation in TEs as a remedy to estimation 
problems that are endemic in existing literature.110   
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 discusses, in general 
terms, the methodology used in this Chapter. Here the analytical framework and basic 
terminology of the policy evaluation econometrics is introduced. Section 6.2 discusses 
the model, the data and the modelling procedure, including the improvements in 
modelling to overcome diagnosed problems. Section 6.3 presents the estimated effects 
of ownership transformation on companies’ performance (sales and employment). 
Section 6.4 presents some limitations of this Chapter while section 6.5 concludes with 
a summary of findings.  
 
6.1 Impact evaluation  
This section offers an introductory overview of quantitative methods of impact 
evaluation. Here the analytical framework and basic terminology of the impact 
evaluation econometrics, employed in the empirical part of this Chapter, is 
introduced. Privatization of SOEs in TEs has dominated the economic and policy 
agenda of these countries since its inception in early 1990s. Policies, such as 
privatization, are designed and carried out to achieve an objective or change an 
                                                        
110 In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one study (Salis, 2006) that uses matched 
difference-in-difference in similar context.  
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outcome, for instance the performance of privatized companies. The majority of 
countries justified this policy by the anticipated improvement in performance after 
ownership transformation (for details see Chapter 1). As argued in pervious Chapters, 
theoretical literature and empirical evidence is not conclusive about the privatization 
process on performance. Indeed, there are many studies that find mixed results (for 
details, see Chapter 2). Evaluating the impact of privatization process in TEs is 
especially important because of the relative size and scope of the state sector at the 
onset of transition in these countries. Furthermore, given the absence of a consensus 
on the impact of privatisation,  methods of evaluation of the level and nature of the 
impact of privatization on privatised firms remains the main concern of researchers 
and policymakers.  
 
6.1.1 The evaluation problem 
Impact evaluation, in the current context, aims to identify and determine the change 
in the outcome of a policy measure or a ‘treatment’ (performance of privatized 
companies) that can be attributed to that policy alone (privatization). The causal 
relationship between the policy and the outcome under investigation is considered as 
the most important feature and the biggest challenge of impact evaluations (Gertler et 
al., 2010). Analysing the impact of a particular policy requires making inference about 
the outcome that would have been observed in absence of the policy (Holland, 1986). 
If we denote with 𝑌0 the outcome of the firm had it not gone through the treatment 
and with 𝑌1 the outcome of the firm had it gone through the treatment, then the impact 
of the policy would be: 
∆= 𝑌1 − 𝑌0                                                                       (6.1) 
If these data were available, then one could conclude that the relationship between the 
policy and the variable under consideration is causal. Since for any firm only one of 
the Ys is observed (either 𝑌1 or 𝑌0), the difference or the policy impact (∆) is not 
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observed for any of the firms. This missing data problem is the core of the policy 
impact evaluation, and approaches that try to overcome this problem attempt to 
estimate these missing data. In the absence of such information (or the counterfactual), 
one might alternatively compare the outcome of units that were subject to policy with 
a suitable comparison group or benchmark. The choice of the comparison group 
therefore is very important. Generally there are two types of comparison benchmarks 
(surrogate counterfactuals): (1) the comparison of the outcome of companies that went 
through privatization with the outcome of those that did not; and (2) the comparison 
in outcome of companies that went through privatization ‘before and after’ the 
intervention.   
Comparing companies that went through the treatment and those that did not is 
usually known as ‘with-and-without’ comparison.111 This technique requires 
additional effort to ensure that the companies being compared are not systematically 
different from each other. If it fails to ensure this, the estimates are likely to be biased.  
For instance, due to selection bias in the privatization process, companies that went 
through the treatment might have had a better performance even before the treatment. 
Companies might have been selected for privatization because they would have found 
willing buyers more quickly and therefore were better to start the process with. 
Comparing this group of firms with a group that has not gone through the treatment 
would produce biased estimates.112 This is because differences in performance might 
not be a result of the policy itself; they rather represent the underlying differences that 
exist between the two sets of firms.  
Comparison in outcome of companies that went through privatization ‘before and 
after’ the intervention is another counterfactual. It is commonly referred to as ‘before-
                                                        
111 This method is largely used in the evaluation of privatization policy. For details see Megginson 
(2005).   
112 In this case, if privatized companies would have had better performance regardless of the policy, the 
selection bias will be positive, overestimating the impact of the privatization process on performance.  
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and-after’ comparison. It attempts to evaluate the impact of a programme by tracking 
changes in performance indicators over time. The counterfactual is estimated using 
the pre-intervention (pre-policy) outcome. It assumes that had the firm not gone 
through the treatment, its outcome would have been the same as the pre-intervention 
outcome. This simple difference method is unlikely to yield reasonable evaluation of 
the policy since there are many factors, apart from policy itself, which might change 
over time. Ignoring other factors could lead to biased estimates by falsely attributing 
differences in outcomes solely to the treatment. Consequently this comparison might 
yield under- or over-estimation of policy’s impact. However, one might combine these 
approaches to improve the estimation process. A combination of ‘with and without’ 
with ‘before and after’ arguably best improves the accuracy of an evaluation study 
(Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). This combined technique is described later in the 
Chapter and used thereafter.  
There are different approaches to policy evaluation. Depending on the data used for 
evaluation, they broadly fall into two categories: (i) experimental and (ii) non-
experimental. Before discussing these approaches, it is important to note that both 
assume that the impact of the policy on one unit does not affect other units, or the 
impact of the policy on participants does not affect non-participants (known as non-
interaction assumption).113 The non-interaction assumption is referred to as Stable 
Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin, 1978). In cases when the scope of 
the policy or treatment is limited, SUTVA usually holds. However, even in cases when 
the policy is more widespread (like in case of privatization in TEs), Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009) suggest that the indirect effects of a policy on one unit are likely to 
                                                        
113 The interacting effects, i.e. the effects of treated companies on non-treated companies are known as 
general equilibrium (or spill-over) effects. 
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be much smaller than the direct effects of the exposure of the unit itself. As a result, 
the general equilibrium effects can probably be ignored for most purposes.114   
Experimental methods are generally viewed as the most robust evaluation approaches 
(Burtless, 1995; Nichols, 2007). They are usually considered as the gold standard of 
impact evaluation (Gertler et al., 2010). Ideal experimental data provide the best 
counterfactual and eliminate the evaluation problem (Blundell and Dias, 2002). They 
are based on constructing a comparison group that is a random subset of the 
population. If carried out properly, this approach constructs a control group with 
identical distributions of observable and unobservable characteristics to those in the 
treatment group (within sampling variation). The only difference is the participation 
in the programme that is being evaluated. Hence, the selection problem is overcome 
because participation is randomly determined (Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon, 2002). 
Given that the number of potential participants to which we apply the randomized 
assignment process is sufficiently large, the resulting groups of treated and non-
treated units will have a high probability of being statistically identical (Gertler et al., 
2010). In turn, randomized experiments have high internal and external validity.115 In 
a randomized experiment isolating the effect of the treatment is straightforward. 
Regressing the outcome on the intercept and a treatment indicator yields unbiased 
estimator of average treatment effect. It also allows adding other control variables to 
the regression function to increase precision without jeopardising consistency since 
randomization implies that in large samples the treatment indicator and the covariates 
are independent (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).  
                                                        
114 There is a noteworthy literature that deals with the problems arising with cases when SUTVA does 
not hold. This involves modelling the interactions by specifying which units interact with each other 
and possibly the relative magnitude of these interactions. Most of this literature treats the interactions 
not as nuisance; it rather deals with this problem as the primary object of interest while still many of 
the issues remain unresolved. For further discussion, see Smith (2000), Manski (2000), Brock and 
Durlauf (2000), Kling, Jeffrey and Lawrence (2007), and Graham (2008).   
115 Internal validity indicates that the estimated impact is clear of other confounding factors and that it 
represents the true effect of the policy. External validity on the other hand means that the estimated 
impact can be generalized to accurately represent the population from which the sample is drawn. 
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However, experimental data are usually rare in economics mainly due to ethical 
considerations and high costs. Allowing a particular set of units to undergo the 
treatment and deny it to others is often politically unfeasible as the justification of such 
a policy to units that are left out is difficult (Khandker, Koolwal and Samad, 2010). As 
a result, most of the research in the evaluation literature is based on observational data 
(nonrandomized experiments). Studies based on observational data try to mimic the 
natural experiment as much as possible. In the absence of a controlled randomised 
experiment, the primary task therefore is to use estimation to create the counterfactual 
or control units under most reasonable conditions. These methods among others 
include: instrumental variable (IV) estimators, two-step Heckman selection 
estimators, propensity score matching estimators and difference in difference 
estimators. The appropriate methodology for non-experimental data largely depends 
on the information available to the researcher. Panel data or repeated cross sections 
support less restrictive estimators because they draw from both cross-sectional and 
time dimension. In any case, there is a clear trade-off between the available 
information and the restrictions needed to guarantee a reliable estimator.  
Blundell and Dias (2009) suggest the use of IV estimators and two-step Heckman 
selection estimators when only a single cross-sectional data are available. Similarly, 
propensity score matching can be used in both cases when cross-sectional and panel 
data are available. If one has access to baseline data, then the use of difference in 
difference provides more robust estimates of the impact of the policy. Finally, a 
combination of the last two methods (i.e. propensity score matching with difference 
in difference) is expected to improve the quality of non-experimental evaluation 
significantly (Blundell and Dias, 2000; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Khandker, 
Koolwal and Samad, 2010). Since the data used in this Chapter are longitudinal (with 
information on both treated and non-treated), the use of a combined method is 
decided as the preferred empirical strategy. The following subsections discuss the 
propensity score matching, difference in difference and the combined method. Here 
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the necessary conditions of these techniques for reliable estimation of policy 
evaluation are also discussed.   
6.1.2 Propensity score matching 
The following section describes the propensity score matching methodology. 
Matching can be applied in almost any policy evaluation context as long as there is a 
group of treated units and a group of non-treated units that can serve as a suitable 
benchmark. It relies on observed characteristics to construct a comparison group, 
hence relying on the strong assumption of no unobserved differences among the two 
groups. Because of this strong assumption, matching methods are more reliable when 
combined with other policy evaluation techniques (primarily with difference-in-
difference estimators). Finding an appropriate match from non-treated group for each 
unit that went through the treatment requires approximating characteristics or 
determinants as closely as possible between the two groups of units. As the list of 
characteristics or the dimensions against which one wants to find the match increases, 
the likelihood of finding a match diminishes. This is commonly referred to as the 
‘curse of dimensionality’ and its effect increases exponentially with the increase in 
dimensions. The curse of dimensionality is present in any dataset with high 
dimensionality (many characteristics). As the number of characteristics increases, the 
data are scattered far apart from each other. Thus the number of matched data points 
available can be very small which can yield erroneous estimates because sample 
selection bias may be introduced. For instance, if one tries to find a match of non-
participants based on two characteristics, say, sector of operation and size of the 
company, it is likely that many matches can be found from the pool of the comparison 
group. However, if the vector of characteristics, for which one tries to find matches, 
increases to include, say, location of operation, export activity, then the chances of 
finding an exact match diminishes significantly. Table 6.1 illustrates the problem. It 
contains two groups of seven firms (treated and non-treated) with data on four 
characteristics (location, export, sector and size). It attempts to find a match for each 
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of the treated firms in the comparison group based on the four characteristics. As 
shown in the table, it is clear that there is no exact match for four of the treated firms 
and only three of them could be matched against the comparison group (the rows with 
same colour shading represent the exact match between the treated and the 
comparison groups). If number of known characteristics of the treated group were 
higher, the chance of finding exact match for them would diminish. In cases of high 
dimensional data, fewer companies can be matched. Therefore, in the absence of 
enough matched observations, it is hard to get good estimates. However, if the 
number of units in the comparison groups is large, then it would be more likely to 
find matches. Matching requires abundant high quality data (Blundell and Dias, 2002).  
Table 6.1. Matching on different characteristics             20 
 
Treatment group 
Location 
(1–large city; 
0–other) 
Export 
(range  
from 1–5)  
Sector 
(NACE) 
Size 
(Small – S; 
Medium – 
M; Large – 
L) 
1 3 B L 
0 2 C M 
0 5 D L 
0 1 D S 
1 4 D M 
1 2 H L 
0 1 L S 
 
Comparison group 
Location 
(1–large city; 
0–other) 
Export 
(range 
from 1–5)  
Sector 
(NACE) 
Size 
(Small – S; 
Medium – 
M; Large – 
L) 
1 2 H L 
0 1 L S 
0 4 F M 
0 3 N M 
0 5 D L 
0 1 E S 
0 1 L S 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
Note: the same colour shading of cells represents the exact match between units in the treated group 
and units in the comparison group. 
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The curse of dimensionality can be avoided by using propensity score matching (PSM) 
proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). A propensity score is a conditional 
probability of participation in a treatment. This approach does not try to match two 
groups of units with exactly the same values for all observable control characteristics. 
Instead, for each participating and non-participating unit it estimates a probability 
that a unit will participate in a treatment. For companies that, for whatever reason, 
have not participated in a treatment, a propensity score provides a measure of how 
likely they were to have participated, had they been eligible for the programme based 
on the characteristics of those who were selected to participate (Wilde and Hollister, 
2007). In this way, non-participants and participants with similar characteristics, 
summarized by their propensity scores, can be matched. The non-participants with 
similar propensity scores to participants are the comparison group.  
The probability estimation, the so-called propensity score, is based on the observed 
control characteristics. In effect, propensity scores primarily simplify matching by 
reducing the dimensionality of the matching problem and summarizing the pre-
treatment characteristics of units in each groups to a single variable. Consequently, if 
each unit undergoing the treatment can be matched with a unit with the same 
matching variables (score) that has not undergone the treatment, then the impact of 
the treatment on that unit can be measured (Blundell and Dias, 2002).  
PSM is based on two assumptions (i) the conditional independence assumption, and 
(ii) the assumption of common support. The conditional independence assumption, 
also called un-confoundedness, implies that the selection into the programme (or the 
take-up of the programme) is based on observed characteristics (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). If the selection criteria of the programme 
are not straightforward or if it allows for self-selection116, then selection bias is 
                                                        
116 The self-selection problem is not present in our case as the decision to select for treatment is external 
to the firm and not in its control.   
Chapter 6 – Privatization in Kosovo: impact evaluation 
203 
 
introduced in the estimates. The un-confoundedness assumption cannot be tested. If 
unobserved characteristics determine the selection, PSM is not the appropriate 
method. If unobserved characteristics affect both participation and outcome, this 
situation yields what is called a ‘hidden bias’ (Rosenbaum, 2002). However, when 
combined with other techniques, the hidden bias problem is largely alleviated.117 
The second assumption, the common support or overlap condition, maintains that 
treated companies have comparison observations ‘nearby’ in the propensity score 
distribution (Heckman et al., 1999; Blundell and Dias, 2002). In order for PSM to 
ensure valid estimates, all treated companies have to be matched successfully with 
non-treated companies. The biggest concern in applying matching method is the lack 
of common support (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Finding a substantial region of 
common support requires a large set of data. Treated companies therefore are 
required to be similar to non-treated companies in terms of observed characteristics. 
Some of the non-treated companies may have to be dropped to ensure comparability 
(Khandker, Koolwal and Samad, 2010 p. 56). In the absence of sufficient similar 
comparison companies, a non-random sub-sample of treated companies may have to 
be dropped (Ravallion, 2008). This situation might introduce a sampling bias in the 
treatment effect. Heckman et al. (1997) suggest dropping treatment observations with 
weak common support. Inferences on causality can only be made in the area of 
common support. In case of lack of common support or lack of overlap, the inference 
on causality becomes more and more difficult. Figure 6.1 presents two examples of the 
distribution of propensity score for non-treated (red dotted line) and treated units 
(black dotted line), with the common support being good in panel (a) and weak in 
panel (b). If the balancing property is satisfied, then the companies with the same 
propensity score must have the same distribution of observable characteristics 
independently of treatment status (Becker and Ichino, 2002). In other words firms that 
                                                        
117 In our case, the self-selection problem is further alleviated as the sample of treated companies is a 
representative random draw of almost the entire population of privatized companies.  
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have similar propensity scores, are at least observationally similar. Propensity score 
can be estimated by any probability model. In many cases, PSM is used as a sole 
approach in policy evaluation.118  
 
Figure 6.1. Region of common support. Examples of (a) good balancing and sufficient 
common support and (b) poor balancing and weak common support 17 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on multiple sources 
On the basis of the propensity score, different matching algorithms are used to match 
two groups of units. They include nearest neighbour matching, calliper and radius 
matching, stratification and interval matching as well as kernel matching and local 
liner matching. Since the analysis of this Chapter does not use the propensity score as 
                                                        
118 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) refer to the combination of these two assumptions (unconfoundness 
and overlap) as strong ignorability. 
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a sole estimation strategy for evaluating the effect of privatization, we will only briefly 
explain these approaches in this section.119  
Nearest neighbour matching finds the closes match for a control unit based on propensity 
score. Two options of nearest neighbour matching are used in the literature, namely 
with or without replacement. In the former case, non-treated unit can be used more 
than once as a match, whereas in the latter case it is considered only once (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2005). In cases when the propensity score distribution between the two 
groups is highly different, allowing replacements might improve the matching. For 
instance, if there are a large number of treated units with high propensity score but 
only few comparison units with high propensity score, then using without 
replacement matching might result in inadequate match; that is high propensity score 
units might get matched with low propensity score units. This can be overcome by 
allowing replacement which in turn reduces the number of distinct comparison units 
used to construct the counterfactual outcome (Smith and Todd, 2005).  
The nearest neighbour matching might result in fairly poor matches if the closest 
neighbour is far away. Caliper matching tries to offer a solution to this problem. By 
imposing a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance (or the caliper), 
these poor matches can be avoided. The use of caliper involves matching with 
replacement but allowing only for those matches that fall within the pre-specified 
propensity range. A possible drawback of this method is that the specification of the 
appropriate tolerance level is difficult (Smith and Todd, 2005). A different type of 
caliper matching is suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (2002) known as radius matching. 
The basic idea of this type of matching is that it uses not only the nearest neighbour 
within each caliper but it uses all of the comparison units within the caliper. This 
approach improves the matching by using as many comparison units as are available 
                                                        
119 See Imbens (2004) or Smith and Todd (2005) for more technical details. 
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within the caliper by allowing the use of fewer units when good matches are not 
available and additional units when good matches are available.  
Stratification matching divides the range of variation of the propensity score into 
several intervals (strata), and ensures that within each interval the average propensity 
score of treated and control group do not differ. This method is also known as interval 
matching, blocking and sub-classification (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The appropriate 
number of strata to be used in empirical research is important to minimize the bias 
associated will all covariates used for matching. Imbens (2004) notes that the use of 
five strata is usually sufficient to eliminate 95 percent of bias associated with all 
covariates. Justifying the choice of the number of strata can be done by checking the 
balancing property of the propensity score within each stratum (Aakvik, 2001; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). If the balancing property within each interval is not 
satisfied, then strata are too large and need to be split. In stratification matching, some 
treated units may be discarded since there may be no matching non-treated units in 
respective blocks (i.e. they fall outside the common support region).120 In cases when 
the number of disregarded units is relatively small, this does not pose any problem in 
estimation (Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon, 2002). If the number of disregarded treated 
units is large, then concerns are raised whether the estimated effect of the remaining 
units can be viewed as representative since sample selection bias might be introduced. 
This method is used in our case given that it allows us to test the common support 
assumption (see Section 6.2.3.1 for details).  
Other non-parametric approaches include kernel and local linear matching. The basic 
idea of these approaches is to use the weighted average of non-participants to 
construct a counterfactual match for each participating unit. Thus, one major 
advantage of these approaches is the lower the variance which is achieved because 
                                                        
120 Note that the treatment effect for units outside the common support cannot be estimated.  
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more information is used. A drawback of these methods is that observations that are 
bad matches can be possibly used. 
 
6.1.3 Difference in difference 
 
This section explains the basic idea behind the ‘difference in difference’ (DID) method. 
Since the work by Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985), DID has 
become a widespread approach in policy evaluation while it is extensively used to 
assess the effect of various policies.121 DID is also used in analysing the effects of the 
privatization policy in regulated sectors- for instance, Gonzalez-Eiras and Rossi (2007) 
focus on the electricity and health sectors; and Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky, 
(2005) on water supply services.  
 
DID or the ‘natural experiment approach’ compares the changes in outcome over time 
of the group of treated companies and the comparison units. This approach typically 
considers the policy itself as an experiment (or treatment) and attempts to find a 
suitable comparison group that can mimic the properties of the control group from an 
experimental approach (Blundell and Dias, 2000). In the standard case, outcomes are 
observed for two groups for two time periods denoted T ∈ {0,1}. Period zero 
represents the pre-treatment phase while period one represents the post-treatment 
phase. The treated group is exposed to a treatment in period one. The comparison 
group is not exposed to the treatment during this period. Assume that Ap (Anp) is the 
outcome of participants (non-participants) after the intervention and Bp (Bnp) is the 
outcome of participants (non-participants) before the intervention, the first difference 
                                                        
121 In other fields, the use of approaches akin to difference in difference can be traced even further back 
in time (for details see Lechner, 2011). DID is used to estimate the effects of Active Labour Market 
Programmes (see for instance: Ashenfelter, 1978, Ashenfelter and Card, 1985, Heckman and Hotz, 1989, 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1998, Blundell, Meghir, Costa Dias, and van Reenen, 2004), the effect of 
minimum wage on employment (e.g. Card and Krueger, 1994), the effect of immigration on the local 
labour market (e.g. Card, 1990), or the analysis of labour supply (e.g. Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir, 
1998). 
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Ap–Bp (Anp–Bnp) represents the before-and-after comparison for the treatment (non-
treatment) group. The expression (Bp–Ap)–(Bnp–Anp) therefore expresses the 
difference in difference measure when stripped from other explanatory variables 
besides the treatment indicator. Therefore, the expression (Bp–Ap)–( Bnp–Anp) 
differences out the aggregate shocks to which both groups have been exposed to and 
isolates the effect of treatment. Table 6.2 summarises this discussion. 
Table 6.2. Difference in Difference approach  21 
 Before After Difference 
Participants Bp Ap Ap–Bp 
Non-participants Bnp Anp Anp–Bnp 
Difference in difference            (DID) DID=( Ap–Bp)–( Anp–Bnp) 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
The difference in difference approach requires repeated observations of the units 
under consideration. The availability of ‘before and after’ data, for both groups of 
units, is the makes this approach superior to other approaches that rely only on single 
cross-section of data. The DID assumes that other factors, such as changes in economic 
conditions, affect both groups of units similarly. It allows to difference out the 
unobserved heterogeneity which is assumed to be constant over time. In the current 
context, the DID compares the change in performance indicators (employment and 
sales) of companies that went through privatization and uses the non-treated 
companies to eliminate the effect of other factors and isolate the causal impact of the 
policy alone. This method distils the impact of privatization on firm performance from 
simultaneously occurring external dynamics that affect all firms, such as deregulation 
as well as price and trade liberalization.  
The treatment and comparison group do not necessarily need to have the same pre-
intervention conditions. In an ideal setting (as in experimental methods), finding a 
suitable control group would mean finding a group of companies that are the same as 
the treated companies in every aspect apart from the treatment. As indicated, DID 
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relaxes this assumption and instead merely assumes that the trend of treated and non-
treated companies is similar over time. The difference in difference method is depicted 
graphically in Figure 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2. Graphical presentation of the difference in difference method  18 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on multiple sources 
A treatment group undergoes the treatment while the comparison group does not. In 
the absence of a comparison group, the distance A-C would have been seen as the 
treatment effect. That estimate would be based on the assumption that the difference 
in outcome is completely attributable to the treatment. Assuming that the trend of the 
two groups of companies is similar, the treatment effect is reduced to A-B because the 
distance B-C, which is attributable to other factors affecting both groups, is differenced 
out by the comparison group.  
In a simple panel regression setting, the difference in difference model can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                            (6.2) 
Where Y denotes the variable of interest, D denotes treatment, X denotes control 
variables, i denotes units and t denotes time periods. The coefficient δ is the treatment 
effect and β represents the effects of other control variables; vit is a composite error 
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term which can be decomposed into two components: (i) the unobserved firm effect 
or the firm fixed effect, and (ii) idiosyncratic or time-varying error term.  
𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                       (6.3) 
The cross-sectional unit-specific error, 𝑎𝑖, does not change over time and the 
idiosyncratic error uit, varies over the cross-sectional units and time (Wooldridge, 
2002). The motivation and benefits of decomposing the error terms into two parts are 
that if one could eliminate some part of the error term using panel data, one would be 
better off in terms of minimizing concerns for omitted variable bias caused by 
unmeasured unit-specific factors. The following equation expresses the incorporation 
of Equation (6.3) into Equation (6.2):  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                   (6.4) 
The resulting generalized equation can be easily extended to include other controls 
(or extended to accommodate multiple periods) (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). This is 
particularly important for a model that controls not only for the unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity, but also for heterogeneity in observed characteristics over a 
multiple-period setting (Khandker, Koolwal and Samad, 2010). This framework can 
be estimated using panel fixed-effects model. Consistent estimation is possible even 
with endogenous regressors 𝑋𝑖𝑡, provided that they are correlated only with the time-
invariant component of the error term (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The panel data 
technique offer another powerful way to tackle issues related to omitted variable bias. 
It ensures that factors that are assumed to remain constant over time but are 
unobserved will not bias the estimated impact. 
6.1.4 Matched difference in difference 
As discussed in greater details in Chapter 2, simply comparing the ‘before and after’ 
change in output measures of units that went through privatization, does not indicate 
the causal impact of the privatization process. This is because many other factors, 
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which are also likely to impact the output measures, also change over time. In other 
words, while the companies’ specific differences are captured, the outside time-
varying factors are not captured. Similarly, comparing the units that went through 
privatization with those that did not, might be tainted with bias if the two groups are 
systematically different and if no attempt is made to deal with such systematic 
differences.  
However, the results would be improved if these two methods are combined with one 
another; that is if the before-and-after output changes of companies that went through 
privatization are compared with the before-and-after output changes of companies 
that did not. This is because the time-varying factors are captured by the latter group 
of companies since both groups are assumed to have been exposed to the roughly 
similar environment and changes in the environment. Non-participants in this case 
are used to difference out these outside effects, hence eliminating a great source of 
bias arising by simply calculating ‘before and after’ difference. Such DID estimators 
are capable of cancelling out company-level effects that are time-invariant between 
treated and non-treated companies. However, DID is not capable of addressing the 
issue of potential baseline imbalances between treated and non-treated companies in 
cases when there are large differences among two groups. If such imbalances are 
present, the results will be highly sensitive to model specifications and may in fact 
reflect findings that are not supported by the data.  
In order to avoid such imbalances, PSM method is used to match companies of both 
groups as closely as possible. Actually, PSM is used extensively in its own right as an 
estimation strategy to determine the average treatment effect on the treated. However, 
the PSM estimator is criticized on the grounds of its strong assumption that the 
selection is based only on observable factors. Therefore, a combination of PSM with 
DID methods (which allows for some selection based on unobservable factors) is 
expected to significantly increase the quality of non-experimental evaluation results 
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(Blundell and Dias, 2000; Smith and Todd, 2005). Given that the data permits the use 
of combined methods, this method is chosen as the preferred empirical strategy in this 
chapter. 
6.2 Empirical considerations  
Estimating the effect of privatization on sales and employment of companies whose 
ownership has been transferred from social to private ownership, requires making an 
inference about the performance that would have been observed had the privatization 
process not been implemented. Since this cannot be observed in the absence of 
privatization, the establishment of the causal effect becomes a problem of inference 
with missing data. In this regard, the combined matched DID estimators are used to 
estimate the missing counterfactual. In the rest of this section the theoretical basis of 
the model, the data and the models and estimation procedures are discussed 
separately.  
6.2.1 Discussion of the model  
As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, companies under private ownership are expected to 
display improvements in performance, in particular in more competitive markets. 
From an empirical point of view, there are broadly two approaches to analysing the 
effects of ownership transformation. The first approach, and by far more frequently 
used, is to compare performance indicators of companies under different ownership. 
The second approach, employing longitudinal data, is to compare ‘before and after’ 
performance measures.  This Chapter follows a broader literature on the impact of 
ownership transformation on companies’ performance, while attempting to remedy 
some of the econometric problems that are endemic in this field. Given that many 
studies did not adopt an appropriate technique to account for selection bias, a large 
part of evidence could be left out of discussion since their results on the causal effect 
of privatization on firm performance are likely to be biased (Hagemejer, Tyrowicz and 
Svejnar, 2014). However, the heterogeneity in the direction of results varies for 
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different indicators. For instance, even after controlling for selection bias, the results 
on the causal relationship between privatization and sales, more often than not, are 
found to be positive.122 On the other hand, the results of the impact of privatization on 
employment are more diverging. Studies examining this relationship systemically 
provide inconclusive evidence ranging from negative to positive effects.123  
Unlike most previous studies, the analysis in this Chapter uses a large representative 
sample of companies with observations over a seven year period. Moreover, the 
sample used here contains companies that did not undergo through a privatization 
process hence providing a good benchmark to isolate the effect of aggregate shocks. 
Also, controlling for selection bias is the main challenge in evaluating the effect of 
privatization. In the context of policy evaluation econometrics, several approaches are 
used to deal with selection bias problem, including instrumental variable approach, 
propensity score matching or the difference in difference. While all have their relative 
merits, a combination of matching technique with difference in difference arguably 
improves the estimation accuracy (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; Smith and Todd, 
2005).  
The estimations in this Chapter are based on this approach. This combined technique 
can capture the effect of ownership transformation on performance indicators (sales 
and employment) while differencing out the effect of aggregate shocks and the impact 
of other factors. DID estimator alone has the advantage of stripping the observable 
and unobserved time-invariant firm-level effects between treated and non-treated 
companies. Using fixed effect estimator (which is itself a within-unit estimator), DID 
can rule out all time-invariant company-level factors as sources of omitted variable 
bias. In effect, each company serves as its own control group. However, DID does not 
                                                        
122 See for details Chapter 2.  
123 See Chapter 2 for details. Studies that control for foreign ownership report that privatized firms, 
particularly those with foreign owners, tend to increase or at least not reduce employment relative to 
firms with state ownership. 
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address the issue of potential baseline imbalances between treated and non-treated 
groups. If the companies used as comparison benchmark to cancel out the effect of 
aggregate shocks are systematically different, the results may be biased. In order to 
overcome this issue, the PSM is used to match companies of two groups hence 
increasing the precision of estimates.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the privatization 
process in Kosovo is almost over with less than 10 percent of companies remaining to 
be privatized. Therefore the problem of selection bias is alleviated further given that 
we use a random representative sample of privatized companies and a random 
representative sample of non-privatized companies. 
6.2.2 Data 
The source of data is a survey of 133 privatized companies and 600 de-novo private 
companies in Kosovo. The survey was conducted in 2012 by Riinvest Institute for 
Development Research.124 In this survey a stratified random representative sampling 
method was used which ensures the external validity of the estimates. Three levels of 
stratification were used: industry, company size and location.125 The same survey 
questionnaire was administered to both groups of companies in order to allow for 
comparison. Additional specific questions were asked from privatized companies. 
The data was gathered via face-to-face interviews with key people in firms – owners 
or managers – who were well-informed about the developments in the firm and 
authorized to provide the information. Interviews were conducted by a team of 
trained interviewers. All questionnaires went under logical check in order to identify 
any inconsistencies in the completed questionnaires. In cases when inconsistencies 
were identified, the respondents were contacted again. Around 10 percent of them 
                                                        
124 The author is a Senior Researcher at the Institute and was responsible for the design of the 
questionnaire and the survey process. 
125 The stratification by sector, size and region was made according to their share in the population. For 
the purpose of sector stratification, in absence of detailed information, only three categories were used: 
manufacturing, services and other sectors. For the purpose of size classification, three categories were 
used: small, medium and large. And finally, for the purpose of regional stratification, five regions were 
used: Prishtina, Mitrovica, Peja, Prizren and Gjilan.  
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were controlled on site. More than 50 percent of surveyed companies were contacted 
by phone to check that interviewers had visited them and collected the required data 
properly. In addition to the base sample, a separate sample of 133 privatized 
companies and 600 de-novo private companies were selected for eventual 
replacement of enterprises which were missing or could not be found from the base 
sample during the interviewing process. The selection of reserve sample followed the 
same criteria as the base sample and the replacement of companies was made 
pursuant to the same characteristics. Once the data was collected, it was entered and 
coded using MS Excel in spreadsheets prepared with the data fields and pop-up tables 
indicating relevant codes. After entry, two individuals, one using the questionnaire 
and one the spreadsheet, read aloud to one another to confirm the correctness of the 
responses. 
In the case of privatized companies, the sample was selected from the data on the 
electronic registry provided by the Privatization Agency of Kosovo (PAK). However, 
the sample was selected only from the list of firms that were privatized before 2011, 
in order to allow for at least one year of operation under private ownership.126 This 
period is considered as a reasonable time period for new owners to take over and start 
full-scale operation. The sample of 133 companies were selected out of a total 525 
companies on the list. The sample size was calculated using the standard sample size 
calculator. The current sample size ensures valid results at a confidence level of 95 
percent and a confidence interval of 7. The sample was randomly selected from the 
electronic registry stratified by sector, size and region. During the survey process, 32 
firms had to be replaced with companies with similar characteristics. These firm had 
been liquidated or stopped their operation and therefore had to be replaced. In three 
cases the respondents were not willingness to participate in the survey.  
                                                        
126 As indicated in Chapter 5, by 2011, more than 90 percent of companies had been privatized.  
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In the case of de-novo private companies, the sample was based on the electronic 
registry of Kosovo Tax Administration. The sample consists of 600 de-novo private 
companies. This sample size ensures valid results at confidence level of 95% and a 
confidence interval of 4. Again, the sample was randomly selected from the electronic 
registry stratified for industry, size and region.  
Respondents were asked to provide historical data (from 2006 until 2011) on several 
variables including sales, number of employees, capacity utilisation and investment. 
Some questions required a numerical response while for others the response was a 
range to be selected from a list provided. The list of variables that were extracted for 
the purpose of this analysis is presented in Table 6.3. The percentage of missing data 
was very low (below 10 percent) for variables of interest (see Table 6.4).However, the 
data for capacity utilisation and investment had high level of missing observations 
especially for pre-privatization periods as the information on these categories were 
not part of the information provided in the privatization information package.127 
Therefore they were discarded altogether from the analysis. Other control variables 
are qualitative responses which were converted into binary variables.  
  
                                                        
127 The privatization information package was provided for potential investors by PAK for each 
company before it was privatised . It contained facts and figures about the company and its 
performance indicators such the number of employees; level of sales and detailed description of assets 
and was . The last sentence is repetition.   
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Table 6.3. Description of variable   22 
Name of the variable Description 
Dependent variable/s  
Sales* 
Level of annual sales (sales figures were deflated; year 2000 
was used as the base year)  
Employment* Total number of employees  
Independent 
variables 
 
Treatment 
Takes the value of 1 if a company has gone through 
privatization and 0 otherwise (i.e. 1 if treated and 0 
otherwise) 
PostTreatment  
Takes the value of 1 in the year that the company is 
privatized and the following years, and 0 otherwise 
Urban 
1 if company operates in areas with more than 50,000 
inhabitants and 0 otherwise 
Age of the company* Current year minus the year of establishment  
Foreign/Domestic 
1 if company has over 10 percent of foreign ownership and 
0 otherwise 
Manufacturing 
1 if the company operates in manufacturing sector and 0 
otherwise  
Services 1 if the company operates in service sector and 0 otherwise  
Other Sectors 
1 if the company operates in other sectors and 0 otherwise 
(base category) 
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Special Spin-off 
1 if the company has been privatised through special spin-
off arrangement and 0 otherwise  
Export dummy 1 if firm is engaged in export activities and 0 otherwise  
p_treat_Man 
Interaction term between PostTreatment and 
Manufacturing 
p_treat_Serv Interaction term between PostTreatment and Services 
p_treat_Urban Interaction term between PostTreatment and Urban 
p_treat_Export Interaction term between PostTreatment and Export 
p_treat_Foreign Interaction term between PostTreatment and Foreign 
p_treat_SpecialSO 
Interaction term between PostTreatment and Special Spin-
off 
* Continuous variables 
Source: Author’s own compilation   
The summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 6.4. For binary variables, 
the most important summary statistic is the fractions of the responses taking values 1 
and 0. Most of our responses in the binary variables have sufficient variation, which 
is important for producing efficient results.  
  
 
Table 6.4. Summary statistics            23 
Variable Observations 
Fraction 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 0 
Sales  5131 - - 74,200.62 14,832,000.00 7,200 65,000,000 
Employment  5131 - - 25.38 68.30 1 855 
Treatment 5131 18.14% 81.86% 0.13 0.34 0 1 
PostTreatment  5131 12.53% 87.47% 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Urban 5131 77.76% 22.24% 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Age of the company 5109 - - 14.57 7.51 4 58 
Foreign/Domestic 5131 9.01% 90.99% 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Manufacturing 5131 25.58% 74.42% 0.44 0.50 0 1 
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Services 5131 30.23% 69.77% 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Other sectors 5131 44.19% 55.81% 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Special Spin-off 5131 4.94% 95.06% 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Export dummy 5131 20.20% 79.80% 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on STATA output 
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Summary statistics show that companies’ annual sales range from just over 7,200 
Euros to 65 million Euros. Companies in the sample are dominated by small firms 
(with an average of 25 employees) though the maximum number of employees 
reaches 855. Around 26 percent of observations are from the manufacturing sector; 30 
from the service sector and the remaining are from other sectors.  Around 9 percent of 
companies have at least 10 percent of foreign ownership.  Around 22 percent of 
companies in the sample operate in areas with more than 50,000 inhabitants. Around 
5 percent of companies were privatised through special spin-off arrangement. Around 
18 percent of companies in the sample are privatised (treated) while the remaining are 
de-novo private companies. For almost 13 percent of firms, post-privatization data are 
observed. The discrepancy between treated and post-treatment data arise from the 
fact that companies were not all privatized at once. Therefore for some of them more 
post-privatization data are available.  
The data used in this Chapter have several advantages. First, the same set of question 
(same questionnaire) was used for both groups of firms (treatment group and 
comparison group); and second, both groups operate in the same market environment 
(including the same accounting standards), hence the macro effects are expected to 
affect the behaviour of both groups similarly.128 Also, since the data have a 
longitudinal dimension, one can make inference using the additional information 
provided by the time dimension. Having access to a panel data-set gives additional 
flexibility during the modelling process and less restrictive assumptions need to be 
made. Panel data enables us to control for time-invariant unobservable company-
specific characteristics that affect performance (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Difference-in-difference estimators are based on the assumption that the underlying 
‘trends’ in the outcome variable of both treated and non-treated companies is similar. 
                                                        
128  For a discussion of the potential issues arising in absence of these advantages, see Heckman et al., 
1997 and Blundell and Dias, 2000.  
Chapter 6 – Privatization in Kosovo: impact evaluation 
222 
 
This assumption is regularly referred to as Common Trend Assumption. This 
assumption cannot be tested with any formal testing procedure. Moreover, in cases 
when there are only two data points for each company, it is impossible to determine 
whether this assumption is even plausible. However, in cases when there are more 
than two data points for each company, one can get some idea if this assumption is in 
fact reasonable. To do so, a graphical presentation of the outcome variables of the two 
groups can serve as an indicator to see if these variables over time follow parallel 
trends. Given that the set of data used here has significant depth, it is possible to 
construct a graph which shows whether the outcome variable of treated and non-
treated companies follow parallel trend. Moreover, most of the privatized companies 
have at least two data points before the privatization. As Figure 6.3 shows, the trend 
followed by both sets of companies is fairly similar. Part a) of Figure 6.3 presents the 
trend of log values of real sales levels while part b) shows the trend of log values of 
employment. Even though the there is a difference among groups, this difference is 
mainly systematic across years (formally that is what the common trend assumption 
means, that the difference between groups is constant over time). This property is 
sufficient for cancelling out aggregate fluctuations.   
 
 
Figure 6.3. Trend of employment and sales figures between treated and non-treated 
groups         19 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
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6.2.3 Models and estimation procedure  
The estimation process of matched difference in difference is run in two stages and 
the sequence of analysis is as follows. Initially, a propensity score algorithm is run in 
order to construct a matched sample of firms based on observable characteristics. As 
argued earlier in the Chapter, the validity of the impact evaluation relies on finding a 
good comparison group. Therefore, propensity score matching is used to find a valid 
control group which will correct the difference in difference estimates. The following 
subsections, describe the estimation procedure of the Matching model and the 
Difference in Difference estimation.  
 
6.2.3.1 Matching model  
Using the propensity score matching approach proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), the intention is to extract a sub-sample of non-privatized companies in which 
the distribution of covariates was similar to that in the sample of privatized 
companies.129 The first step was to estimate the conditional probability that companies 
from both samples have gone through privatization process during the study period 
given the vector of observed covariates. The conditional probability, i.e. the 
propensity score, is defined as the probability that a company in the sample is 
privatized, given a set of observed variables. In case of our control group it is defined 
as the conditional probability to go through privatization had they been eligible.130   
 
                                                        
129 It is, however, possible that in cases where there are no matches for a particular privatized company, 
it is dropped from the sample.  
130 The control group in our case is the group of de-novo private companies that were not eligible to 
undergo privatization; however, they have similar observable attributes to those which were in the 
privatization group. They serve as a benchmark to ‘difference out’ the confounding factors and isolate 
the impact of the policy (the treatment effect) which is subsequently estimated as a difference between 
performance measures ‘before and after’ privatization.  
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The propensity scores are derived using a probit regression with a set of covariates. 
The matching is performed in cross-sectional dataset. All but one of the control 
variables used for matching procedure were time invariant variables, important to 
determine the likelihood for being selected for privatization. For the slowly changing 
variable (the age of the company) the averaged value is taken such that the matching 
can identify firms that are on average the most similar over the duration of the sample.  
The matching model is as follows: 
𝐿𝑖 = (
𝑃𝑖
1−𝑃𝑖
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 +
    𝛽4𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 +5 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑡ℎ𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖                         (6.5) 
where the dependent variable is the likelihood that a company is earmarked for 
privatization. Independent variables include characteristics that are expected to affect 
their selection for ownership transformation. These variables include the location in 
which firm operates, the sector of operation, a dummy controlling for export activity 
during the pre-treatment period and the average age of the company over the duration 
of the period under investigation. Definition of variables is provided in Table 6.3. 
As discussed in previous Chapters, governments are expected to initially sell 
companies that operate in more competitive markets. To measure product market 
competitiveness, a dummy variable (Urban) is used which takes the value of 1 if 
company operates a location with more than 50,000 inhabitants and 0 if it operates in 
smaller locations. As argued in Chapter 1, ceteris paribus, the more competitive a 
market in which the company operates, the more likely it is for the company to be 
selected for privatization. Similarly, two dummy variables depicting sector of 
operation (manufacturing and services) are included which are considered as an 
important determinant on how the ownership transformation is sequenced and how 
companies are selected for privatization. Based on the characteristics of the sector, 
Bornstein (1999) presents a concise categorization on the likelihood of different 
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industrial sectors being selected for privatization. He argues that companies from 
sectors in which small scale investments are the norm (for example insurance 
services), are more likely to be initially selected for privatization. Conversely, 
companies from sectors in which substantial remedial capital spending and 
restructuring (perhaps even foreign investment) is required, are less likely to be 
initially sequenced for privatization. Likewise, export dummy controlling if firm was 
engaged in export activities in the initial period is included (in case of privatized 
companies, it means the export activity prior to privatization). As such, it controls for 
a pre-privatization behaviour that could make them more likely to get selected for 
privatization by the government but also to make them more attractive targets for 
foreign investors. Finally, an average age variable is included to provide an additional 
important dimension against which companies of two groups are matched.131  
The propensity score matching technique is implemented by a STATA ‘.ado’ file called 
pscore.ado which was developed by Becker and Ichino (2002). The pscore command 
estimates the propensity score, which in this case is the likelihood that a company is 
selected for privatization. The pscore command also tests the balancing property, 
which is the condition that propensity scores have the same distribution of observable 
characteristics independent of treatment status. The balancing property is necessary 
to estimate the causal effect of interest.  
The results of the pscore matching algorithm include the regression output (probit in 
this case). They also include description of the estimated propensity score, 
identification of the optimal number of blocks as well as the balancing property test. 
                                                        
131 Different theoretical predictions are provided in the literature to explain the relationship between 
age of the company on the one hand and its performance and growth on the other hand. For instance, 
Jovanovic (1982) predicts that over time low productivity firms exit, while high productivity firms 
remain in business. In terms of performance, Arrow (1962) predicted that as time passes, companies 
improve their performance due to accumulated knowledge about the production process as well as due 
to already established relations with customers and suppliers. Age seems to be an important 
determinant of companies’ performance and growth. As such it might play an important role in 
predicting the likelihood of a company to be selected for privatization.  
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The common support restriction was imposed which restricts the analysis of the 
balancing property to all privatized and non-privatized companies in the region of 
common support. By imposing such a restriction, it is expected that the quality of 
matching is improved (Becker and Ichino, 2002). The results of the pscore probit 
regression are presented in Table 6.5. As these results show, all variables of interest 
are statistically significant and their magnitude and the direction of the effects are 
mostly as expected. Variables are jointly significant.132 The propensity score estimation 
results in Table 6.5 suggest a positive correlation between market competitiveness, 
export activity, age of the company, service sector and manufacturing sector on the 
one hand, and the probability of being selected for privatization on the other.   
 
Table 6.5. Estimation of the propensity score 24 
Dependent variable 
(treatment) 
Coefficient Standard Error 
Independent  
Variables 
Urban 0.335*** 0.063 
Manufacturing  0.867*** 0.067 
Services 0.313*** 0.066 
Export  0.298*** 0.058 
Age of the company 0.042*** 0.004 
_constant term -85.782*** 7.580 
LR chi2(5) - 431.84***                    - 
Pseudo R2 - 0.1154                      - 
Number of observations - 5109                            - 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on STATA output 
The first part of the output of pscore run is presented in Appendix 6. The results show 
that the identified region of common support is [0.085 to 0.879]. The description of the 
estimated propensity score in the region of common support is presented in Appendix 
7. Blocks, in which the mean propensity score is different between privatized and non-
                                                        
132 LR statistic is presented at the bottom of Table 6.5. With a p value of zero, it allows us to reject the 
hypothesis that all the slope coefficients associated with independent variables are simultaneously 
equal to zero. 
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privatized companies, are split in half. This algorithm continues until, the average 
propensity score of privatised and non-privatised is the same in all blocks. In our case, 
the optimal number of blocks is found to be eight (8). This number ensures that the 
mean propensity score for privatized and non-privatised companies is not different.  
After establishing the optimal number of blocks, the pscore algorithm proceeds to test 
the balancing property for each variable. Test results show that the balancing property 
is satisfied at 1 percent level of significance.133 Test results of the balancing property 
as well as the tabulated final distribution of privatized and non-privatized companies 
across blocs, is presented in Appendix 8. Results show that block identifiers for some 
non-privatized companies are missing as they lay outside the common support. 
Therefore the number of observations in the table in Appendix 8 is 4,816 instead of 
5,131; suggesting that 45 companies were dropped. However, it is important to point 
out that none of the privatized companies were dropped, hence causing no problem 
in estimation.134Once the matching procedure is conducted, a unique identifier was 
used to match pairs in the panel dataset. In other words, one variable per company 
was used during the matching procedure. The information about the matched cases 
was then merged with the original dataset. Cases that are not matched were dropped. 
Thereafter, the resulting sub-sample of matched firms is referred to as the matched 
sample. 
6.2.3.2 Matched Difference in Difference model  
After the construction of the matched sample, the Difference in Difference for outcome 
indicators is estimated.  This section tries to determine whether following 
privatization, the firms improve their performance measured in terms of selected 
performance indicators. Table 6.6 shows the details of the proxies for these 
                                                        
133 This significance level is applied to test each variable and the balancing property is not rejected only 
if it holds for each variable. 
134 If the number of dropped privatized companies is considerable, problems in inferences might occur 
as a sample selection bias may be introduced in the estimates (Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon, 2002).  
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performance indicator as well as the predicted relationships (as described in Chapter 
2).  
Table 6.6. Performance indicators and the predicted relationship     25 
Performance indicator Proxies Predicted relationship* 
Sales 
Real Sales = 
Nominal Sales/Producer Price Index 
positive 
Employment 
Total Employment  
= Total Number of Employees 
positive or negative 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
Two baseline models are estimated, with (i) sales and (ii) employment as dependent 
variables. Additional extension models are also developed to see if the treatment effect 
on the treated has increased over time. Here, the two baseline models are explained 
separately.   
Sales model: 
The following model is estimated to investigate the impact of ownership transformation 
on sales: 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖                              (6.6) 
The depended variable (𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) is the log value of deflated sales. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
takes a value of 1 in the year that the company underwent ownership transformation 
and the following years, and 0 otherwise. It is used to estimate the effect of the 
treatment on the treated. Although the time-invariant variables cannot be 
accommodated directly in a fixed effects model, they can still be interacted with other 
time-variant variables in particular with time dummies (Wooldridge, 2009 p. 484). The 
following are interacted with the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 and are expected to capture 
effects of treatment on the treated. These interaction variables include, 𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑛 
and 𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣 to control for sector differences of the treatment effect on the treated. 
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They control for manufacturing and service sectors respectively. The base category 
includes other sectors of operation. The following variables, 𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔, 
𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 respectively control for region, export activity and 
foreign ownership differences of the treatment effect on the treated. An additional 
interaction term 𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑂 is included to control for differences of the 
treatment effect on the treated between companies that were privatized through the 
‘special spin-off’ route and those that were privatized with regular spin-off.135 The 
subscript 𝑖 refers to companies (1,...,n) and 𝑡 to years (2005,…, 2011). Finally, 𝜀𝑖 is the 
usual white noise error term. The interaction terms of year dummies (last two years 
of the investigation period) and post-treatment variables are also included as 
extension in an additional specification to see if the treatment effect on the treated has 
increased over time.  
The procedure is based on fixed effects estimation as we are interested in the effect of 
a within‐unit change in treatment. Fixed-effects regression controls for firm-specific 
unobserved and time-invariant characteristics that may influence the outcome 
variable. The regression results of specification 6.6 are presented in Appendix 9. After 
the estimation, the model is subjected to diagnostic tests. The test for 
heteroskedasticity checks if the variance of the residuals is non-constant over cross-
sectional units which is a very common problem when working with panel data. 
Basically we assume Homogeneity of the Variance of Residuals. The result of the Wald Test 
(presented in Appendix 10) shows that there is a large presence of heteroskedasticity. A 
possible solution to account for heteroskedasticity is to report results with robust 
standard errors. The improved results with robust standard errors are reported in 
Appendix 11.  
After running the regression with robust standard errors, the next step is to test for 
serial correlation, another common problem in panel data analysis. Results are 
                                                        
135 For a concise discussion on the privatization methods in Kosovo, see Chapter 5.   
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checked for autocorrelation to see if the error in each time period contains a time-
constant omitted factor, i.e. if error terms are correlated across time (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p. 176). The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data suggests that there is a 
serial correlation problem as there is first order autocorrelation in the data (see 
Appendix 12). A possible response to this problem is to estimate a dynamic model. 
However, the autocorrelation in the model might suggest that the dependent variable 
is affected by other variables not included explicitly in the model; therefore the 
dynamics are unobservable and so are contained within the residuals.  
To overcome this problem, the dynamics is modelled in the error term using the 
Unobserved Components Model estimated based on Cochrane-Orcutt (1949). 
Following this method, slope coefficients of the static model conditional on AR(1) 
dynamics in the residuals are estimated. However, the Unobserved Component 
Model is valid only under the assumption that a particular type of parameter 
restriction known as Common Factor Restrictions (CFR) hold. Next, in BOX 1, we 
explain the CFR assumption based on Spanos (1986) and McGuirk and Spanos (2004). 
For simplicity, a bivariate model with an autoregressive error term of first order AR(1) 
is assumed:  
  
Chapter 6 – Privatization in Kosovo: impact evaluation 
231 
 
BOX 1.   
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
(6.7) 
 
 
where: 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 
 
𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 as a disturbance term and 𝑉𝑖𝑡 as a the white noise component 
 
(6.8) 
 
 
The first step is to lag once each variable of (6.7): 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 = α + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 
 
(6.9) 
 
 
The second step is to solve Equation (6.9) for 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1: 
 
𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 − α − 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 
 
(6.10) 
 
 
The third step is to substitute Equation (6.10) into Equation (6.8): 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌(𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 − α − 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 
 
(6.11) 
 
 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜌α − 𝜌𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜌𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 
 
(6.12) 
 
 
The forth step is to substitute Equation (6.12) into Equation (6.7): 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜌α − 𝜌𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜌𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 
 
(6.13) 
 
 
The fifth step is to collect terms of Equation (6.13): 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)α + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜌𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜌𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 
 
(6.14) 
 
 
Equation (6.14) is a restricted version of the following dynamic linear regression model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛼1𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛼5𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 
 
(6.15) 
 
-In Equation (6.14) the coefficient on  𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is 𝜌 while in Equation (6.14) the coefficient on 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is 𝛼1 
-In Equation (6.14) the coefficient on 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is – 𝜌𝛼2while in Equation (6.14) the coefficient on  𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is 𝛼4 
-In Equation (6.14) the coefficient on 𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 is – 𝜌𝛼3 while in Equation (6.14) the coefficient on  𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 is 𝛼5 
 
Therefore, coefficient – 𝜌𝛼2 is the negative product of the coefficient on 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1   
           and, coefficient – 𝜌𝛼3 is the negative product of the coefficient on 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 
 
As a result, the dynamic linear regression model in Equation (6.15), can be transferred into restricted 
version model in Equation (6.14) only if the following restrictions [(i) and (ii)] hold in Equation (6.15): 
(i) −𝛼4 = 𝛼1 ∗ 𝛼2, and 
(ii) −𝛼5 = 𝛼1 ∗ 𝛼5 
 
Restrictions in (i) and (ii) are referred to as Common Factor Restrictions.  
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In order to test the CFR, Equation 6.6 is transformed into a dynamic linear regression 
model of order one, Equation (6.16) 
𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿_𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽10𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽13𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                                         (6.16) 
Following the estimation of the dynamic linear regression model of order one 
(Equation 6.16), the CFR on each variable is tested. Tests are conducted for both Fixed 
Effect Estimation and for pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS). This double test is 
conducted in order to encompass the whole range of possible dynamic 
misspecification. This is because in the OLS regression, the coefficient of the lagged 
depended variable is subject to maximum upward bias, while in the Fixed Effects 
regression, the coefficient of the lagged depended variable is subject to downward 
bias (Bond, 2002). The CFR test is performed based on the derivation explained earlier. 
The results of the dynamic linear regression model of order one are presented in 
Appendix 13 (for Fixed Effect Estimation) and in Appendix 14 (for OLS regression).  
CFR tests are presented in BOX 2.136 CFR tests indicate that CFRs of all variables hold. 
Also, the results of CFR tests are consistent across both Fixed Effects and OLS 
specification, thus increasing the reliability of the results. Therefore, given that CFRs 
hold, an unobserved components method to a fixed effects model specified in 
Equation 6.6 is applied. Results of the regression are presented in Appendix 16. The 
results are discussed in section 6.3.  
 
  
                                                        
136 STATA printouts of CFR tests from both Fixed Effects and OLS are also presented in Appendix 15.  
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BOX 2. Results of the Common Factor Restrictions testing procedure for both OLS and Fixed 
Effects regressions (after the estimation of Equation 6.7) 
Fixed effects OLS 
. testnl  -
_b[L_PostTreatment]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[PostTreat
ment] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_PostTreatment] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        2.11 
              Prob > F =        0.1324 
. testnl  -
_b[L_PostTreatment]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[PostTreat
ment] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_PostTreatment] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        6.12 
              Prob > F =        0.0134 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Man]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Man
] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Man] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        1.90 
              Prob > F =        0.1684 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Man]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Man
] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Man] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        0.05 
              Prob > F =        0.8213 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Serv]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Se
rv] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        2.72 
              Prob > F =        0.0994 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Serv]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Se
rv] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        2.68 
              Prob > F =        0.1017 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Urban]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_U
rban] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Urban] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Urban] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        6.03 
              Prob > F =        0.1141 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Urban]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_U
rban] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Urban] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Urban] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        0.39 
              Prob > F =        0.5326 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Export]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_
Export] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Export] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        4.22 
              Prob > F =        0.1401 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Export]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_
Export] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Export] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        0.07 
              Prob > F =        0.7886 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Foreign]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat
_Foreign] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        2.62 
              Prob > F =        0.1056 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Foreign]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat
_Foreign] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        2.19 
              Prob > F =        0.1389 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_tre
at_SpecialSO] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        1.13 
              Prob > F =        0.2883 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO]=_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_tre
at_SpecialSO] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO] = 
_b[L_lnsales]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        0.46 
              Prob > F =        0.4975 
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Employment model 
The following model is estimated to investigate the impact of ownership 
transformation on employment: 
𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖                             (6.17) 
 
The depended variable (𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡) is the log of the number of employees. The 
independent variables are the same as the ones in specification 6.6. Finally, 𝜀𝑖 is the 
usual white noise error term. Again, the procedure is based on fixed effects estimation 
given our interest in the effect of a within‐unit change in treatment. The regression 
results of specification 6.17 are presented in Appendix 17. After the estimation, the 
model is subjected to diagnostic tests. The results of Wald Test (presented in Appendix 18) 
show that there is a large presence of heterskedasticity. A possible solution to account for 
heteroskedasticity is to report results with robust standard errors. The improved 
results with robust standard errors are reported in Appendix 19.  
Next we checked for autocorrelation to see if the error in each time period contains a 
time-constant omitted factor, i.e. if error terms are correlated across time (Wooldridge, 
2002, p. 176). The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data suggests that there 
is a serial correlation problem as there is first order autocorrelation in data (see 
Appendix 20). A possible response to this problem is to estimate a dynamic model. 
However, the autocorrelation in the model might suggest that the dependent variable 
is affected by other variables not included explicitly in the model; therefore the 
dynamics are unobservable and so are contained within the residuals.  
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Again, to overcome this problem, we test whether CFRs holds, so that we can use the 
Unobserved Components Model.  CFR test is performed based on the derivation 
explained earlier. In order to test the CFRs, Equation 6.17 is transformed into a 
dynamic linear regression model of order one Equation 6.18.  
𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿_𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽10𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽13𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐿_𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                                         (6.18) 
The results of the dynamic linear regression model of order one are presented in 
Appendix 21 (for Fixed Effect Estimation) and in Appendix 22 (for OLS regression).  
CFR tests are presented in BOX 3.137 CFR tests presented in Box 2, indicate that CFRs 
hold for all variables. Also, CFR tests’ results are consistent across both Fixed Effects 
and OLS specification, thus increasing the reliability of the results. Therefore, given 
that CFRs hold, an unobserved components method to a fixed effects model specified 
in Equation 6.17 is applied. Results of the regression are presented in Appendix 24. 
The results are discussed in section 6.3.  
                                                        
137 STATA printouts of CFR tests from both Fixed Effects and OLS are also presented in Appendix 23.  
Chapter 6 – Privatization in Kosovo: impact evaluation 
236 
 
BOX 3. Results of the Common Factor Restrictions testing procedure for both OLS and Fixed 
Effects regressions (after the estimation of Equation 6.7) 
Fixed effects OLS 
. testnl  -
_b[L_PostTreatment]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[PostTreatme
nt] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_PostTreatment] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        2.99 
              Prob > F =        0.2127 
. testnl  -
_b[L_PostTreatment]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[PostTreatme
nt] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_PostTreatment] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        0.83 
              Prob > F =        0.3615 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Man]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Man] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        1.37 
              Prob > F =        0.1938 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Man]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Man] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        1.95 
              Prob > F =        0.1631 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Serv]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Serv
] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        1.04 
              Prob > F =        0.3068 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Serv]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Serv
] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        1.81 
              Prob > F =        0.1784 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Urban]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Urb
an] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Urban] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Urban] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        0.00 
              Prob > F =        0.9709 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Urban]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Urb
an] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Urban] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Urban] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        1.70 
              Prob > F =        0.1928 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Export]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Ex
port] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Export] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        0.05 
              Prob > F =        0.8167 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Export]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Ex
port] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Export] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        3.85 
              Prob > F =        0.0497 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Foreign]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_F
oreign] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        3.52 
              Prob > F =        0.0607 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_Foreign]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_F
oreign] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        0.64 
              Prob > F =        0.4237 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat
_SpecialSO] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        3.07 
              Prob > F =        0.0979 
. testnl  -
_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat
_SpecialSO] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO] = 
_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        0.07 
              Prob > F =        0.7932 
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6.3 Results 
This section presents and discusses the results of the models specified in Equation 6.6 
and Equation 6.17 and their extensions. Table 6.7 presents the estimation results, 
where the main baseline specification for Sales Model is presented in column 1 and 
the main baseline specification for the Employment Model is presented in column 3. 
Two other columns present extensions to baseline specifications for sales and 
employment (when the year dummies for the last two years are included).138 The 
estimation results show that most variables are highly significant and direction of 
effect generally as expected. Results are similar across different specifications, 
suggesting robustness of coefficients.  
In terms of sales, the results suggest that the impact of privatization process is positive. 
Ownership transformation is associated with an improvement in sales by almost 13 
percent. The sector and region of operation do not seem to explain changes in sales 
after divestiture. However, privatized companies that are engaged in export activities 
seem to display higher performance improvement and so do companies that were 
privatized through special spin-off. A rather surprising finding is that companies that 
have at least 10 percent foreign ownership seem to exhibit lower sales improvement 
associated with ownership transformation. This is largely contrary to previous 
studies, however, in the context of Kosovo, it may be due to several specific reasons. 
Firstly, the variable captures only a relatively simple categorisation of foreign 
ownership and is unable to differentiate among foreign owners. Second, many of these 
companies were acquired by members of the Diaspora (classified as foreign  owners) 
who do not necessarily have the capital and know-how to properly restructure newly 
privatised companies as their decision to initially invest in these companies might 
have been influenced by non-economic factors.  When including year dummies, the 
                                                        
138 STATA printouts of the model extensions of the baseline models are presented in Appendix 25 (for 
Sales Model) and in Appendix 26 (for Employment Model).  
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results are largely confirmed. The year dummies depicting the last two years of the 
investigation period show that there is a significant improvement in sales over time 
following ownership transformation.  
Table 6.7. Estimation Results (unobserved component model)    26 
 Sales model Employment model 
 Column I Column II Column III Column IV 
 Baseline Extended  Baseline Extended  
 lnSales lnSales lnEmp lnEmp 
Independent variables     
PostTreatment 
0.128*** 
(0.042) 
0.072* 
(0.043) 
-0.405*** 
(0.039) 
-0.419*** 
(0.039) 
p_treat_Man 
-0.079 
(0.055) 
-0.077 
(0.055) 
0.160*** 
(0.051) 
0.161*** 
(0.051) 
p_treat_Serv 
-0.125* 
(0.066) 
-0.139** 
(0.066) 
0.187*** 
(0.061) 
0.184*** 
(0.061) 
p_treat_Cap 
-0.024 
(0.062) 
-0.029 
(0.061) 
0.103* 
(0.057) 
0.102* 
(0.057) 
p_treat_Export 
0.160*** 
(0.053) 
0.164*** 
(0.053) 
0.166*** 
(0.049) 
0.167*** 
(0.049) 
p_treat_Foreign 
-0.157** 
(0.065) 
-0.162** 
(0.065) 
-0.093 
(0.060) 
-0.095 
(0.060) 
p_treat_SpecialSO 
0.343*** 
(0.064) 
0.345*** 
(0.063) 
0.131** 
(0.059) 
0.131** 
(0.059) 
_cons 
9.484*** 
(0.049) 
9.481*** 
(0.049) 
1.982*** 
(0.036) 
1.981*** 
(0.036) 
Year_TR_6 - 
0.129*** 
(0.026) 
- 
0.015 
(0.023) 
Year_TR_7 - 
0.192*** 
(0.029) 
- 
0.061** 
(0.027) 
Wald chi2(8) 105.32*** - 181.16*** - 
Wald chi2(10) - 156.75*** - 187.18*** 
Number of 
observations 
4816 4816 4752 4752 
Number of groups 688 688 688 688 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on STATA output  
 
In terms of employment, the results suggest that the impact of privatization process is 
negative. These findings follow some of the studies (cited in Section 6.2.1) that find 
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negative impact of ownership transformation on employment levels. Ownership 
transformation is associated with a drop in employment levels by almost 41 percent. 
In the current context – as described in Chapter 5 – these results are somehow 
predictable as some of these workers were not actively engaged in any productive 
work even though they had valid contracts and appeared on the payrolls of 
companies. Privatized companies from manufacturing and service sectors seem to do 
better in terms of employment compared to the base category. Similarly, the level of 
competition in product market proxied by variable Urban, seems to explain some 
heterogeneity in employment associated with ownership transformation. Privatized 
companies that are engaged in export activities seem to display better employment 
prospects than those that do not; and so do companies that were privatized through 
special spin-off. The impact of foreign ownership seems to be insignificant.  When 
including year dummies, the results are largely confirmed. The year dummies 
depicting the last year of the investigation period shows a positive sign. This finding 
confirms previous studies that employment drops after divestiture but then catches 
up over time.  
6.4 Limitations 
Despite the fact that this Chapter has addressed important shortcomings that are 
endemic in the existing literature, few limitations of the investigations deserve some 
attention. The data provides only relatively simple categorisation of both private 
ownership and foreign ownership. As a consequence we are unable to distinguish 
relatively homogeneous groups of owners within each group. A more comprehensive 
dataset on the identity of owners (or type of owners) after divestiture (including the 
extent and quality of foreign ownership), would have allowed us to provide a more 
exhaustive analysis on the causal relationship between ownership and sales or 
employment.   
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An additional drawback of the analysis relates to the inability to get hold of 
information about the companies that were inactive after the privatization process. 
The proportion of companies that had to be replaced during the survey process was 
considerable (almost a quarter). As discussed in Chapter 5, in some cases firms have 
been liquidated or stopped their operation. In some other cases, new owners saw more 
benefit in treating these companies as real estate investments hence keeping them idle 
while expecting better market valuation of the property. In any case, the information 
for further investigation was not available. This might pose an additional source of 
bias that the reader should be aware of when interpreting the results. Finally, the data 
used in this Chapter are not directly comparable with those presented in Chapter 4 as 
they use different performance measures and different methodologies.  
6.5 Conclusions 
The main objective of this Chapter was to analyse the causal relationship between 
ownership transformation and companies’ sales and employment. It draws upon the 
theoretical propositions set forth in Chapters 1 and 2 as well as upon the context of 
investigation presented in Chapter 5.  This Chapter analysed this relationship using 
policy evaluation econometrics and addressed several problems that the literature on 
ownership transformation is beset with. As discussed on several occasions in this 
thesis, controlling for selection (endogeneity) bias of ownership is the main challenge 
in evaluating the effect of privatization. In the context of policy evaluation 
econometrics the combination of matching technique with difference in difference 
arguably best addresses this issue. Since data on ‘before and after’ privatization were 
obtained, the endogeneity problem associated with sample selection was largely 
addressed. Moreover, given that the privatization process in Kosovo is almost over 
with less than 10 percent of companies remaining ,to be privatized this problem was 
alleviated further as we used a random representative sample of almost all privatized 
companies and a random representative sample of non-privatized companies.  
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Using the fixed effect estimator, the DID method is able to difference out all time-
invariant company-level factors as sources of omitted variable bias. However, in order 
to address the issue of potential baseline imbalances between treated and non-treated 
groups, DID was combined with PSM. This combined technique can isolate the effect 
of ownership transformation on performance indicators (employment and sales) 
while differencing out the aggregate shocks.  The estimation process of matched 
difference in difference is run in two stages; initially a propensity score algorithm is 
run in order to construct a matched sample of firms based on observable 
characteristics by finding valid control group which will correct the difference in 
difference estimates. After the construction of the matched sample, the Difference in 
Difference for outcome indicators was estimated. Two baseline models looking at the 
sales and employment effects of privatization were estimated. Additional extension 
models were also estimated to see if the effect of treatment on the treated has increased 
over time.  
The results remained robust in different specifications. In terms of sales, the results 
suggest that the impact of privatization process is positive; confirming findings of 
previous studies in transition countries. Ownership transformation is associated with 
an improvement in sales by almost 13 percent. The results also find that the 
effectiveness of the policy is heterogeneous depending on the export activity of 
companies and the method of privatization (special vs regular spin-off). However, the 
sector of operation and location do not seem to explain any heterogeneity in sales 
improvement associated with ownership transformation. On the other hand, unlike 
the bulk of previous literature, the results in this Chapter find a negative effect for 
foreign ownership on performance.  Lastly, when year dummies are included, the 
expected results were largely confirmed, showing improvements in performance over 
time. In terms of employment, results suggest that the impact of privatization process 
has been negative which follows one stream of the previous (divergent) research. 
Results find that ownership transformation is associated with a drop in employment 
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levels by almost 41 percent. The Kosovo specific context may to some extent explain 
this result. Similarly, the effectiveness of the policy is heterogeneous depending on 
various factors, including: sector of operation, location, export activity and method of 
privatization. However, the impact of foreign ownership seems to be insignificant.  
Again, when including time dummies, the previous results are largely confirmed and 
show that after a period of drop in employment after divesture it eventually starts to 
pick up.  
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Introduction 
This thesis aimed at investigating the impact of privatization on companies’ 
performance in the successor states of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia). The research is 
confined within the broad context of the neoclassical theory and its extensions, in line 
with the dominant empirical literature in this field. It started by reviewing a range of 
theories and concerns related to the impact of ownership and privatization policy. The 
aim was to investigate as broadly as possible relevant theories on the importance of 
ownership for companies’ performance as well as the effectiveness of the privatization 
process in TEs (Chapter 1). It then analysed the existing empirical literature on these 
areas in the context of TEs. Here a summary of various features of reviewed empirical 
studies and their results, including their efforts to control for the selection bias 
problem, was presented (Chapter 2).  Given the fact that the nature of ownership in 
former Yugoslavia was different from that in other socialist countries, the 
privatization process had to deal with different issues and concerns and respond to 
different interest groups. The thesis analysed the nature of ‘social ownership’ and how 
it was dealt with in the process of privatization in the successor states of former 
Yugoslavia. Also, a review of limited empirical studies that analyse the effect of 
ownership transformation on companies’ performance in these countries was 
reported (Chapter 3). Having highlighted a number of problems that have dominated 
empirical studies on privatization and the absence of studies looking at the 
transformation of ‘socially owned’ enterprises, a cross-country empirical investigation 
of the impact of ownership on companies’ efficiency in successor states of former 
Yugoslavia, using firm-level representative data from the BEEPS database and 
employing the Stochastic Frontier Analysis as well as a simulation based extension of 
the Heckman selection model for nonlinear models controlling for selection bias 
problem, was undertaken (Chapter 4). Here the issue of missing data, which is ignored 
in previous studies, was also addressed by applying for the first time the multiple 
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imputation procedure in the context of privatization. Given that the first three rounds 
of BEEPS did not include Kosovo, the impact of privatization in this country had to be 
dealt with separately in the last two chapters. Firstly, in order to provide the relevant 
background information for the empirical analysis, the privatization process in 
Kosovo was discussed in detail and in the context of the state of Kosovo’s economy 
before and after the war (Chapter 5). In the absence of any official data on enterprise 
ownership performance in Kosovo, the author conducted a representative survey of 
privatised enterprises and a large number of de-novo firms in order to obtain original 
data suitable for the policy evaluation econometric analysis which is preferable to the 
standard regression analysis prevalent in the literature. Using the propensity score 
matching and the difference in difference procedures, it was possible to identify the 
change in the performance of enterprises resulting from the change in their ownership 
from that caused by other reform measures and external events that affected all 
enterprises (Chapter 6).   
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 presents the main findings 
of the research. Section 7.2 will discuss the main contribution to knowledge provided 
by this thesis. Section 7.3 presents some policy implication while Section 7.4 points out 
the limitations of this research. Section 7.5 provides directions for future research.  
 
7.1 Main findings 
The first Chapter of this thesis outlined the main conceptual and theoretical 
foundations underlying the ownership debate. It started by discussing the arguments 
for state ownership which fall under two broad categories: firstly, state ownership is 
viewed as a remedy to market failures (related to market structures or public goods), 
and secondly, state ownership is considered as a policy instrument for advancing non-
economic goals, such as maximising social welfare, even at a tolerable loss of economic 
efficiency.  
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This Chapter then discusses the case for private ownership. Here, several theories, 
including the key elements of property rights theory, public choice theory and 
principal-agent theory were presented. These theories support the contention that 
privatization improves companies’ performance through better incentives, 
accountability, organizational performance, monitoring and control. According to 
these theories, relative inefficiency of SOEs is a function of ownership as well as a 
function of the behaviour of government and its agents. This Chapter also argued that 
the absence of competition, resulting from state ownership, may be another cause of 
the relative inefficiency of SOEs. This is especially important in the context of TEs 
where state ownership was not limited to natural monopolies (as in the case of many 
market economies) but to enterprises in all sectors.  
Chapter 1 also investigated the privatization policy, particularly in the context of TEs 
where privatization was part of broader economic and political reforms. This was 
especially important from the empirical perspective since the effects of privatization 
must be distinguished from the effects of other reforms that were undertaken 
simultaneously in these countries. Here special attention was paid to methods of 
privatization as well as to the sequencing of the privatization reform. The main 
conclusion of this Chapter was that theory alone cannot provide conclusive answers 
about the effect of privatization, hence a review of empirical research was deemed 
important.  
The second Chapter provided a critical review of the empirical research investigating 
the impact of ownership on companies’ performance, with special focus on TEs. The 
empirical literature on privatization, especially those related to TEs, is very broad and 
there is considerable heterogeneity in the results. These differences arise from 
different factors, including diverse methodologies employed, differences in the 
indicators and measurement of performance and ownership as well as other genuine 
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differences among countries and time periods covered. Most of the studies reviewed 
in this Chapter suffer from methodological problems, primarily the selection bias 
problem. The earlier studies, in particular, tended to ignore this problem altogether. 
Another major reason for the heterogeneity of results is the type of data used and the 
specific problem associated with survey data. 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that studies accounting for the selection bias problem had 
less diverse results and the effect of privatization was mostly found to be positive.  
However, even a review of more recent studies in this Chapter suggests that there is 
still heterogeneity in the results. The lack of conclusive evidence can be attributed 
partly to the lack of attention paid to the selection bias problem partly to the fact that 
most of these studies use non-representatives samples of data which usually are not 
comparable. This Chapter infers that the relationship between privatization and 
companies’ performance is not straightforward. As such, neither the theory nor the 
empirical literature were able to provide a definitive conclusion about the direction 
and magnitude of the effect of ownership transformation on companies’ performance. 
Also, studies conducted in the context of TEs have generally not accounted for 
aggregate shocks of the transition process in order to be able to isolate the effect of 
privatization.  
Chapter 3 provided a detailed analysis of the nature of social ownership in former 
Yugoslavia which was very distinct from that of other socialist economies. Here two 
important lines of arguments about the consequences of social ownership were 
considered. The first stemmed from the work of Ward (1958) and others who maintain 
that a labour managed firm will have lower performance as it will invest, employ and 
produce less compared to a profit maximising company. The second line of arguments 
came from the property rights theory which highlighted the impact of poorly defined 
property rights and ownership arrangements and showed that labour-managed firm 
have sub-optimal level of investments. Although a number of Yugoslav economists 
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such as Horvat disputed the assumptions of these theories and maintained that these 
theories do not properly reflect the realities of Yugoslav labour managed firms, the 
inefficiencies arising from the absence of the disciplining effects of the market and 
well defined property rights could not be disputed.  
This Chapter suggested that even though labour managed firms did not initially 
pursue profit maximising objective, still, after the start of the transition process they 
had to adjust themselves to the new realities of the market economy by pursuing profit 
maximising objectives in order to be able to survive in the new market conditions, 
particularly the disciplining effect of competition, the emerging hard budget 
constraint and the credible threat of bankruptcy.  Chapter 3 also argued that despite 
the sweeping, and initially successful, reforms of the late 1980s, economic reforms 
were not ultimately successful as political problems in the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia and ethnic tensions between Serb and other nationalities led to the 
disintegration of the federation.  
This Chapter also analysed the privatization process in former Yugoslavia and its 
successor states which, despite sharing the legacies of the social ownership, followed 
different paths of privatizing their enterprises. The privatization process also led to 
the resolution of the problem of social ownership which in the final analysis led to the 
division of socially owned property between the state and the employees. Chapter 3 
also reviewed the limited number of empirical evidence investigating the impact of 
privatization on companies’ performance in the successor states of former Yugoslavia. 
The review showed that limited efforts have been made to control for selectin bias and 
other data related problems.  
Chapter 4 embarked on the empirical investigation of the impact of ownership on the 
performance of companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia focusing on 
efficiency of these companies. As argued in this Chapter, the concept of efficiency has 
been largely ignored in the economic literature mainly due to the dominance of 
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neoclassical economics which considers companies to be operating on their 
production possibility frontier and being fully efficient. However, in recent decades 
the measurement of efficiency and the analysis of the gap between the actual and 
potential levels of output has attracted greater attention from researchers and policy 
makers. This Chapter summarised the theoretical and empirical contributions that led 
to the development and expansion of efficiency analyses and reviewed the methods 
of estimating efficiency, including parametric and non-parametric techniques which 
provided the rational for using SFA as the appropriate method of estimation. SFA is 
used for estimating the impact of ownership on companies’ performance by 
comparing the mean efficiency scores of companies with different ownership 
structures. It also investigates the performance of companies privatized to domestic 
and foreign owners. In order to control for selection bias problem which, as argued in 
Chapter 2, have been largely overlooked in previous studies the empirical 
investigation of this Chapter also employed simulation based extension of the 
Heckman selection model for nonlinear models (as proposed by Greene, 2006). Due 
to data limitations, the analysis of this Chapter was limited to technical efficiency. It 
used cross sectional pooled data of three rounds of BEEP surveys conducted in 2002, 
2005 and 2009 covering over 3,800 companies with different ownership structures in 
six of the successor states (BEEP surveys of 2002 and 2005 were not conducted in 
Kosovo). The data are representative at country level and collected on the basis of the 
same methodology in all countries, and as such were suitable for inferring cross-
country comparisons.  
As is often the case when using survey data, the datasets used in this Chapter had a 
number of missing observations. The issue of missing data is usually ignored in the 
literature partly because with large datasets it has been assumed that the remaining 
data continues to be representative enough, and partly because methods of addressing 
the problem of missing data are complex. Missing data problem is dealt with by using 
Multiple Imputation procedure after carefully analysing alternative procedures. This 
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procedure led to an increase of 44 percent in the number of companies with full data 
which is expected to improve the precision of estimates significantly. So far, to the best 
knowledge of the author, papers analysing the impact of ownership on companies’ 
performance have ignored this problem without any discussion being provided. 
After an extensive and detailed discussion on the choice of the functional form and 
distributional assumptions, this chapter used the more flexible Translog production 
function to estimate the inefficiency scores. Technical efficiency scores for each 
company in the dataset were calculated which were then used to explain variations in 
efficiency based on a number of environmental and firm-specific factors. The results 
indicated that companies under investigation were not fully efficient and therefore 
SFA was the appropriate method of estimation which is capable of capturing these 
inefficiencies. The results suggest that private companies owned by foreign investors 
have higher efficiency scores than private companies owned by domestic investors 
and SOEs. Also companies privatized by foreign investors outperform SOEs while 
those that were privatized by domestic investors display similar performance to SOEs. 
The results also suggest that countries as well as sectors of operation explain some of 
the variation in mean efficiency scores.  Results suggest that the average efficiency 
scores of companies in the successor states vary across these countries with Slovenian 
companies being the most efficient, followed by those in Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, 
Serbia and Macedonia i.e., reflecting development of market based institutions and 
general economic environment in the region. 
Chapter 5 analysed the privatization process in Kosovo which was the last of the 
successor states of former Yugoslavia to embark on large-scale privatization. It also 
analysed the state of Kosovo’s economy within the former Yugoslav federation until 
now. This Chapter showed that privatization process in Kosovo was distinct from that 
in other successor states of former Yugoslavia, due to its economic and political 
specificities: it was designed and largely implemented by the international 
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administration without any significant involvement of a national government, and the 
method of sale to highest bidders without providing any preference to workers or 
managers was the only method of privatization after the 1999. By allowing all 
interested parties to participate in the bidding process on equal footing, the ownership 
of privatized firms in Kosovo, unlike that in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, 
was not transferred to interest groups close to the political parties in power or to the 
former elite. However, even though the privatization method promoted foreign 
investors, the level of privatization-related FDI remained limited, which also reflects 
the overall conditions of the business environment in Kosovo.  
Despite the fact that privatization in Kosovo has been almost completed, there is no 
empirical evidence investigating the effect of privatization on companies’ 
performance. This void is filled by the empirical analysis undertaken in Chapter 6, to 
which Chapter 5 provided the relevant background information and context.  
Chapter 6 investigated the privatization-induced performance changes of companies 
in Kosovo using policy evaluation econometrics, specifically a combination of 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Difference In Difference (DID). This Chapter 
provided a review of the analytical framework and basic features of the policy 
evaluation econometrics. Here the pre- and post-privatization performance 
(expressed in terms of sales and employment) of two groups of companies privatized 
(or treated) companies and de-novo private firms (or non-treated companies) during 
the same time period were compared. In this context, PSM was used to match 
companies with similar traits from the two groups. Then, fixed effect estimators were 
employed so that each treated company serves as a comparison point for itself. Non-
treated companies serve to identify and separate the effect of aggregate shock and 
changes in the environment to which both groups of companies were exposed. 
Therefore, the net effect of privatization is isolated.  
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This Chapter used data that were collected specifically for the purpose of this thesis 
and covered a period of seven years. The combination of PSM with DID is arguably 
the best methodology to address the issue of selection bias which is the main challenge 
in evaluating the effect of privatization on companies’ performance. The problem of 
the identified serial correlation in the data was addressed using unobserved 
component model after confirming that Common Factor Restrictions hold.  
The results indicated that, in terms of sales, privatization is associated with 
improvement in sales by almost 13 percent. On the other hand, employment is found 
to be negatively affected by privatization. The results suggest that after privatization, 
the level of employment dropped by 41 percent. However, these results ought to be 
interpreted with caution, as many workers were not actively engaged in any 
productive work even though they appeared on the payrolls of SOEs (without having 
received any wages). The sector and region of operation do not seem to explain 
differences in performance associated with privatization, while companies that are 
involved in export and those privatized through special spin-off exhibit higher 
performance improvement after privatization.  
Contrary to the existing literature, this Chapter finds that companies that have at least 
10 percent foreign ownership are associated with a drop in sales levels after 
privatization. Foreign ownership is found to be insignificant in case of employment. 
This may partly be explained by the fact that foreign ownership in this Chapter is 
captured by a relatively simple categorisation which is unable to differentiate between 
different foreign owners. Also, many of these companies were acquired by members 
of the Diaspora who might not possess the required know-how and skill to 
successfully restructure their companies as their decision to participate in the 
privatization process might have been motivated by other, non-economic reasons. 
This Chapter also found that following privatization sales continues to increase 
Chapter 7 – Concluding remarks 
253 
 
without interruption while employment suffers a large drop after privatisation and 
later on begins to grow.   
To sum up, the main findings of this thesis are:  
a. Companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia privatized by foreign 
investors outperform SOEs; 
b. Companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia privatized by domestic 
investors display similar performance to SOEs; 
c. Private foreign companies in successor states of former Yugoslavia have higher 
mean technical efficiency scores than SOEs and domestic de-novo private 
companies; 
d. The mean technical efficiency scores of domestic private de-novo companies in 
successor states of former Yugoslavia is not statistically different from that of 
SOEs; 
e. The heterogeneity across successor states of former Yugoslavia can also be 
partly explained by country characteristics and environment. Slovenian 
companies appear to be the most efficient followed by companies from Croatia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia;  
f. Privatization in Kosovo is associated with improvement in performance 
expressed in terms of sales and with a drop in employment levels; 
g. Companies in Kosovo privatized by foreign investors display lower 
performance expressed in terms of sales than companies privatized by 
domestic investors; 
h. Companies in Kosovo privatized by foreign investors display similar 
performance expressed in terms of employment to companies privatized by 
domestic investors; 
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i. Following privatization, the performance of companies in Kosovo expressed in 
terms of sales continue to increase without any break while employment 
suffers a significant drop after privatisation but later starts to pick up.  
 
7.2 Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis has made several contributions to knowledge in particular in the context 
of TEs and more significantly in the context of the transition in successor states of 
former Yugoslavia. So far there is no empirical evidence that jointly evaluates the 
impact of ownership and privatization on companies’ performance in all successor 
states of former Yugoslavia. Also, there is no study that employs SFA in comparing 
the efficiency of firms with different ownership in these countries. To our knowledge, 
there is only one study (Kocenda, Hanousek and Masika, 2011) that uses this 
methodology in the context of TEs. However, even this study does not justify the 
choice of appropriate functional form and distributional assumptions that this 
methodology requires and does not properly control for selection bias.  
Another contribution to knowledge of this thesis is that it employs data that are 
statistically representative for all countries under investigation while addressing the 
issue of missing data; a problem that is endemic in research employing survey data 
and is largely ignored in comparable studies without any discussion. Missing data are 
dealt with by using the Multiple Imputation procedure which is the most efficient way 
of addressing this issue. The use of Multiple Imputation increased the sample size and 
relaxed the assumption of missing completely at random, which is implicitly made in 
current literature without being acknowledged.  
This thesis also investigates the privatization-induced performance changes in 
Kosovo empirically for the first time.  Moreover, since the data for Kosovo have a 
longer time dimension, this investigation was also able to capture the dynamic effects 
of privatization. In addition, the use of policy evaluation techniques (in particular the 
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combination of PSM with DID) has not been widely used in studies on privatisation 
as a remedy for estimation problems that are endemic in existing literature.   
Similarly, by providing robust and statistically significant relationship between 
privatization and efficiency or sales, and in particular for finding robust and 
statistically significant negative relationship between privatization and employment, 
this thesis adds more evidence to the ambiguous theoretical and empirical literature 
on privatization in TEs.  
The data used for this empirical investigation by the author is a primary dataset 
specifically collected through a large scale survey of a representative sample of 
companies in Kosovo. The sample was representative for both privatized and de-novo 
private companies, alleviating further the issue of sample selection bias.   
Finally, this thesis has also contributed towards improvement of the BEEPS datasets. 
The author has identifying errors in the data which were reported to the World Bank 
and were subsequently corrected by the latter.   
 
7.3 Policy implications  
This thesis has provided evidence for a statistically significant relationship between 
ownership and companies’ performance which has important policy implications.  
The main audience of these findings includes the government agencies in charge of 
designing and implementing privatization policies. These findings should also be 
interesting for other policy makers, such as parliament commissions. Privatization 
process is almost completed in all successor states of former Yugoslavia, therefore 
policy implications are not primarily directed towards these countries. However, 
these lesson can serve for other countries or for those sectors of the economy (like 
utilities) which are still not privatized. 
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First, results from the empirical investigation suggest that, in general, privatization 
seem to be associated with improvement in companies’ performance expressed in 
terms of technical efficiency and real sales. Second, privatization to foreign investors 
is associated with higher efficiency in the successor states of former Yugoslavia. 
Therefore, it may be suggested that governments ought to encourage privatization-
related foreign investments by: (i) improving the overall business environment which 
is conducive and attracts foreign investors, and (ii) designing a privatization process 
which does not discriminate against foreign investors.  
Third, provided that privatization process seem to be associated with a drop in 
employment, policymakers should consider devising supporting schemes that will act 
as safety net for the laid off workers. Apart from alleviating the hardship of this 
transition, this would also increase the popular support for the policy.  
 
7.4 Limitations  
Besides the fact that this thesis has provided several important contributions to the 
existing literature, in particular in contributing towards improving the understanding 
of the ownership transformation and its impact on companies’ performance in 
successor states of former Yugoslavia, still it has faced several limitations that need to 
be acknowledged and discussed.  
First, the analysis related to successor states of former Yugoslavia relies on cross-
sectional data and as such it cannot provide a dynamic assessment of the relationship 
between ownership and companies’ performance. Also, in that context, the absence of 
information before privatization, makes it hard to control properly for pre-
privatization condition of companies under investigation.  
Second, the data for Kosovo and for the rest of successor states of former Yugoslavia 
provide only relatively simple categorisation of both private ownership and foreign 
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ownership. Therefore, this thesis cannot distinguish between relatively homogeneous 
groups of owners within each group. Third, the data for successor states of former 
Yugoslavia did not provide information about the prices of inputs and outputs. 
Consequently this thesis was unable to account for both technical and allocative 
efficiency and had to be content with the former.  
Fourth, in the case of Kosovo it was impossible to access information about the 
companies that were inactive after the privatization process. In turn, this missing 
information may be a source of a hidden bias. Finally, the data used for the successor 
states of former Yugoslavia and for Kosovo are not directly comparable. Therefore the 
thesis has had to use different methodologies and performance measures, reducing 
the comparability of the results for the two groups.  
 
7.5 Directions for further research 
Drawing on the limitations of this thesis, in what follows we try to elaborate a set of 
important points that can inform and direct future research in the field of privatization 
and company performance in the context of TEs and other countries that have similar 
characteristics.  
First, given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity about the impact of privatization 
on companies’ performance, and taking into account the availability of more recent 
studies on privatization, an updated Meta Regression Analysis that would follow the 
work of Djankov and Murrell (2002) is recommended.  
Second, provided the data is available, it would be highly rewarding to supplement 
the quantitative analysis by using more qualitative information when controlling for 
selection bias. This would improve the understanding of the process of selection into 
privatization and improve the reliability of the results.  
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Third, future studies that employ SFA would greatly benefit from utilising data on 
prices of inputs and output. This would allow for decomposition of efficiency 
(inefficiency) component into technical and allocative efficiency (inefficiency). In turn, 
this would enable the identification of the source of inefficiency and departure from 
optimal frontier (cost minimizing, revenue or profit maximizing). This is particularly 
important from policy perspective as it would inform the policy making process.  
Fourth, future studies would greatly benefit from finding more information about the 
type of new owners after privatization (including the extent and quality of foreign 
ownership) which would produce more insightful results on the relationship between 
the ownership structure and companies’ performance. In particular, the extent of 
foreign ownership would allow to test for a non-linear relationship between foreign 
ownership and companies’ performance. Last, broadening the time span of data could 
increase the quality of estimation and better capture the dynamic relationship between 
ownership and performance.  
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Appendix 1: The results of the selection model 
Appendix 1.1: The results of the selection model with M1 dataset 
 
-->probit; lhs=PART; rhs=one,lcap,llab, lnout, manufact, construc, 
hotel_an, wholesal,urban,monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni; Hold $ 
 
 
-->frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,private_,private0,monteneg,bosnia
, croatia,serbia,macedoni; Selection$ 
 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 07:15:45PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                  4     | 
| Log likelihood function       -20496.80     | 
| Number of parameters                 36     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =         10.80052     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =         10.80070     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =         10.85800     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =         10.82095     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .84399   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .26694   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .51667   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .91869   | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    13.4536027       .79573428    16.907   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .11593261       .10356212     1.119   .2629   12.4692717 
 LLAB    |    1.63049966       .10078507    16.178   .0000   3.18923504 
 LCAPS   |     .03762399       .00876911     4.291   .0000   79.8074927 
 LLABS   |    -.03859458       .01405638    -2.746   .0060   6.40170411 
 CAPL    |    -.05906201       .00767055    -7.700   .0000   41.7533449 
 _2005   |     .63931443       .06857606     9.323   .0000    .30428360 
 _2009   |     .35001977       .06799262     5.148   .0000    .47680945 
 MANUFACT|    -.22636150       .06118332    -3.700   .0002    .26528804 
 CONSTRUC|     .21403043       .08142004     2.629   .0086    .10635155 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.31577072       .10808790    -2.921   .0035    .05819793 
 WHOLESAL|     .41455737       .05717016     7.251   .0000    .36898080 
 PRIVATE_|     .84633893       .32636875     2.593   .0095    .11373708 
 PRIVATE0|     .36934403       .32169975     1.148   .2509    .87474151 
 MONTENEG|    -.80855962       .10592155    -7.634   .0000    .03367799 
 BOSNIA  |    -.96360281       .06794073   -14.183   .0000    .18316100 
 CROATIA |    -.59793866       .07372928    -8.110   .0000    .15480059 
 SERBIA  |   -1.47616329       .06925621   -21.315   .0000    .23751846 
 MACEDONI|   -1.58867802       .07061987   -22.496   .0000    .20974889 
 lnsgma_U|    -.66035769       .70965575     -.931   .3521 
 gamma*_V|     .08480753       .01972915     4.299   .0000 
---------+Index function for PROBIT selection model 
 Constant|    -.39364659       .03804802   -10.346   .0000 
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 LCAP    |     .13559614       .03629882     3.736   .0002      .000000 
 LLAB    |     .32070904       .08165565     3.928   .0001      .000000 
 LNOUT   |     .51863057       .11766570     4.408   .0000      .000000 
 MANUFACT|     .10772143       .12538777      .859   .3903      .000000 
 CONSTRUC|     .51687601       .08693428     5.946   .0000      .000000 
 HOTEL_AN|     .85058995       .29747418     2.859   .0042      .000000 
 WHOLESAL|    -.16272927       .09627607    -1.690   .0910      .000000 
 URBAN   |     .36625156       .09884561     3.705   .0410      .000000 
 MONTENEG|     .20634474       .10936343     1.887   .0592      .000000 
 BOSNIA  |     .08951754       .09905942      .904   .3662      .000000 
 CROATIA |     .84046848       .13109760     6.411   .0000      .000000 
 SERBIA  |    1.04372098       .01564062    66.731   .0000      .000000 
 MACEDONI|     .93366847       .06228374    14.991   .0000      .000000 
 Rho(w,v)|    .508365D-05      .04040809      .000   .9999     3.705289 
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Appendix 1.2: The results of the selection model with M2 dataset 
 
 
-->probit; lhs=PART; rhs=one,lcap,llab, lnout, manufact, construc, 
hotel_an, wholesal,urban,monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni; Hold $ 
 
 
 
-->frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,private_,private0,monteneg,bosnia
, croatia,serbia,macedoni; Selection$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 07:06:58PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                  1     | 
| Log likelihood function       -19914.83     | 
| Number of parameters                 36     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =         10.49439     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =         10.49456     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =         10.55186     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =         10.51481     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .78234   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .12592   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .35485   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .88450   | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    10.3568493      1.93911598     5.341   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.01537344       .14986398     -.103   .9183   12.4384413 
 LLAB    |    1.26669863       .33628307     3.767   .0002   3.18732906 
 LCAPS   |     .02845744       .01558771     1.826   .0679   79.5205668 
 LLABS   |    -.02963820       .02477552    -1.196   .2316   6.39503602 
 CAPL    |    -.02873102       .01535974    -1.871   .0614   41.7259685 
 _2005   |     .42572982       .12644515     3.367   .0008    .30428360 
 _2009   |     .20793073       .09416790     2.208   .0272    .47680945 
 MANUFACT|    -.31989977       .10615707    -3.013   .0026    .26528804 
 CONSTRUC|    -.04685071       .10870194     -.431   .6665    .10635155 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.34554461       .16025216    -2.156   .0311    .05819793 
 WHOLESAL|     .23358559       .10570334     2.210   .0271    .36898080 
 PRIVATE_|     .43437269       .27329474     1.589   .1120    .11373708 
 PRIVATE0|     .03907787       .25092286      .156   .8762    .87474151 
 MONTENEG|    -.71986852       .23187586    -3.105   .0019    .03367799 
 BOSNIA  |    -.84191667       .21378130    -3.938   .0001    .18316100 
 CROATIA |    -.37102436       .12835124    -2.891   .0038    .15480059 
 SERBIA  |   -1.09000431       .27287757    -3.994   .0001    .23751846 
 MACEDONI|   -1.27778736       .30419730    -4.201   .0000    .20974889 
 lnsgma_U|   -1.03605826       .47222570    -2.194   .0282 
 gamma*_V|     .12273163       .02431076     5.048   .0000 
---------+Index function for PROBIT selection model 
 Constant|    -.42604670       .04237639   -10.054   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .13779951       .04082672     3.375   .0007      .000000 
 LLAB    |     .30215154       .08991239     3.361   .0008      .000000 
Appendices 
300 
 
 LNOUT   |     .49237508       .12520749     3.932   .0001      .000000 
 MANUFACT|     .07432981       .13834218      .537   .5911      .000000 
 CONSTRUC|     .49204026       .09388169     5.241   .0000      .000000 
 HOTEL_AN|     .92447109       .28723539     3.219   .0013      .000000 
 WHOLESAL|    -.14239635       .10361621    -1.374   .1694      .000000 
 URBAN   |     .03889240       .91214241      .042   .6216      .000000 
 MONTENEG|     .21109398       .11963051     1.765   .0776      .000000 
 BOSNIA  |     .12462101       .10811669     1.153   .2491      .000000 
 CROATIA |     .88809420       .14239245     6.237   .0000      .000000 
 SERBIA  |    1.04291731       .20661882     5.048   .0000      .000000 
 MACEDONI|     .73592040       .15539174     4.736   .0000      .000000 
 Rho(w,v)|       .000000       .01315949      .000  1.0000 
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Appendix 1.3: The results of the selection model with M3 dataset 
 
 
-->probit; lhs=PART; rhs=one,lcap,llab, lnout, manufact, construc, 
hotel_an, wholesal,urban,monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni; Hold $ 
 
 
-->frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,private_,private0,monteneg,bosnia
, croatia,serbia,macedoni; Selection$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 06:59:54PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                  6     | 
| Log likelihood function       -20711.54     | 
| Number of parameters                 36     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =         10.91349     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =         10.91366     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =         10.97096     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =         10.93391     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .79115   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .75195   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .86715   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .88946   | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    18.9604210       .95944405    19.762   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.12651735       .08986516    -1.408   .1592   12.4659740 
 LLAB    |    2.11887503       .07763564    27.293   .0000   3.18773079 
 LCAPS   |     .05862598       .00773809     7.576   .0000   79.9309844 
 LLABS   |     .09457102       .00937464    10.088   .0000   6.39589154 
 CAPL    |    -.12748411       .00537707   -23.709   .0000   41.8737909 
 _2005   |     .70918899       .05964892    11.889   .0000    .30428360 
 _2009   |     .52509582       .05879738     8.931   .0000    .47680945 
 MANUFACT|    -.22098924       .05569228    -3.968   .0001    .26528804 
 CONSTRUC|    -.05465306       .07453172     -.733   .4634    .10635155 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.44674061       .09617700    -4.645   .0000    .05819793 
 WHOLESAL|     .26650871       .05294176     5.034   .0000    .36898080 
 PRIVATE_|     .85527629       .22575725     3.788   .0002    .11373708 
 PRIVATE0|     .48556925       .21981070     2.209   .0272    .87474151 
 MONTENEG|   -1.31105024       .10485618   -12.503   .0000    .03367799 
 BOSNIA  |   -1.43873647       .06539086   -22.002   .0000    .18316100 
 CROATIA |    -.87307561       .06889874   -12.672   .0000    .15480059 
 SERBIA  |   -1.63180892       .06284165   -25.967   .0000    .23751846 
 MACEDONI|   -1.77579950       .06269043   -28.326   .0000    .20974889 
 lnsgma_U|    -.14254388      1.37336818     -.104   .9173 
 gamma*_V|     .11713553       .02026137     5.781   .0000 
---------+Index function for PROBIT selection model 
 Constant|    -.34775758       .03895937    -8.926   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .06014602       .03650263     1.648   .0994      .000000 
 LLAB    |     .28130521       .08173461     3.442   .0006      .000000 
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 LNOUT   |     .53680725       .11834615     4.536   .0000      .000000 
 MANUFACT|     .07928597       .12438197      .637   .5238      .000000 
 CONSTRUC|     .52105674       .08710915     5.982   .0000      .000000 
 HOTEL_AN|     .76988567       .29156546     2.641   .0083      .000000 
 WHOLESAL|    -.23903739       .09648296    -2.478   .0132      .000000 
 URBAN   |     .04484121       .32444564      .138   .5321      .000000 
 MONTENEG|     .16096613       .11253577     1.430   .1526      .000000 
 BOSNIA  |     .01694449       .10047866      .169   .8661      .000000 
 CROATIA |     .74345076       .13367357     5.562   .0000      .000000 
 SERBIA  |    1.05066527       .01458413    72.042   .0000      .000000 
 MACEDONI|    1.41809925       .10783488    13.151   .0000      .000000 
 Rho(w,v)|     .00050794       .09486448      .005   .9957 
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Appendix 1.4: The results of the selection model with M4 dataset 
 
 
-->probit; lhs=PART; rhs=one,lcap,llab, lnout, manufact, construc, 
hotel_an, wholesal,urban,monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni; Hold $ 
 
 
 
-->frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,private_,private0,monteneg,bosnia
, croatia,serbia,macedoni; Selection$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 11:43:13PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 38     | 
| Log likelihood function       -19397.63     | 
| Number of parameters                 36     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =         10.22232     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =         10.22250     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =         10.27979     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =         10.24275     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .81025   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .18813   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .43373   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .90014   | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    12.5589048      7.22734447     1.738   .0823 
 LCAP    |     .19457824      1.09981598      .177   .8596   12.5297980 
 LLAB    |    1.22185759      1.14105779     1.071   .2843   3.18409598 
 LCAPS   |    -.00596476       .09577478     -.062   .9503   80.7930617 
 LLABS   |    -.03870146       .22381792     -.173   .8627   6.38534428 
 CAPL    |    -.02801477       .09749930     -.287   .7739   42.0188930 
 _2005   |     .55463483       .90670996      .612   .5407    .30428360 
 _2009   |     .34891580       .88430015      .395   .6932    .47680945 
 MANUFACT|    -.32232057       .88827969     -.363   .7167    .26528804 
 CONSTRUC|    -.07861558      1.18427495     -.066   .9471    .10635155 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.37251850      1.66885258     -.223   .8234    .05819793 
 WHOLESAL|     .37439798       .69132476      .542   .5881    .36898080 
 PRIVATE_|     .66722648      3.11915270      .214   .8306    .11373708 
 PRIVATE0|     .18032566      3.05505827      .059   .9529    .87474151 
 MONTENEG|    -.87232128      1.94918658     -.448   .6545    .03367799 
 BOSNIA  |    -.92444761       .99475298     -.929   .3527    .18316100 
 CROATIA |    -.40323544      1.04461524     -.386   .6995    .15480059 
 SERBIA  |   -1.21654368       .89103779    -1.365   .1722    .23751846 
 MACEDONI|   -1.48506930       .76425049    -1.943   .0520    .20974889 
 lnsgma_U|    -.83532193       .50880009    -1.642   .1006 
 gamma*_V|     .10520696       .02176551     4.834   .0000 
---------+Index function for PROBIT selection model 
 Constant|    -.41176560       .04195951    -9.813   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .13284664       .03930205     3.380   .0007      .000000 
 LLAB    |     .31563972       .08853431     3.565   .0004      .000000 
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 LNOUT   |     .49628903       .12363533     4.014   .0001      .000000 
 MANUFACT|     .13371045       .13380680      .999   .3177      .000000 
 CONSTRUC|     .51001477       .09111668     5.597   .0000      .000000 
 HOTEL_AN|     .84319727       .30917425     2.727   .0064      .000000 
 WHOLESAL|    -.14054496       .09975681    -1.409   .1589      .000000 
 URBAN   |     .03116951       .11198112      .278   .4618      .000000 
 MONTENEG|     .21539806       .11533884     1.868   .0618      .000000 
 BOSNIA  |     .12922977       .10390712     1.244   .2136      .000000 
 CROATIA |     .86584784       .13600114     6.366   .0000      .000000 
 SERBIA  |    1.00314153       .05829636    17.208   .0000      .000000 
 MACEDONI|     .87174119       .28377305     3.072   .0021      .000000 
 Rho(w,v)|    -.00046075       .01448220     -.032   .9746 
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Appendix 1.5: The results of the selection model with M5 dataset 
 
 
-->probit; lhs=PART; rhs=one,lcap,llab, lnout, manufact, construc, 
hotel_an, wholesal,urban,monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni; Hold $ 
 
-->frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,private_,private0,monteneg,bosnia
, croatia,serbia,macedoni; Selection$ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 06:43:53PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                  1     | 
| Log likelihood function       -23811.09     | 
| Number of parameters                 36     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =         12.54397     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =         12.54415     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =         12.60144     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =         12.56440     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .84207   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .33004   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .57449   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .91765   | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    10.7105002       .26246346    40.808   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .16858672       .04901301     3.440   .0006   12.5113557 
 LLAB    |    1.22059637       .04536358    26.907   .0000   3.18724392 
 LCAPS   |     .06579278       .00437131    15.051   .0000   80.4714121 
 LLABS   |    -.06225712       .00933579    -6.669   .0000   6.39657099 
 CAPL    |    -.01301444       .00452037    -2.879   .0040   41.9689242 
 _2005   |     .49346671       .02908187    16.968   .0000    .30428360 
 _2009   |     .32496679       .03359132     9.674   .0000    .47680945 
 MANUFACT|    -.26244328       .03105182    -8.452   .0000    .26528804 
 CONSTRUC|     .10102055       .03985572     2.535   .0113    .10635155 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.35605853       .04730583    -7.527   .0000    .05819793 
 WHOLESAL|     .26759011       .02808708     9.527   .0000    .36898080 
 PRIVATE_|     .60891884       .11057013     5.507   .0000    .11373708 
 PRIVATE0|     .19112036       .10707655     1.785   .0743    .87474151 
 MONTENEG|    -.97548266       .06803348   -14.338   .0000    .03367799 
 BOSNIA  |    -.90254846       .03531476   -25.557   .0000    .18316100 
 CROATIA |    -.41710490       .03519411   -11.852   .0000    .15480059 
 SERBIA  |   -1.18553711       .03362441   -35.258   .0000    .23751846 
 MACEDONI|   -1.36448961       .03569934   -38.222   .0000    .20974889 
 lnsgma_U|    -.55426533       .51111326    -1.084   .2782 
 gamma*_V|     .08594395       .02212283     3.885   .0001 
---------+Index function for PROBIT selection model 
 Constant|    -.38765879       .03775699   -10.267   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .12469637       .03721091     3.351   .0008      .000000 
 LLAB    |     .30648760       .08110137     3.779   .0002      .000000 
 LNOUT   |     .52442813       .11668800     4.494   .0000      .000000 
 MANUFACT|     .07218459       .12602701      .573   .5668      .000000 
 CONSTRUC|     .50041035       .08771498     5.705   .0000      .000000 
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 HOTEL_AN|     .89080426       .29755864     2.994   .0028      .000000 
 WHOLESAL|    -.13731081       .09761739    -1.407   .1595      .000000 
 URBAN   |     .04214881       .29251516      .144   .5899      .000000 
 MONTENEG|     .20499187       .11146845     1.839   .0659      .000000 
 BOSNIA  |     .10729132       .10021495     1.071   .2843      .000000 
 CROATIA |     .85259444       .13020752     6.548   .0000      .000000 
 SERBIA  |    1.14331017       .00999799   114.354   .0000      .000000 
 MACEDONI|     .90139976       .02399246    37.570   .0000      .000000 
 Rho(w,v)|   -.312583D-04      .02868525     -.001   .9991 
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Appendix 2: The results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications  
Appendix 2.1: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M1 dataset 
Cobb-Douglas (Normal Distribution) 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; eff=ui_nCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Aug 31, 2012 at 07:56:00AM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 12     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5551.855     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.92470     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.92471     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.93784     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.92937     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .76457   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .89897   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .87440   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .94814   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.28978   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.26487006       .47423339    19.537   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .04168509       .08735745      .477   .6332   12.5431453 
 LLAB    |    1.06514666       .08625003    12.350   .0000   3.31781158 
 LCAPS   |     .02259589       .00834503     2.708   .0068   80.8575222 
 LLABS   |    -.01571203       .01380921    -1.138   .2552   6.93244022 
 CAPL    |    -.02244377       .00833104    -2.694   .0071   43.7796496 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.08433535       .04537801    23.896   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.28978357       .00028378  4544.965   .0000 
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Translog (Normal Distribution) 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_2009,manufa... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_n$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Aug 31, 2012 at 07:57:11AM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 27     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5087.514     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.68728     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.68734     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.72176     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.69953     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .63087   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .61332   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .79428   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .78315   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.11544   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.21141520       .42692767    21.576   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .13924596       .07809129     1.783   .0746   12.5431453 
 LLAB    |    1.07081002       .07738390    13.838   .0000   3.31781158 
 LCAPS   |     .00693499       .00750151      .924   .3552   80.8575222 
 LLABS   |    -.03445386       .01239535    -2.780   .0054   6.93244022 
 CAPL    |    -.01177458       .00746352    -1.578   .1147   43.7796496 
 _2005   |     .39256592       .04082039     9.617   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .28194640       .04589429     6.143   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.23774755       .04394266    -5.410   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .07398378       .05728708     1.291   .1965    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.31361317       .06845778    -4.581   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .23962405       .04222078     5.675   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.84251487       .09511005    -8.858   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.82194223       .04969203   -16.541   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.41072531       .05199767    -7.899   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.03833442       .04718417   -22.006   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.18519887       .05000165   -23.703   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .41627059       .06521667     6.383   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .06502018       .05093234     1.277   .2017    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |     .98599343       .04344731    22.694   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.11543642       .00024145  4619.688   .0000 
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Appendix 2.2: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M2 dataset 
Cobb-Douglas (Normal Distribution) 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; eff=ui_nCD$ 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 08:27:11PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 13     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5638.577     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.97032     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.97033     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.98346     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.97499     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .78391   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .98814   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .88539   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .99405   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.33118   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    10.1385504       .47097215    21.527   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.05496894       .08577193     -.641   .5216   12.5520749 
 LLAB    |    1.00182269       .08468628    11.830   .0000   3.31500890 
 LCAPS   |     .02790481       .00813898     3.429   .0006   81.0507172 
 LLABS   |    -.01051194       .01396958     -.752   .4518   6.92244484 
 CAPL    |    -.01911379       .00815976    -2.342   .0192   43.8058639 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.12272962       .04601787    24.398   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.33118321       .00029421  4524.665   .0000 
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Translog (Normal Distribution) 
 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_2009,manufa... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_n$ 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 08:28:00PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 26     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5168.892     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.73009     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.73015     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.76457     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.74234     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .68866   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .55415   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .82986   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .74441   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.11482   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    10.0461447       .42702986    23.526   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .02605870       .07692471      .339   .7348   12.5520749 
 LLAB    |    1.00920305       .07613709    13.255   .0000   3.31500890 
 LCAPS   |     .01391434       .00732503     1.900   .0575   81.0507172 
 LLABS   |    -.02678556       .01254521    -2.135   .0328   6.92244484 
 CAPL    |    -.00880098       .00729760    -1.206   .2278   43.8058639 
 _2005   |     .39880111       .04190835     9.516   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .28326886       .04728548     5.991   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.28485059       .04489568    -6.345   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.05929766       .05869459    -1.010   .3124    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.29026973       .07030151    -4.129   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .29391926       .04314489     6.812   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.68804526       .09703774    -7.090   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.75949340       .05065559   -14.993   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.36667344       .05322256    -6.889   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |    -.99833948       .04835320   -20.647   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.19079605       .05077371   -23.453   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .47259789       .06678451     7.076   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .07055631       .05209628     1.354   .1756    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |     .89703892       .04266445    21.025   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.11481735       .00024189  4608.736   .0000 
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Appendix 2.3: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M3 dataset 
 
Cobb-Douglas (Normal Distribution) 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; eff=ui_nCD$ 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:01:50PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 13     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5582.155     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.94064     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.94065     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.95378     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.94531     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .77842   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .90918   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .88228   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .95351   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.29908   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.67362480       .47106648    20.536   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.03249230       .08672847     -.375   .7079   12.4886891 
 LLAB    |    1.19570210       .08638597    13.841   .0000   3.31824505 
 LCAPS   |     .03133721       .00830644     3.773   .0002   80.1882398 
 LLABS   |     .00245415       .01370387      .179   .8579   6.93183529 
 CAPL    |    -.03858629       .00828427    -4.658   .0000   43.6208371 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.08073236       .04523694    23.890   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.29907917       .00028608  4540.993   .0000 
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Translog (Normal Distribution) 
 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_2009,manufa... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_n$ 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:02:36PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 26     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5088.708     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.68791     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.68797     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.72239     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.70016     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .69866   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .42287   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .83586   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .65029   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.05903   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.96122799       .42202953    23.603   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.04183842       .07664436     -.546   .5852   12.4886891 
 LLAB    |    1.23372018       .07674993    16.075   .0000   3.31824505 
 LCAPS   |     .02700276       .00735803     3.670   .0002   80.1882398 
 LLABS   |    -.02221785       .01223070    -1.817   .0693   6.93183529 
 CAPL    |    -.02970761       .00733852    -4.048   .0001   43.6208371 
 _2005   |     .48450291       .04090015    11.846   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .23439614       .04580250     5.118   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.23189174       .04400201    -5.270   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.00399787       .05738407     -.070   .9445    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.27610057       .06871579    -4.018   .0001    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .33021561       .04225313     7.815   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.65789594       .09508212    -6.919   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.77636918       .04936204   -15.728   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.37036598       .05214188    -7.103   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.01025864       .04696440   -21.511   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.17515009       .04952117   -23.730   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .28700235       .06547056     4.384   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|    -.02027755       .05105795     -.397   .6913    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |     .77798515       .04212338    18.469   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.05902759       .00022906  4623.422   .0000 
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Appendix 2.4: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M4 dataset 
 
Cobb-Douglas (Normal Distribution) 
 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; eff=ui_nCD$ 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:29:12PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 13     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5513.414     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.90448     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.90449     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.91762     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.90915     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .73561   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .92085   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .85767   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .95961   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.28703   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.44438224       .47649446    19.821   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.00274195       .08764341     -.031   .9750   12.4505278 
 LLAB    |    1.08730646       .08335027    13.045   .0000   3.31788738 
 LCAPS   |     .02915794       .00835505     3.490   .0005   79.6547910 
 LLABS   |    -.01375357       .01358851    -1.012   .3115   6.93107360 
 CAPL    |    -.02686434       .00806698    -3.330   .0009   43.4437872 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.11885029       .04577396    24.443   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.28703405       .00028237  4557.895   .0000 
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Translog (Normal Distribution) 
 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_2009,manufa... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_n$ 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:29:38PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 27     | 
| Log likelihood function       -4976.808     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.62904     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.62911     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.66353     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.64130     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .58928   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .59583   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .76764   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .77190   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.08863   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.73352365       .42297568    23.012   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.00140954       .07714660     -.018   .9854   12.4505278 
 LLAB    |    1.19591831       .07338748    16.296   .0000   3.31788738 
 LCAPS   |     .02596842       .00737120     3.523   .0004   79.6547910 
 LLABS   |    -.02316070       .01200610    -1.929   .0537   6.93107360 
 CAPL    |    -.02766344       .00708112    -3.907   .0001   43.4437872 
 _2005   |     .38412254       .03968983     9.678   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .21434110       .04437171     4.831   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.31010134       .04268193    -7.265   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.02488468       .05571735     -.447   .6551    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.32688804       .06647774    -4.917   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .23206042       .04099229     5.661   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.70155789       .09272034    -7.566   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.83360954       .04786150   -17.417   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.40330553       .05055160    -7.978   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.04775940       .04542185   -23.067   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.23461057       .04802947   -25.705   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .44494945       .06343360     7.014   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .06656795       .04934519     1.349   .1773    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.00554573       .04348539    23.124   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.08862510       .00023349  4662.323   .0000 
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Appendix 2.5: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M5 dataset 
 
Cobb-Douglas (Normal Distribution) 
 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; eff=ui_nCD$ 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 10:33:50PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 13     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5606.845     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.95363     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.95364     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.96676     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.95830     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .78690   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .92599   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .88707   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .96228   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.30877   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    10.0243692       .51171435    19.590   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.09181951       .09292105     -.988   .3231   12.4987458 
 LLAB    |    1.15090785       .08712791    13.209   .0000   3.31958432 
 LCAPS   |     .03393954       .00873846     3.884   .0001   80.1716606 
 LLABS   |    -.02167912       .01367843    -1.585   .1130   6.93701034 
 CAPL    |    -.02677198       .00831919    -3.218   .0013   43.5413882 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    1.08478339       .04532863    23.932   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.30877182       .00028580  4579.391   .0000 
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Translog (Normal Distribution) 
 
--> frontier;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_2009,manufa... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_n$ 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 10:34:18PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 27     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5127.682     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.70841     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.70847     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.74289     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.72066     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .68856   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .50091   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .82979   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .70775   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.09063   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.92883384       .46002482    21.583   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.02465934       .08281592     -.298   .7659   12.4987458 
 LLAB    |    1.15573796       .07802208    14.813   .0000   3.31958432 
 LCAPS   |     .02241629       .00781128     2.870   .0041   80.1716606 
 LLABS   |    -.03388140       .01226248    -2.763   .0057   6.93701034 
 CAPL    |    -.01859330       .00741880    -2.506   .0122   43.5413882 
 _2005   |     .45159302       .04129741    10.935   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .27827930       .04614032     6.031   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.19089240       .04435171    -4.304   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .15198830       .05795532     2.623   .0087    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.23790655       .06955669    -3.420   .0006    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .29222198       .04270763     6.842   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.58139747       .09605840    -6.053   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.75097892       .04991713   -15.045   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.46097993       .05265003    -8.756   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.09484642       .04723879   -23.177   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.17165878       .05005596   -23.407   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .44550028       .06601330     6.749   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .08487372       .05156086     1.646   .0997    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |     .85292082       .04225848    20.183   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.09062753       .00023426  4655.717   .0000 
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Appendix 3: The results of the Translog specification controlling for 
type of new owner after privatization  
Appendix 3.1: the results of the Translog specification assuming normal 
distribution controlling for type of new owner after privatization with 
M1 dataset 
frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,PriFORE,PRIDOM,monteneg,bosnia, 
croatia,serbia,macedoni$ 
 +---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 06:40:22PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 26     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5110.663     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.69945     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.69952     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.73394     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.71171     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .64669   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .59767   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .80417   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .77309   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.11551   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.24445231       .42734867    21.632   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .14526152       .07861374     1.848   .0646   12.5431453 
 LLAB    |    1.07139206       .07792357    13.749   .0000   3.31781158 
 LCAPS   |     .00589344       .00755100      .780   .4351   80.8575222 
 LLABS   |    -.03821490       .01244815    -3.070   .0021   6.93244022 
 CAPL    |    -.01011685       .00750717    -1.348   .1778   43.7796496 
 _2005   |     .38638908       .04077260     9.477   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .27425304       .04498254     6.097   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.22720540       .04414818    -5.146   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .05715483       .05731903      .997   .3187    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.30997040       .06890751    -4.498   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .26587155       .04224699     6.293   .0000    .34744871 
 PRIFORE |     .09369421       .03429511     2.732   .0063    .06259863 
 PRIDOM  |     .00643420       .02153120      .299   .7651    .57364545 
 MONTENEG|    -.85933812       .09568282    -8.981   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.83436096       .04987682   -16.728   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.40176581       .05242551    -7.664   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.04138828       .04747506   -21.935   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.18646067       .05029577   -23.590   .0000    .19358233 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |     .96135942       .04322480    22.241   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.11550880       .00024130  4622.946   .0000 
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Appendix 3.2: the results of the Translog specification assuming normal 
distribution controlling for type of new owner after privatization with 
M2 dataset 
frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,PriFORE,PRIDOM,monteneg,bosnia, 
croatia,serbia,macedoni$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 07:17:25PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 26     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5197.921     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.74536     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.74542     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.77984     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.75761     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .70855   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .53627   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .84175   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .73230   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.11571   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    10.1901714       .42765636    23.828   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .01107895       .07753883      .143   .8864   12.5520749 
 LLAB    |    1.00840133       .07676543    13.136   .0000   3.31500890 
 LCAPS   |     .01483082       .00738506     2.008   .0446   81.0507172 
 LLABS   |    -.03197476       .01260625    -2.536   .0112   6.92244484 
 CAPL    |    -.00673703       .00734928     -.917   .3593   43.8058639 
 _2005   |     .38827253       .04193361     9.259   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .26168286       .04649143     5.629   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.27417071       .04517413    -6.069   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.08204724       .05880153    -1.395   .1629    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.28521422       .07087446    -4.024   .0001    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .32402554       .04323916     7.494   .0000    .34744871 
 PRIFORE |     .10104955       .03529660     2.863   .0042    .06259863 
 PRIDOM  |     .01070030       .02204313      .485   .6274    .57364545 
 MONTENEG|    -.70563297       .09776108    -7.218   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.77053242       .05091469   -15.134   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.35538894       .05374291    -6.613   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |    -.99656719       .04872943   -20.451   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.18786447       .05113811   -23.229   .0000    .19358233 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |     .86997037       .04254438    20.449   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.11571345       .00024169  4616.240   .0000 
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Appendix 3.3: the results of the Translog specification assuming normal 
distribution controlling for type of new owner after privatization with 
M3 dataset 
frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,PriFORE,PRIDOM,monteneg,bosnia, 
croatia,serbia,macedoni$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 06:58:47PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 26     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5103.514     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.69569     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.69576     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.73018     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.70795     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .70947   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .41113   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .84230   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .64119   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.05858   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.92747150       .42098913    23.581   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.03985889       .07693916     -.518   .6044   12.4886891 
 LLAB    |    1.23048903       .07704591    15.971   .0000   3.31824505 
 LCAPS   |     .02662099       .00738688     3.604   .0003   80.1882398 
 LLABS   |    -.02465317       .01224126    -2.014   .0440   6.93183529 
 CAPL    |    -.02800861       .00735839    -3.806   .0001   43.6208371 
 _2005   |     .46458879       .04076662    11.396   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .19939627       .04486902     4.444   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.22835007       .04411885    -5.176   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.02517895       .05729382     -.439   .6603    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.27302968       .06900301    -3.957   .0001    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .34742840       .04219599     8.234   .0000    .34744871 
 PRIFORE |     .08638707       .03514192     2.458   .0140    .06259863 
 PRIDOM  |     .01752172       .02148473      .816   .4148    .57364545 
 MONTENEG|    -.67049212       .09544078    -7.025   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.77986115       .04942651   -15.778   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.36392899       .05243777    -6.940   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.00750620       .04714259   -21.371   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.17705103       .04968841   -23.689   .0000    .19358233 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |     .76124081       .04221625    18.032   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.05858374       .00022873  4628.073   .0000 
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Appendix 3.4: the results of the Translog specification assuming normal 
distribution controlling for type of new owner after privatization with 
M4 dataset 
frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,PriFORE,PRIDOM,monteneg,bosnia, 
croatia,serbia,macedoni$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 07:05:41PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 27     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5005.088     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.64392     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.64398     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.67840     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.65617     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .60223   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .59274   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .77603   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .76989   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.09314   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.89408057       .42390210    23.340   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.01888919       .07769519     -.243   .8079   12.4505278 
 LLAB    |    1.19557108       .07396926    16.163   .0000   3.31788738 
 LCAPS   |     .02705507       .00742636     3.643   .0003   79.6547910 
 LLABS   |    -.02825680       .01206383    -2.342   .0192   6.93107361 
 CAPL    |    -.02560002       .00713117    -3.590   .0003   43.4437872 
 _2005   |     .37348608       .03973423     9.400   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .19381005       .04378910     4.426   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.30061929       .04294625    -7.000   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.04553990       .05582823     -.816   .4147    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.32351618       .06698848    -4.829   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .26048453       .04107030     6.342   .0000    .34744871 
 PRIFORE |     .09753902       .03299544     2.956   .0031    .06259863 
 PRIDOM  |     .01451979       .02113956      .687   .4922    .57364545 
 MONTENEG|    -.71588268       .09339632    -7.665   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.84342875       .04810956   -17.531   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.39270677       .05102808    -7.696   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.04693728       .04576260   -22.878   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.23169337       .04835149   -25.474   .0000    .19358233 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |     .99208701       .04339529    22.862   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.09314424       .00023424  4666.709   .0000 
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Appendix 3.5: the results of the Translog specification assuming normal 
distribution controlling for type of new owner after privatization with 
M5 dataset 
frontier;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005, 
_2009,manufact,construc,hotel_an,wholesal,PriFORE,PRIDOM,monteneg,bosnia, 
croatia,serbia,macedoni$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Feb 18, 2013 at 07:12:35PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 26     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5152.972     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.72171     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.72177     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.75619     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.73397     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .69932   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .50317   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .83625   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .70934   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      1.09658   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    10.0839311       .46026717    21.909   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.03612127       .08331051     -.434   .6646   12.4987458 
 LLAB    |    1.16151633       .07855582    14.786   .0000   3.31958432 
 LCAPS   |     .02311800       .00785803     2.942   .0033   80.1716606 
 LLABS   |    -.03755807       .01230546    -3.052   .0023   6.93701034 
 CAPL    |    -.01765591       .00745989    -2.367   .0179   43.5413882 
 _2005   |     .44966830       .04127874    10.893   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .27512259       .04524592     6.081   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.18015913       .04457955    -4.041   .0001    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .13543706       .05802058     2.334   .0196    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.23584887       .07003246    -3.368   .0008    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .32092813       .04275391     7.506   .0000    .34744871 
 PRIFORE |     .08710026       .03498245     2.490   .0128    .06259863 
 PRIDOM  |    -.00612948       .02179648     -.281   .7785    .57364545 
 MONTENEG|    -.59649951       .09669328    -6.169   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.76321600       .05012285   -15.227   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.45312729       .05309399    -8.534   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.09645261       .04754323   -23.062   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.16791462       .05035914   -23.192   .0000    .19358233 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |     .84823799       .04231114    20.048   .0000 
 Sigma   |    1.09658075       .00023538  4658.838   .0000 
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Appendix 4: The results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications assuming truncated, exponential and gamma 
distribution 
Appendix 4.1: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M1 dataset 
Cobb-Douglas (Truncated Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_tCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Aug 31, 2012 at 08:00:41AM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 98     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5543.853     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.92102     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.92103     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.93580     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.92627     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .85401   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=     95.58804   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .92413   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      9.77691   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      9.82049   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.01332185       .46094753    19.554   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .03391324       .08198742      .414   .6791   12.5431453 
 LLAB    |    1.08529118       .07661979    14.165   .0000   3.31781158 
 LCAPS   |     .02369405       .00755927     3.134   .0017   80.8575222 
 LLABS   |    -.01410013       .01191442    -1.183   .2366   6.93244022 
 CAPL    |    -.02443000       .00692118    -3.530   .0004   43.7796496 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -195.538266      3539.80180     -.055   .9559 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    10.5796168      94.3685052      .112   .9107 
 Sigma   |    9.82049147      87.0189787      .113   .9101 
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Translog (Truncated Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_t$ 
Maximum iterations reached. Exit iterations with status=1. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Aug 31, 2012 at 08:01:16AM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5070.980     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.67911     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.67918     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.71523     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.69194     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .66297   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=     73.60286   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .81423   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      8.57921   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      8.61776   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.07255730       .42550297    21.322   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .12496173       .07325720     1.706   .0880   12.5431453 
 LLAB    |    1.09828941       .06938247    15.829   .0000   3.31781158 
 LCAPS   |     .00867539       .00664602     1.305   .1918   80.8575222 
 LLABS   |    -.03024427       .01037991    -2.914   .0036   6.93244022 
 CAPL    |    -.01499744       .00611377    -2.453   .0142   43.7796496 
 _2005   |     .39280294       .04506296     8.717   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .29906413       .04657095     6.422   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.24354994       .04599457    -5.295   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .06549737       .05889791     1.112   .2661    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.32613509       .07559026    -4.315   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .23341356       .04095187     5.700   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.85281010       .08456684   -10.084   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.82251761       .05119294   -16.067   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.41144369       .05713282    -7.202   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.03236397       .04849133   -21.290   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.18011643       .05110071   -23.094   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .42636631       .07081939     6.020   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .06808053       .05694039     1.196   .2318    .77880063 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -168.903388      2002.04733     -.084   .9328 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    10.5365763      61.3825857      .172   .8637 
 Sigma   |    8.61776276      49.9028304      .173   .8629 
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Cobb-Douglas (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_eCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Aug 31, 2012 at 08:02:37AM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 11     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5543.768     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.92045     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.92046     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.93358     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.92511     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .85379   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .23473   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .92401   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .48449   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.01057532       .47752457    18.869   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .03402777       .08792117      .387   .6987   12.5431453 
 LLAB    |    1.08544358       .08773153    12.372   .0000   3.31781158 
 LCAPS   |     .02368901       .00845160     2.803   .0051   80.8575222 
 LLABS   |    -.01408338       .01410798     -.998   .3182   6.93244022 
 CAPL    |    -.02444808       .00858817    -2.847   .0044   43.7796496 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.06402389       .16433772    12.560   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .92400926       .02004093    46.106   .0000 
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Translog (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_e$ 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Aug 31, 2012 at 08:03:09AM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 25     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5070.767     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.67847     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.67853     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.71295     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.69072     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .66125   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .18659   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .81317   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .43197   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.06490214       .42684642    21.237   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .12579602       .07831946     1.606   .1082   12.5431453 
 LLAB    |    1.09859956       .07858090    13.980   .0000   3.31781158 
 LCAPS   |     .00862599       .00757723     1.138   .2549   80.8575222 
 LLABS   |    -.03021268       .01270030    -2.379   .0174   6.93244022 
 CAPL    |    -.01503051       .00770560    -1.951   .0511   43.7796496 
 _2005   |     .39249633       .04033087     9.732   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .29834041       .04573638     6.523   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.24333565       .04348077    -5.596   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .06544649       .05663008     1.156   .2478    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.32583859       .06746629    -4.830   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .23328994       .04187641     5.571   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.85288483       .09454401    -9.021   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.82258300       .04910714   -16.751   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.41153019       .05119393    -8.039   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.03227520       .04669800   -22.105   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.18005465       .04955742   -23.812   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .42713972       .06442321     6.630   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .06879647       .05021498     1.370   .1707    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.31499516       .16775180    13.800   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .81317073       .01662937    48.900   .0000 
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Cobb-Douglas (Gamma Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_gCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Aug 31, 2012 at 08:12:24AM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 13     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5543.768     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.92097     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.92098     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.93575     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.92622     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .85357   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .23495   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .92389   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .48471   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.01160753       .45885798    19.639   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .03403357       .08190301      .416   .6778   12.5431453 
 LLAB    |    1.08542048       .07654926    14.179   .0000   3.31781158 
 LCAPS   |     .02368800       .00755271     3.136   .0017   80.8575222 
 LLABS   |    -.01408556       .01185242    -1.188   .2347   6.93244022 
 CAPL    |    -.02444573       .00691134    -3.537   .0004   43.7796496 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.06654100       .16212262    12.747   .0000 
 P       |    1.00335802       .13403210     7.486   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .92389050       .01952866    47.309   .0000 
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Translog (Gamma Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_g$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Aug 31, 2012 at 08:36:33AM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 26     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5070.762     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.67899     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.67906     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.71512     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.69183     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .66183   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .18602   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .81353   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .43131   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.06133839       .42306519    21.418   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .12574074       .07305972     1.721   .0852   12.5431453 
 LLAB    |    1.09873293       .06923533    15.870   .0000   3.31781158 
 LCAPS   |     .00863272       .00662734     1.303   .1927   80.8575222 
 LLABS   |    -.03019406       .01028298    -2.936   .0033   6.93244022 
 CAPL    |    -.01504506       .00608487    -2.473   .0134   43.7796496 
 _2005   |     .39252056       .04491900     8.738   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .29841967       .04635363     6.438   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.24334738       .04584707    -5.308   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .06542575       .05871755     1.114   .2652    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.32587698       .07534633    -4.325   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .23326173       .04078802     5.719   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.85295987       .08427088   -10.122   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.82258160       .05105143   -16.113   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.41152330       .05695503    -7.225   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.03224925       .04836182   -21.344   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.18003337       .05096145   -23.155   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .42717118       .07053591     6.056   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .06880780       .05676258     1.212   .2254    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.30203378       .15735198    14.630   .0000 
 P       |     .98580922       .13049087     7.555   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .81352782       .01652887    49.219   .0000 
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Appendix 4.2: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M2 dataset 
 
Cobb-Douglas (Truncated Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_tCD$ 
 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 08:28:48PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 97     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5630.331     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.96651     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.96652     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.98129     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.97176     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .87838   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=    106.88996   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .93722   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =     10.33876   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=     10.38115   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.91398564       .47452427    20.892   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.07184324       .08331848     -.862   .3885   12.5520749 
 LLAB    |    1.03087879       .07335667    14.053   .0000   3.31500890 
 LCAPS   |     .03012695       .00756867     3.980   .0001   81.0507172 
 LLABS   |    -.00772681       .01142077     -.677   .4987   6.92244484 
 CAPL    |    -.02224674       .00641685    -3.467   .0005   43.8058639 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -206.775198      4203.13614     -.049   .9608 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    11.0313440      110.620405      .100   .9206 
 Sigma   |    10.3811527      103.462366      .100   .9201 
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Translog (Truncated Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_t$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 08:29:33PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5154.468     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.72302     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.72309     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.75915     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.73586     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .71104   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=     66.23501   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .84323   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      8.13849   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      8.18206   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.93335890       .44353366    22.396   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .00706560       .07602335      .093   .9260   12.5520749 
 LLAB    |    1.04378435       .06677208    15.632   .0000   3.31500890 
 LCAPS   |     .01639113       .00682819     2.401   .0164   81.0507172 
 LLABS   |    -.02194631       .01003906    -2.186   .0288   6.92244484 
 CAPL    |    -.01289469       .00573674    -2.248   .0246   43.8058639 
 _2005   |     .39629428       .04587149     8.639   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .29759196       .04720235     6.305   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.29320862       .04698271    -6.241   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.06792307       .06282433    -1.081   .2796    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.30064214       .07761641    -3.873   .0001    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .28666509       .04251447     6.743   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.69434286       .08816641    -7.875   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.75637226       .05365784   -14.096   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.36672670       .05942081    -6.172   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |    -.98966307       .05106846   -19.379   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.18171648       .05303862   -22.280   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .48085006       .07267794     6.616   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .07352367       .05806715     1.266   .2054    .77880063 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -157.390037      2033.60811     -.077   .9383 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    9.65157302      61.2287898      .158   .8747 
 Sigma   |    8.18205622      51.5040567      .159   .8738 
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Cobb-Douglas (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_eCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 08:30:46PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 11     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5630.254     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.96594     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.96595     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.97908     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.97061     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .87833   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .26239   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .93719   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .51224   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.91293354       .47150831    21.024   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.07209765       .08599289     -.838   .4018   12.5520749 
 LLAB    |    1.03135178       .08607605    11.982   .0000   3.31500890 
 LCAPS   |     .03016423       .00822659     3.667   .0002   81.0507172 
 LLABS   |    -.00763469       .01431089     -.533   .5937   6.92244484 
 CAPL    |    -.02231249       .00843328    -2.646   .0082   43.8058639 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    1.95221342       .14610552    13.362   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .93719270       .02038580    45.973   .0000 
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Translog (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_e$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 08:31:29PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 25     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5154.251     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.72238     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.72245     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.75687     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.73464     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .70937   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .17491   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .84224   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .41822   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.94933551       .42536919    23.390   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .00422764       .07677502      .055   .9561   12.5520749 
 LLAB    |    1.04501857       .07687660    13.593   .0000   3.31500890 
 LCAPS   |     .01665816       .00736336     2.262   .0237   81.0507172 
 LLABS   |    -.02169644       .01284831    -1.689   .0913   6.92244484 
 CAPL    |    -.01305712       .00750639    -1.739   .0820   43.8058639 
 _2005   |     .39667330       .04148400     9.562   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .29804622       .04713064     6.324   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.29255675       .04446398    -6.580   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.06776184       .05805763    -1.167   .2432    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.30068084       .06948171    -4.327   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .28648334       .04283891     6.687   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.69451343       .09648241    -7.198   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.75750959       .05014871   -15.105   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.36762435       .05246608    -7.007   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |    -.98986987       .04798231   -20.630   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.18271497       .05047689   -23.431   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .48135689       .06602689     7.290   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .07298111       .05147722     1.418   .1563    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.39108589       .18973407    12.602   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .84223862       .01701005    49.514   .0000 
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Cobb-Douglas (Gamma Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_gCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 08:42:13PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 13     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5630.254     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.96647     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.96648     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.98125     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.97172     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .87837   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .26235   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .93722   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .51220   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.91274174       .47447091    20.892   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.07209985       .08316083     -.867   .3859   12.5520749 
 LLAB    |    1.03135683       .07330653    14.069   .0000   3.31500890 
 LCAPS   |     .03016457       .00755967     3.990   .0001   81.0507172 
 LLABS   |    -.00763416       .01139428     -.670   .5029   6.92244484 
 CAPL    |    -.02231305       .00640966    -3.481   .0005   43.8058639 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    1.95178754       .15373910    12.695   .0000 
 P       |     .99939953       .13433641     7.440   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .93721622       .02042741    45.880   .0000 
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Translog (Gamma Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_g$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:02:38PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 27     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5154.251     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.72291     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.72298     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.75904     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.73575     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .70946   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .17481   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .84230   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .41810   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.94874601       .44242218    22.487   .0000 
 LCAP    |     .00421485       .07595001      .055   .9557   12.5520749 
 LLAB    |    1.04504235       .06671616    15.664   .0000   3.31500890 
 LCAPS   |     .01665982       .00682430     2.441   .0146   81.0507172 
 LLABS   |    -.02169334       .00999220    -2.171   .0299   6.92244484 
 CAPL    |    -.01305982       .00572644    -2.281   .0226   43.8058639 
 _2005   |     .39667517       .04575325     8.670   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .29805653       .04710753     6.327   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.29256277       .04692416    -6.235   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.06776529       .06272281    -1.080   .2800    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.30068538       .07749167    -3.880   .0001    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .28647609       .04237949     6.760   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.69452198       .08801618    -7.891   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.75750883       .05354609   -14.147   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.36762366       .05933070    -6.196   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |    -.98986369       .05095258   -19.427   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.18270974       .05287696   -22.367   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .48136145       .07250908     6.639   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .07298160       .05800440     1.258   .2083    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.38880247       .16921832    14.117   .0000 
 P       |     .99754124       .13266517     7.519   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .84229586       .01654095    50.922   .0000 
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Appendix 4.3: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M3 dataset 
 
Cobb-Douglas (Truncated Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_tCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:03:41PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5573.815     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.93678     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.93679     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.95156     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.94203     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .86781   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=     95.05430   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .93156   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      9.74958   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      9.79398   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.43809825       .47951942    19.682   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.04405302       .08620476     -.511   .6093   12.4886891 
 LLAB    |    1.21981128       .07951957    15.340   .0000   3.31824505 
 LCAPS   |     .03281816       .00803008     4.087   .0000   80.1882398 
 LLABS   |     .00452511       .01140122      .397   .6914   6.93183529 
 CAPL    |    -.04096727       .00716954    -5.714   .0000   43.6208371 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -193.163414      3385.94514     -.057   .9545 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    10.4658165      90.3422468      .116   .9078 
 Sigma   |    9.79398361      83.9815866      .117   .9072 
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Translog (Truncated Distribution) 
 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_t$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:04:45PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5075.362     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.68141     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.68148     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.71754     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.69425     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .69927   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=     60.14154   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .83622   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      7.75510   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      7.80005   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.85477407       .44177959    22.307   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.04964251       .07796696     -.637   .5243   12.4886891 
 LLAB    |    1.25324093       .07035916    17.812   .0000   3.31824505 
 LCAPS   |     .02805343       .00715838     3.919   .0001   80.1882398 
 LLABS   |    -.01825942       .01010899    -1.806   .0709   6.93183529 
 CAPL    |    -.03229185       .00622109    -5.191   .0000   43.6208371 
 _2005   |     .48105194       .04465601    10.772   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .25222711       .04645163     5.430   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.23977597       .04535369    -5.287   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.01569570       .05895748     -.266   .7901    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.28920211       .07490968    -3.861   .0001    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .32020971       .04118579     7.775   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.65720302       .08519481    -7.714   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.77129627       .05231507   -14.743   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.36707239       .05763247    -6.369   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |    -.99961962       .05002849   -19.981   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.16475175       .05191431   -22.436   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .29746205       .06818787     4.362   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|    -.01841650       .05445411     -.338   .7352    .77880063 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -155.101659      1997.30062     -.078   .9381 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    9.27394088      58.6175487      .158   .8743 
 Sigma   |    7.80005178      48.8744972      .160   .8732 
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Cobb-Douglas (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_eCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:14:48PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 12     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5573.722     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.93620     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.93621     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.94934     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.94087     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .86760   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .23813   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .93145   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .48799   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.43556487       .47070678    20.046   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.04379637       .08665498     -.505   .6133   12.4886891 
 LLAB    |    1.21944822       .08726505    13.974   .0000   3.31824505 
 LCAPS   |     .03280250       .00834215     3.932   .0001   80.1882398 
 LLABS   |     .00466001       .01401057      .333   .7394   6.93183529 
 CAPL    |    -.04097513       .00848316    -4.830   .0000   43.6208371 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.04923004       .16168051    12.675   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .93144970       .02002594    46.512   .0000 
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Translog (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_e$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:15:17PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 26     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5075.152     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.68077     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.68084     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.71526     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.69303     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .69849   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .14818   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .83576   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .38495   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.85587652       .41974061    23.481   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.04981131       .07628277     -.653   .5138   12.4886891 
 LLAB    |    1.25271444       .07710431    16.247   .0000   3.31824505 
 LCAPS   |     .02806050       .00736322     3.811   .0001   80.1882398 
 LLABS   |    -.01826720       .01248511    -1.463   .1434   6.93183529 
 CAPL    |    -.03224842       .00748259    -4.310   .0000   43.6208371 
 _2005   |     .48119827       .04052719    11.873   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .25221364       .04572511     5.516   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.23965865       .04366601    -5.488   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.01535276       .05689257     -.270   .7873    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.28897051       .06803592    -4.247   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .32070295       .04197975     7.639   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.65766382       .09476280    -6.940   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.77190351       .04891142   -15.782   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.36764895       .05151149    -7.137   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.00057771       .04660515   -21.469   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.16506881       .04922271   -23.669   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .29695049       .06490940     4.575   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|    -.01878997       .05055682     -.372   .7101    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.59775586       .22297091    11.651   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .83575904       .01635777    51.092   .0000 
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Cobb-Douglas (Gamma Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_gCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:32:52PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 13     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5573.722     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.93673     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.93674     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.95151     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.94198     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .86753   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .23820   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .93141   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .48806   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.43589129       .47754197    19.759   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.04379218       .08613969     -.508   .6112   12.4886891 
 LLAB    |    1.21943855       .07950033    15.339   .0000   3.31824505 
 LCAPS   |     .03280193       .00802608     4.087   .0000   80.1882398 
 LLABS   |     .00465894       .01137985      .409   .6822   6.93183529 
 CAPL    |    -.04097412       .00716638    -5.718   .0000   43.6208371 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.05003940       .16052248    12.771   .0000 
 P       |    1.00108714       .13368931     7.488   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .93141105       .02008292    46.378   .0000 
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Translog (Gamma Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_g$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:51:57PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 29     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5075.151     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.68130     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.68137     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.71743     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.69414     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .69836   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .14832   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .83568   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .38512   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.85681989       .43949951    22.427   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.04979583       .07790446     -.639   .5227   12.4886891 
 LLAB    |    1.25268191       .07031980    17.814   .0000   3.31824505 
 LCAPS   |     .02805857       .00715313     3.923   .0001   80.1882398 
 LLABS   |    -.01827307       .01002435    -1.823   .0683   6.93183529 
 CAPL    |    -.03224444       .00620850    -5.194   .0000   43.6208371 
 _2005   |     .48119641       .04458772    10.792   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .25219007       .04627968     5.449   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.23964944       .04530905    -5.289   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.01533920       .05889055     -.260   .7945    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.28895785       .07478995    -3.864   .0001    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .32071697       .04114482     7.795   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.65765668       .08511161    -7.727   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.77190976       .05223120   -14.779   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.36765381       .05756933    -6.386   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.00059018       .04996386   -20.026   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.16508067       .05179360   -22.495   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .29694126       .06801903     4.366   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|    -.01879266       .05439921     -.345   .7297    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.60214606       .18716878    13.903   .0000 
 P       |    1.00428156       .13288985     7.557   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .83568119       .01558942    53.606   .0000 
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Appendix 4.4: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M4 dataset 
 
Cobb-Douglas (Truncated Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_tCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:30:35PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5503.424     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.89975     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.89976     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.91453     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.90500     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .82714   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=     96.52697   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .90947   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      9.82481   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      9.86682   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.18602655       .46949775    19.566   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.01027587       .08479354     -.121   .9035   12.4505278 
 LLAB    |    1.10311724       .07661975    14.397   .0000   3.31788738 
 LCAPS   |     .03022229       .00792341     3.814   .0001   79.6547910 
 LLABS   |    -.01295800       .01177162    -1.101   .2710   6.93107360 
 CAPL    |    -.02832914       .00689247    -4.110   .0000   43.4437872 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -195.308436      2912.53916     -.067   .9465 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    10.8027334      79.2830244      .136   .8916 
 Sigma   |    9.86681893      71.9912500      .137   .8910 
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Translog (Truncated Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_t$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:33:31PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 95     | 
| Log likelihood function       -4957.944     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.61964     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.61972     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.65577     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.63248     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .62408   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=     71.36356   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .78998   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      8.44770   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      8.48455   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.55712815       .42980546    22.236   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.00780056       .07583614     -.103   .9181   12.4505278 
 LLAB    |    1.20832900       .06681687    18.084   .0000   3.31788738 
 LCAPS   |     .02685122       .00696099     3.857   .0001   79.6547910 
 LLABS   |    -.02095151       .01015161    -2.064   .0390   6.93107360 
 CAPL    |    -.02924772       .00585869    -4.992   .0000   43.4437872 
 _2005   |     .38262874       .04340890     8.815   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .22463794       .04403717     5.101   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.31919453       .04401111    -7.253   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.03594596       .05762588     -.624   .5328    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.33913837       .07235030    -4.687   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .22400871       .04024726     5.566   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.71183098       .08353789    -8.521   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.83210012       .04927408   -16.887   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.40329840       .05402472    -7.465   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.03888635       .04666673   -22.262   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.22721844       .04883185   -25.132   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .45466437       .06858944     6.629   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .06942601       .05424208     1.280   .2006    .77880063 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -168.953916      1696.62694     -.100   .9207 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    10.6934954      52.7154826      .203   .8392 
 Sigma   |    8.48455301      41.6002794      .204   .8384 
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Cobb-Douglas (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_eCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:35:36PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 12     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5503.312     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.89916     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.89917     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.91230     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.90383     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .82669   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .23974   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .90923   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .48963   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.18450915       .47827500    19.203   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.01033689       .08786282     -.118   .9063   12.4505278 
 LLAB    |    1.10333152       .08399026    13.136   .0000   3.31788738 
 LCAPS   |     .03023134       .00841658     3.592   .0003   79.6547910 
 LLABS   |    -.01294482       .01381235     -.937   .3487   6.93107360 
 CAPL    |    -.02835382       .00823311    -3.444   .0006   43.4437872 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.04235170       .15377934    13.281   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .90922757       .01948466    46.664   .0000 
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Translog (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_e$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:36:17PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 25     | 
| Log likelihood function       -4957.703     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.61899     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.61906     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.65348     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.63125     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .62371   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .17508   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .78975   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .41842   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.55699717       .42189053    22.653   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.00818138       .07699456     -.106   .9154   12.4505278 
 LLAB    |    1.20914539       .07390897    16.360   .0000   3.31788738 
 LCAPS   |     .02687637       .00740134     3.631   .0003   79.6547910 
 LLABS   |    -.02110859       .01223351    -1.725   .0844   6.93107360 
 CAPL    |    -.02924960       .00724241    -4.039   .0001   43.4437872 
 _2005   |     .38272849       .03925264     9.750   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .22450063       .04410020     5.091   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.31908224       .04224171    -7.554   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.03555264       .05507348     -.646   .5186    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.33920911       .06550334    -5.179   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .22377839       .04063803     5.507   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.71194664       .09176406    -7.758   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.83274767       .04725885   -17.621   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.40385513       .04978713    -8.112   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.03931303       .04498802   -23.102   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.22750268       .04757308   -25.802   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .45431303       .06257707     7.260   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .06940811       .04869309     1.425   .1540    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.38991789       .17036192    14.028   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .78975480       .01587022    49.763   .0000 
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Cobb-Douglas (Gamma Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_gCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 09:53:25PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 14     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5503.308     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.89969     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.89970     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.91447     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.90494     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .82753   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .23892   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .90969   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .48879   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.18059177       .46625849    19.690   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.01036344       .08467718     -.122   .9026   12.4505278 
 LLAB    |    1.10341451       .07652459    14.419   .0000   3.31788738 
 LCAPS   |     .03023585       .00791082     3.822   .0001   79.6547910 
 LLABS   |    -.01294091       .01173626    -1.103   .2702   6.93107360 
 CAPL    |    -.02836140       .00687758    -4.124   .0000   43.4437872 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.03297727       .15073288    13.487   .0000 
 P       |     .98744913       .13059249     7.561   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .90968838       .01918492    47.417   .0000 
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Translog (Gamma Distribution) 
 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_g$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 10:20:57PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 27     | 
| Log likelihood function       -4957.689     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.61951     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.61958     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.65564     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.63235     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .62467   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .17413   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .79036   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .41729   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.55101418       .42584874    22.428   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.00824868       .07560761     -.109   .9131   12.4505278 
 LLAB    |    1.20929858       .06673896    18.120   .0000   3.31788738 
 LCAPS   |     .02688502       .00693760     3.875   .0001   79.6547910 
 LLABS   |    -.02109593       .01010581    -2.088   .0368   6.93107360 
 CAPL    |    -.02926417       .00584318    -5.008   .0000   43.4437872 
 _2005   |     .38276141       .04325767     8.848   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .22457370       .04394620     5.110   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.31914272       .04394342    -7.263   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|    -.03560222       .05754943     -.619   .5362    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.33926706       .07226746    -4.695   .0000    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .22371797       .04015206     5.572   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.71205753       .08336257    -8.542   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.83272999       .04920146   -16.925   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.40385350       .05392954    -7.489   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.03924048       .04660264   -22.300   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.22744589       .04874120   -25.183   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .45435400       .06843696     6.639   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .06941659       .05410126     1.283   .1995    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.36771981       .15228653    15.548   .0000 
 P       |     .97618946       .12759467     7.651   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .79036115       .01558858    50.701   .0000 
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Appendix 4.5: the results of the Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications with M5 dataset 
 
Cobb-Douglas (Truncated Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_tCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 10:35:10PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5598.443     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.94973     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.94975     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.96451     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.95499     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .88065   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=     93.54861   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .93843   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      9.67205   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      9.71747   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.77457961       .51796585    18.871   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.10010381       .09171629    -1.091   .2751   12.4987458 
 LLAB    |    1.16664839       .08302849    14.051   .0000   3.31958432 
 LCAPS   |     .03499595       .00841312     4.160   .0000   80.1716606 
 LLABS   |    -.02058368       .01196480    -1.720   .0854   6.93701034 
 CAPL    |    -.02829581       .00727061    -3.892   .0001   43.5413882 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -189.166772      3159.78142     -.060   .9523 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    10.3066576      84.7487291      .122   .9032 
 Sigma   |    9.71747151      79.3523819      .122   .9025 
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Translog (Truncated Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=t;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_t$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 10:37:46PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5113.210     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.70132     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.70139     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.73745     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.71416     | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .70489   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=     63.13685   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .83958   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =      7.94587   | 
| Sigma = Sqr[(s^2(u)+s^2(v)]=      7.99010   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.77258386       .46850490    20.859   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.02964060       .08138412     -.364   .7157   12.4987458 
 LLAB    |    1.17287091       .07459879    15.722   .0000   3.31958432 
 LCAPS   |     .02329466       .00739047     3.152   .0016   80.1716606 
 LLABS   |    -.03081363       .01054974    -2.921   .0035   6.93701034 
 CAPL    |    -.02079859       .00640030    -3.250   .0012   43.5413882 
 _2005   |     .45010740       .04604949     9.774   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .29326605       .04809036     6.098   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.19928121       .04592698    -4.339   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .14043116       .06033050     2.328   .0199    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.24911241       .07648954    -3.257   .0011    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .28347039       .04158188     6.817   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.58463218       .08530916    -6.853   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.74843805       .05208105   -14.371   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.46227360       .05944452    -7.777   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.08675658       .05011138   -21.687   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.16573396       .05186451   -22.477   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .45140330       .07122701     6.338   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .08639572       .05596846     1.544   .1227    .77880063 
---------+Offset [mean=mu(i)] parameters in one sided error 
 Mu      |   -156.330019      1938.73361     -.081   .9357 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Lambda  |    9.46413342      57.5893865      .164   .8695 
 Sigma   |    7.99010269      48.2278149      .166   .8684 
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Cobb-Douglas (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_eCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 10:39:09PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 12     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5598.342     | 
| Number of parameters                  8     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.94915     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.94916     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.96229     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.95382     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .88025   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .23979   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .93821   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .48968   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.76200220       .51294126    19.031   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.09856394       .09304571    -1.059   .2895   12.4987458 
 LLAB    |    1.16704650       .08761507    13.320   .0000   3.31958432 
 LCAPS   |     .03489906       .00878382     3.973   .0001   80.1716606 
 LLABS   |    -.02044628       .01388469    -1.473   .1409   6.93701034 
 CAPL    |    -.02836914       .00846514    -3.351   .0008   43.5413882 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.04214205       .16108718    12.677   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .93821428       .02005652    46.779   .0000 
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Translog (Exponential Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=e;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_e$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 10:39:55PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 25     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5112.985     | 
| Number of parameters                 21     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.70068     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.70074     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.73516     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.71293     | 
| Exponential frontier model                  | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .70440   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .16000   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .83928   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .40001   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.77898616       .45821395    21.342   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.03088922       .08249503     -.374   .7081   12.4987458 
 LLAB    |    1.17163460       .07811374    14.999   .0000   3.31958432 
 LCAPS   |     .02338483       .00781246     2.993   .0028   80.1716606 
 LLABS   |    -.03071856       .01245914    -2.466   .0137   6.93701034 
 CAPL    |    -.02074403       .00753189    -2.754   .0059   43.5413882 
 _2005   |     .44974251       .04082219    11.017   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .29337513       .04594888     6.385   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.19854853       .04398350    -4.514   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .14109501       .05739916     2.458   .0140    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.24841327       .06880293    -3.611   .0003    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .28408927       .04241359     6.698   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.58134369       .09594759    -6.059   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.74782472       .04947455   -15.115   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.46153948       .05194290    -8.886   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.08596841       .04689544   -23.157   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.16486549       .04971159   -23.432   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .45213636       .06531608     6.922   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .08618693       .05100506     1.690   .0911    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.49996166       .20471418    12.212   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .83928486       .01649878    50.870   .0000 
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Cobb-Douglas (Gamma Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl; 
eff=ui_gCD$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 10:49:45PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 13     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5598.342     | 
| Number of parameters                  9     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.94968     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.94969     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.96446     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.95493     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .88031   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .23972   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .93825   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .48962   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.76170005       .51317938    19.022   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.09856580       .09158887    -1.076   .2818   12.4987458 
 LLAB    |    1.16705256       .08292192    14.074   .0000   3.31958432 
 LCAPS   |     .03489934       .00839990     4.155   .0000   80.1716606 
 LLABS   |    -.02044581       .01194272    -1.712   .0869   6.93701034 
 CAPL    |    -.02836972       .00726267    -3.906   .0001   43.5413882 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.04142910       .15721501    12.985   .0000 
 P       |     .99902936       .13304050     7.509   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .93824967       .01978171    47.430   .0000 
 
  
Appendices 
351 
 
Translog (Gamma Distribution) 
--> frontier;model=g;lhs=Lnout; 
rhs=one,lcap,llab,lcaps,llabs,capl,_2005,_200... 
    monteneg,bosnia,croatia,serbia,macedoni,private_,private0;eff=ui_g$ 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Limited Dependent Variable Model - FRONTIER | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Sep 01, 2012 at 11:06:51PM.| 
| Dependent variable                LNOUT     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             3802     | 
| Iterations completed                 27     | 
| Log likelihood function       -5112.985     | 
| Number of parameters                 22     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.70120     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.70127     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          2.73733     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          2.71404     | 
| Normal-Gamma frontier model                 | 
| Variances: Sigma-squared(v)=       .70445   | 
|            Sigma-squared(u)=       .15996   | 
|            Sigma(v)        =       .83931   | 
|            Sigma(u)        =       .39995   | 
| Stochastic Production Frontier, e=v-u.      | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Primary Index Equation for Model 
 Constant|    9.77866324       .46447599    21.053   .0000 
 LCAP    |    -.03089175       .08128810     -.380   .7039   12.4987458 
 LLAB    |    1.17164226       .07451175    15.724   .0000   3.31958432 
 LCAPS   |     .02338523       .00737798     3.170   .0015   80.1716606 
 LLABS   |    -.03071720       .01046270    -2.936   .0033   6.93701034 
 CAPL    |    -.02074498       .00637899    -3.252   .0011   43.5413882 
 _2005   |     .44974352       .04592913     9.792   .0000    .30483956 
 _2009   |     .29338131       .04794010     6.120   .0000    .43819043 
 MANUFACT|    -.19855076       .04586842    -4.329   .0000    .27275118 
 CONSTRUC|     .14109214       .06024758     2.342   .0192    .10362967 
 HOTEL_AN|    -.24841557       .07632458    -3.255   .0011    .06102052 
 WHOLESAL|     .28408567       .04152279     6.842   .0000    .34744871 
 MONTENEG|    -.58134656       .08524127    -6.820   .0000    .03051026 
 BOSNIA  |    -.74782405       .05200986   -14.379   .0000    .19542346 
 CROATIA |    -.46153940       .05932665    -7.780   .0000    .15307733 
 SERBIA  |   -1.08596518       .05004583   -21.699   .0000    .24671226 
 MACEDONI|   -1.16486382       .05179372   -22.490   .0000    .19358233 
 PRIVATE_|     .45213829       .07093243     6.374   .0000    .10126249 
 PRIVATE0|     .08618758       .05591954     1.541   .1232    .77880063 
---------+Variance parameters for compound error 
 Theta   |    2.49867970       .17283804    14.457   .0000 
 P       |     .99867064       .13208999     7.561   .0000 
 Sigmav  |     .83931353       .01600673    52.435   .0000 
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Appendix 5: Confidence interval for technical inefficiencies in all five 
imputed datasets (M1-M5) 
M1: 
 
M2: 
 
M3: 
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M4: 
 
M5: 
 
Source: Author’s own drawing based on LIMDEP outputs 
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Appendix 6: Stata output of pscore run  
 
. pscore  treat  region manufacturing  services export_dummy age_of_company, pscore(ps 
> ) blockid(blockf1) comsup level(0.001) 
 
 
****************************************************  
Algorithm to estimate the propensity score  
****************************************************  
 
 
The treatment is treat 
 
      treat |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      4,466       87.04       87.04 
          1 |        665       12.96      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      5,131      100.00 
 
 
 
Estimation of the propensity score  
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -1870.983 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1660.9382 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1655.0974 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1655.0652 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1655.0652 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       4816 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =     431.84 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1655.0652                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1154 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       treat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      region |   .3347895   .0628078     5.33   0.000     .4578905    .2116884 
manufactur~g |   .8674654   .0666854    13.01   0.000     .7367644    .9981665 
    services |   .3133977   .0656506     4.77   0.000     .1847249    .4420705 
export_dummy |   .2980906   .0583884     5.11   0.000     .1836514    .4125297 
year_of_es~t |   .0420903   .0037851    11.12   0.000     .0346717    .0495089 
       _cons |  -85.78173   7.579934   -11.32   0.000    -100.6381   -70.92533 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Note: the common support option has been selected 
The region of common support is [.08519401, .87855251] 
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Appendix 7: description of the estimated propensity score in the 
region of common support 
 
 
                 Estimated propensity score 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .0072855       .0016095 
 5%       .02159       .0016095 
10%     .0334084       .0016095       Obs                4816 
25%     .0595017       .0016095       Sum of Wgt.        4816 
 
50%     .0989317                      Mean           .1324371 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .1029051 
75%     .1611916       .4606557 
90%     .3023156       .4606557       Variance       .0105895 
95%     .3457308       .4606557       Skewness       1.337436 
99%     .4439854       .4606557       Kurtosis       4.195004 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 8: test results of the balancing property as well as the 
tabulated final distribution of privatized and non-privatized 
companies across blocs  
 
******************************************************  
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks  
Use option detail if you want more detailed output  
******************************************************  
 
 
The final number of blocks is 8 
 
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score 
is not different for treated and controls in each blocks 
 
 
**********************************************************  
Step 2: Test of balancing property of the propensity score  
Use option detail if you want more detailed output  
**********************************************************  
 
 
 
The balancing property is satisfied  
 
 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated 
and the number of controls for each block  
 
 
 
  Inferior | 
  of block |         treat 
of pscore  |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |       711         45 |       756  
       .05 |       931         21 |       952  
      .075 |       703         81 |       784  
        .1 |     1,162        202 |     1,364  
        .2 |       386         63 |       449  
        .3 |       170        117 |       287  
       .35 |        50          6 |        56  
        .4 |        48        120 |       168  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     4,161        655 |     4,816  
 
Note: the common support option has been selected 
 
 
*******************************************  
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore  
******************************************* 
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Appendix 9: regression results of specification 6.6 
 
. xtreg lnturn PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_tre 
> at_Foreign p_treat_SpecialSO , fe i(number) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      4816 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0348                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.1105                                        avg =       7.0 
       overall = 0.0848                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(7,4121)          =     21.25 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2492                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           lnturn |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PostTreatment |   .1792926   .0350849     5.11   0.000     .1105072    .2480779 
      p_treat_Man |  -.1038937   .0463616    -2.24   0.025    -.1947874   -.0129999 
     p_treat_Serv |  -.1405732   .0548661    -2.56   0.010    -.2481403   -.0330061 
      p_treat_Reg |  -.0227193   .0516617    -0.44   0.660     -.124004    .0785655 
   p_treat_Export |   .1177943   .0454124     2.59   0.010     .0287615    .2068271 
  p_treat_Foreign |  -.1494783   .0546229    -2.74   0.006    -.2565686   -.0423881 
p_treat_SpecialSO |   .3193365   .0539774     5.92   0.000     .2135117    .4251612 
            _cons |   9.475743   .0043735  2166.62   0.000     9.467169    9.484318 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          sigma_u |  1.6734936 
          sigma_e |  .24923323 
              rho |  .97830117   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(687, 4121) =   289.65           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 10: Wald test for heteroskedasticity 
 
. xttest3 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (688)  =   1.6e+06 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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Appendix 11: the improved results with robust standard errors  
 
. xtreg lnturn PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_tre 
> at_Foreign p_treat_SpecialSO,fe vce(robust) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      4816 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0348                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.1105                                        avg =       7.0 
       overall = 0.0848                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(7,687)           =      7.83 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2492                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 688 clusters in number) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |               Robust 
           lnturn |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PostTreatment |   .1792926   .1169584     1.53   0.126    -.0503462    .4089313 
      p_treat_Man |  -.1038937    .110401    -0.94   0.347    -.3206576    .1128703 
     p_treat_Serv |  -.1405732   .1224842    -1.15   0.251    -.3810615    .0999151 
      p_treat_Reg |  -.0227193   .0826423    -0.27   0.783     -.184981    .1395425 
   p_treat_Export |   .1177943    .084066     1.40   0.162    -.0472628    .2828514 
  p_treat_Foreign |  -.1494783   .1262648    -1.18   0.237    -.3973896    .0984329 
p_treat_SpecialSO |   .3193365   .0792919     4.03   0.000      .163653    .4750199 
            _cons |   9.475743   .0054459  1739.99   0.000     9.465051    9.486436 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          sigma_u |  1.6734936 
          sigma_e |  .24923323 
              rho |  .97830117   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
. 
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Appendix 12: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation  
 
 
. xtserial lnturn PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_ 
> treat_Foreign p_treat_SpecialSO 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     687) =     61.658 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
. 
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Appendix 13: Results of the dynamic linear regression model of order 
one - fixed effects  
 
. xtreg lnturn PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_Forei 
> gn p_treat_SpecialSO L_lnturn L_PostTreatment L_p_treat_Man L_p_treat_Serv L_p_treat_Reg L_p 
> _treat_Export L_p_treat_Foreign L_p_treat_SpecialSO , fe i(number) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      4815 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0628                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.5240                                        avg =       7.0 
       overall = 0.4203                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(15,4112)         =     18.36 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.6089                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             lnturn |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      PostTreatment |   .1045879   .0422953     2.47   0.013     .0216663    .1875096 
        p_treat_Man |  -.0405111   .0565242    -0.72   0.474    -.1513292     .070307 
       p_treat_Serv |   -.178536   .0666415    -2.68   0.007    -.3091894   -.0478826 
        p_treat_Reg |  -.0952584   .0600886    -1.59   0.113    -.2130645    .0225477 
     p_treat_Export |   .1758347   .0531311     3.31   0.001      .071669    .2800004 
    p_treat_Foreign |  -.1109565   .0648847    -1.71   0.087    -.2381655    .0162526 
  p_treat_SpecialSO |   .2543892   .0650759     3.91   0.000     .1268053    .3819732 
           L_lnturn |    .034734   .0049835     6.97   0.000     .0249635    .0445044 
    L_PostTreatment |   .1389322   .0325839     4.26   0.000     .0750501    .2028142 
      L_p_treat_Man |  -.0547916   .0418858    -1.31   0.191    -.1369105    .0273274 
     L_p_treat_Serv |   .0888871   .0515007     1.73   0.084    -.0120822    .1898563 
      L_p_treat_Reg |   .1186665   .0480145     2.47   0.013     .0245321     .212801 
   L_p_treat_Export |  -.0858304   .0397752    -2.16   0.031    -.1638114   -.0078494 
  L_p_treat_Foreign |  -.0752636   .0500692    -1.50   0.133    -.1734263     .022899 
L_p_treat_SpecialSO |   .0415587   .0487719     0.85   0.394    -.0540605    .1371779 
              _cons |   9.137265   .0473351   193.03   0.000     9.044462    9.230067 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            sigma_u |  1.6173321 
            sigma_e |  .24583401 
                rho |  .97741782   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(687, 4112) =    60.85           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. 
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Appendix 14: Results of the dynamic linear regression model of order 
one - OLS 
 
 
. reg lnturn PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_Foreign 
>  p_treat_SpecialSO L_lnturn L_PostTreatment L_p_treat_Man L_p_treat_Serv L_p_treat_Reg L_p_t 
> reat_Export L_p_treat_Foreign L_p_treat_SpecialSO 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4815 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,  4799) = 1303.64 
       Model |  11307.3012    15  753.820082           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2774.99535  4799  .578244499           R-squared     =  0.8029 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8023 
       Total |  14082.2966  4814  2.92527972           Root MSE      =  .76042 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             lnturn |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      PostTreatment |  -.0965941   .0955376    -1.01   0.312    -.2838916    .0907034 
        p_treat_Man |   .3209574   .1236203     2.60   0.009     .0786049    .5633099 
       p_treat_Serv |  -.3888244   .1513075    -2.57   0.010    -.6854564   -.0921924 
        p_treat_Reg |   .2541499   .1399722     1.82   0.069    -.0202598    .5285596 
     p_treat_Export |   .2662116   .1171831     2.27   0.023     .0364791    .4959442 
    p_treat_Foreign |   .4258836   .1477717     2.88   0.004     .1361834    .7155838 
  p_treat_SpecialSO |   .5911001   .1431172     4.13   0.000     .3105247    .8716755 
           L_lnturn |   .8832728   .0068044   129.81   0.000      .869933    .8966126 
    L_PostTreatment |   .2336785   .0955653     2.45   0.015     .0463268    .4210303 
      L_p_treat_Man |  -.3005087   .1237769    -2.43   0.015    -.5431681   -.0578493 
     L_p_treat_Serv |   .5016198   .1513076     3.32   0.001     .2049876    .7982519 
      L_p_treat_Reg |  -.2790673   .1399952    -1.99   0.046    -.5535221   -.0046124 
   L_p_treat_Export |  -.2541349   .1172571    -2.17   0.030    -.4840125   -.0242573 
  L_p_treat_Foreign |  -.5120196   .1477696    -3.46   0.001    -.8017158   -.2223234 
L_p_treat_SpecialSO |  -.4625487   .1431908    -3.23   0.001    -.7432683   -.1818292 
              _cons |   1.084853   .0645638    16.80   0.000     .9582785    1.211428 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 15: CFR tests from Fixed Effects and OLS  
 
After fixed effects: 
 
. testnl  -_b[L_PostTreatment]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_PostTreatment] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        2.11 
              Prob > F =        0.1324 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Man]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Man] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        1.90 
              Prob > F =        0.1684 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        2.72 
              Prob > F =        0.0994 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Reg]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Reg] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Reg] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Reg] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        6.03 
              Prob > F =        0.1141 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Export]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Export] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        4.22 
              Prob > F =        0.1401 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        2.62 
              Prob > F =        0.1056 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
            F(1, 4112) =        1.13 
              Prob > F =        0.2883 
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After OLS: 
 
. testnl  -_b[L_PostTreatment]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_PostTreatment] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        6.12 
              Prob > F =        0.0134 
 
 
 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Man]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Man] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        0.05 
              Prob > F =        0.8213 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        2.68 
              Prob > F =        0.1017 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Reg]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Reg] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Reg] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Reg] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        0.39 
              Prob > F =        0.5326 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Export]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Export] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        0.07 
              Prob > F =        0.7886 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        2.19 
              Prob > F =        0.1389 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO]=_b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO] = _b[L_lnturn]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
            F(1, 4799) =        0.46 
              Prob > F =        0.4975 
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Appendix 16: Results - unobserved components model  
 
. xtregar lnturn PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_For 
> eign p_treat_SpecialSO 
 
RE GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances       Number of obs      =      4816 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0339                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.1123                                        avg =       7.0 
       overall = 0.0871                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =    105.32 
corr(u_i, Xb)      = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           lnturn |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PostTreatment |   .1283409   .0421614     3.04   0.002      .045706    .2109757 
      p_treat_Man |  -.0793982   .0550769    -1.44   0.149    -.1873468    .0285505 
     p_treat_Serv |  -.1247654   .0663282    -1.88   0.060    -.2547662    .0052354 
      p_treat_Reg |  -.0242529   .0619287    -0.39   0.695     -.145631    .0971252 
   p_treat_Export |   .1596424   .0530319     3.01   0.003     .0557017    .2635831 
  p_treat_Foreign |  -.1568557   .0654376    -2.40   0.017    -.2851112   -.0286003 
p_treat_SpecialSO |   .3430197   .0639552     5.36   0.000     .2176699    .4683695 
            _cons |   9.484211   .0491733   192.87   0.000     9.387833    9.580589 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           rho_ar |  .34631158   (estimated autocorrelation coefficient) 
          sigma_u |  1.5793656 
          sigma_e |  .32573043 
          rho_fov |  .95919997   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
            theta |  .88954545 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 17: regression results of specification 6.17 
 
. xtreg lnemp PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_Foreig 
> n p_treat_SpecialSO, fe i(number) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      4752 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0951                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0671                                        avg =       6.9 
       overall = 0.0319                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(7,4057)          =     60.94 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2528                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PostTreatment |  -.4515769   .0302895   -14.91   0.000    -.5109609   -.3921929 
      p_treat_Man |   .1543467   .0400249     3.86   0.000      .075876    .2328174 
     p_treat_Serv |   .1859877   .0473669     3.93   0.000     .0931225    .2788529 
      p_treat_Reg |   .1100795   .0446005     2.47   0.014      .022638    .1975211 
   p_treat_Export |   .1405723   .0392054     3.59   0.000     .0637082    .2174364 
  p_treat_Foreign |  -.1062121    .047157    -2.25   0.024    -.1986657   -.0137586 
p_treat_SpecialSO |   .0567967   .0465997     1.22   0.223    -.0345643    .1481577 
            _cons |   2.015133   .0038094   528.99   0.000     2.007664    2.022601 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          sigma_u |  1.4709846 
          sigma_e |  .21516788 
              rho |  .97905191   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(687, 4057) =   256.19           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. 
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Appendix 18: Wald test for heteroscedasticity 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (688)  =   4.8e+06 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
 
. 
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Appendix 19: the improved results with robust standard errors  
 
. xtreg lnemp PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_Foreig 
> n p_treat_SpecialSO,fe vce(robust) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      4752 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0951                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0671                                        avg =       6.9 
       overall = 0.0319                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(7,687)           =     25.89 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2528                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 688 clusters in number) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |               Robust 
            lnemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PostTreatment |  -.4515769   .0427878   -10.55   0.000    -.5355874   -.3675664 
      p_treat_Man |   .1543467   .0642062     2.40   0.016     .0282827    .2804107 
     p_treat_Serv |   .1859877   .0889929     2.09   0.037     .0112569    .3607185 
      p_treat_Reg |   .1100795   .0657173     1.68   0.094    -.0189513    .2391103 
   p_treat_Export |   .1405723   .0652195     2.16   0.031     .0125189    .2686258 
  p_treat_Foreign |  -.1062121   .0763348    -1.39   0.165    -.2560896    .0436653 
p_treat_SpecialSO |   .0567967   .0680826     0.83   0.404    -.0768781    .1904716 
            _cons |   2.015133   .0034022   592.30   0.000     2.008453    2.021813 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          sigma_u |  1.4709846 
          sigma_e |  .21516788 
              rho |  .97905191   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. 
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Appendix 20: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
 
. xtserial lnemp PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_For 
> eign p_treat_SpecialSO 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     687) =    309.869 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
. 
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Appendix 21: Results of the dynamic linear regression model of order 
one - fixed effects 
  
. xtreg lnemp PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_Foreig 
> n p_treat_SpecialSO L_lnemp L_PostTreatment L_p_treat_Man L_p_treat_Serv L_p_treat_Reg L_p_t 
> reat_Export L_p_treat_Foreign L_p_treat_SpecialSO , fe i(number) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      4721 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1157                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.2181                                        avg =       6.9 
       overall = 0.1580                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(15,4018)         =     35.05 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.3274                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              lnemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      PostTreatment |  -.3843119   .0369688   -10.40   0.000    -.4567911   -.3118326 
        p_treat_Man |   .0652204   .0492676     1.32   0.186    -.0313714    .1618122 
       p_treat_Serv |   .1394663   .0580083     2.40   0.016      .025738    .2531947 
        p_treat_Reg |   .1183267   .0522397     2.27   0.024     .0159079    .2207455 
     p_treat_Export |   .1202575   .0461591     2.61   0.009     .0297601     .210755 
    p_treat_Foreign |   -.189297   .0565703    -3.35   0.001    -.3002062   -.0783879 
  p_treat_SpecialSO |   .1174001   .0565265     2.08   0.038     .0065767    .2282235 
            L_lnemp |   .0534862   .0059555     8.98   0.000       .04181    .0651623 
    L_PostTreatment |  -.0619667   .0286534    -2.16   0.031    -.1181433   -.0057902 
      L_p_treat_Man |   .0982729    .036629     2.68   0.007     .0264597    .1700861 
     L_p_treat_Serv |   .0366004   .0448146     0.82   0.414    -.0512611    .1244619 
      L_p_treat_Reg |  -.0078062   .0418703    -0.19   0.852    -.0898951    .0742827 
   L_p_treat_Export |  -.0141667   .0345999    -0.41   0.682    -.0820017    .0536684 
  L_p_treat_Foreign |   .0896588    .043956     2.04   0.041     .0034807    .1758369 
L_p_treat_SpecialSO |  -.1147822   .0425231    -2.70   0.007     -.198151   -.0314134 
              _cons |   1.922914     .01255   153.22   0.000     1.898309    1.947519 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            sigma_u |  1.4025277 
            sigma_e |  .21342078 
                rho |  .97736873   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(687, 4018) =    41.61           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. 
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Appendix 22: Results of the dynamic linear regression model of order 
one - OLS 
 
. reg lnemp PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_Foreign  
> p_treat_SpecialSO L_lnemp L_PostTreatment L_p_treat_Man L_p_treat_Serv L_p_treat_Reg L_p_tre 
> at_Export L_p_treat_Foreign L_p_treat_SpecialSO 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4721 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,  4705) = 1776.99 
       Model |  8413.59523    15  560.906349           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1485.13243  4705  .315649825           R-squared     =  0.8500 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8495 
       Total |  9898.72766  4720  2.09718806           Root MSE      =  .56183 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              lnemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      PostTreatment |  -.2944318   .0710517    -4.14   0.000    -.4337265   -.1551371 
        p_treat_Man |   .0397174    .091726     0.43   0.665    -.1401084    .2195432 
       p_treat_Serv |   .0215707   .1120055     0.19   0.847    -.1980125     .241154 
        p_treat_Reg |   .2826231   .1035463     2.73   0.006     .0796238    .4856224 
     p_treat_Export |   .1067894   .0867404     1.23   0.218    -.0632623    .2768412 
    p_treat_Foreign |   .1039363   .1100031     0.94   0.345    -.1117213     .319594 
  p_treat_SpecialSO |    .710603   .1060054     6.70   0.000     .5027828    .9184233 
            L_lnemp |   .9071606   .0062727   144.62   0.000     .8948631     .919458 
    L_PostTreatment |    .308028   .0712682     4.32   0.000     .1683089    .4477471 
      L_p_treat_Man |   .0422598   .0920945     0.46   0.646    -.1382885    .2228081 
     L_p_treat_Serv |   .0773011   .1121417     0.69   0.491    -.1425491    .2971512 
      L_p_treat_Reg |  -.3412495   .1036181    -3.29   0.001    -.5443894   -.1381096 
   L_p_treat_Export |   .0070098   .0869138     0.08   0.936    -.1633819    .1774016 
  L_p_treat_Foreign |  -.1490354   .1105096    -1.35   0.178     -.365686    .0676152 
L_p_treat_SpecialSO |   -.661833   .1061047    -6.24   0.000    -.8698479   -.4538181 
              _cons |   .1723937     .01432    12.04   0.000     .1443198    .2004676 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. 
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Appendix 23: CFR tests from Fixed Effects and OLS 
 
After fixed effects: 
 
 
. testnl  -_b[L_PostTreatment]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_PostTreatment] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        2.99 
              Prob > F =        0.2127 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Man]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Man] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        1.37 
              Prob > F =        0.1938 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        1.04 
              Prob > F =        0.3068 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Reg]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Reg] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Reg] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Reg] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        0.00 
              Prob > F =        0.9709 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Export]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Export] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        0.05 
              Prob > F =        0.8167 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        3.52 
              Prob > F =        0.0607 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
            F(1, 4018) =        3.07 
              Prob > F =        0.0979 
 
. 
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After fixed OLS: 
 
. testnl  -_b[L_PostTreatment]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_PostTreatment] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[PostTreatment] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        0.83 
              Prob > F =        0.3615 
 
 
 
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Man]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Man] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Man] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        1.95 
              Prob > F =        0.1631 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Serv] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Serv] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        1.81 
              Prob > F =        0.1784 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Reg]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Reg] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Reg] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Reg] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        1.70 
              Prob > F =        0.1928 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Export]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Export] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Export] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        3.85 
              Prob > F =        0.0497 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_Foreign] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_Foreign] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        0.64 
              Prob > F =        0.4237 
 
.  
. testnl  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO]=_b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
  (1)  -_b[L_p_treat_SpecialSO] = _b[L_lnemp]*_b[p_treat_SpecialSO] 
 
            F(1, 4705) =        0.07 
              Prob > F =        0.7932 
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Appendix 24: Results of the unobserved components model 
 
. xtregar lnemp PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_Fore 
> ign p_treat_SpecialSO 
 
RE GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances       Number of obs      =      4752 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0913                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0220                                        avg =       6.9 
       overall = 0.0081                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(8)       =    181.16 
corr(u_i, Xb)      = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.7886   0.8439     0.8439     0.8439   0.8439 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PostTreatment |  -.4054415   .0389178   -10.42   0.000     -.481719   -.3291639 
      p_treat_Man |    .160112    .050684     3.16   0.002     .0607733    .2594508 
     p_treat_Serv |   .1870905   .0613262     3.05   0.002     .0668933    .3072877 
      p_treat_Reg |   .1028738    .057125     1.80   0.072    -.0090891    .2148367 
   p_treat_Export |   .1657226   .0485954     3.41   0.001     .0704773    .2609678 
  p_treat_Foreign |   -.093397   .0603534    -1.55   0.122    -.2116875    .0248934 
p_treat_SpecialSO |   .1311398   .0588193     2.23   0.026     .0158561    .2464234 
            _cons |   1.982374   .0356671    55.58   0.000     1.912468     2.05228 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           rho_ar |  .44190604   (estimated autocorrelation coefficient) 
          sigma_u |  1.2766404 
          sigma_e |  .32986715 
          rho_fov |  .93741465   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 25: Results of the unobserved components model (model 
extension) – sales as dependent variable  
 
 
. xtregar lnturn PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_For 
> eign p_treat_SpecialSO YRT6 YRT7 
 
RE GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances       Number of obs      =      4816 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0513                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.1113                                        avg =       7.0 
       overall = 0.0798                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =    156.75 
corr(u_i, Xb)      = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           lnturn |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PostTreatment |    .072435   .0425914     1.70   0.089    -.0110426    .1559126 
      p_treat_Man |  -.0766299   .0546091    -1.40   0.161    -.1836617     .030402 
     p_treat_Serv |  -.1388687   .0657702    -2.11   0.035    -.2677759   -.0099615 
      p_treat_Reg |  -.0293607   .0613947    -0.48   0.632    -.1496921    .0909706 
   p_treat_Export |   .1637911   .0526039     3.11   0.002     .0606893    .2668929 
  p_treat_Foreign |  -.1619078    .064874    -2.50   0.013    -.2890586    -.034757 
p_treat_SpecialSO |   .3453786   .0634148     5.45   0.000     .2210879    .4696693 
             YRT6 |   .1286123   .0255912     5.03   0.000     .0784544    .1787702 
             YRT7 |   .1920416   .0286138     6.71   0.000     .1359597    .2481236 
            _cons |   9.481198   .0490638   193.24   0.000     9.385035    9.577362 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           rho_ar |   .3380325   (estimated autocorrelation coefficient) 
          sigma_u |  1.5792026 
          sigma_e |  .32434094 
          rho_fov |  .95952525   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
            theta |  .89110335 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 26: Results of the unobserved components model (model 
extension) – employment as dependent variable 
 
 
. xtregar lnemp PostTreatment p_treat_Man p_treat_Serv p_treat_Reg p_treat_Export p_treat_Fore 
> ign p_treat_SpecialSO YRT6 YRT7 
 
RE GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances       Number of obs      =      4752 
Group variable: number                          Number of groups   =       688 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0920                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0214                                        avg =       6.9 
       overall = 0.0077                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =    187.18 
corr(u_i, Xb)      = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.7888   0.8440     0.8440     0.8440   0.8440 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PostTreatment |  -.4189661   .0394805   -10.61   0.000    -.4963464   -.3415857 
      p_treat_Man |   .1607786   .0506549     3.17   0.002     .0614968    .2600604 
     p_treat_Serv |   .1842773   .0613163     3.01   0.003     .0640996    .3044551 
      p_treat_Reg |   .1018442   .0570954     1.78   0.074    -.0100607    .2137491 
   p_treat_Export |   .1668884    .048569     3.44   0.001     .0716949    .2620819 
  p_treat_Foreign |  -.0945321   .0603228    -1.57   0.117    -.2127627    .0236985 
p_treat_SpecialSO |   .1314117   .0587853     2.24   0.025     .0161947    .2466287 
             YRT6 |   .0154415     .02287     0.68   0.500     -.029383    .0602659 
             YRT7 |   .0612851   .0265882     2.30   0.021     .0091732     .113397 
            _cons |   1.981266   .0356725    55.54   0.000     1.911349    2.051183 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           rho_ar |  .44193879   (estimated autocorrelation coefficient) 
          sigma_u |  1.2752056 
          sigma_e |  .32927219 
          rho_fov |  .93749448   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
